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Essays on Corporate Hedging: an overview 
1 Corporate hedging 
Corporate hedging should be understood far more broadly than as the use of financial 
derivatives to hedge specific risks in the firm’s cash flow. Concern for risks is reflected in 
investment and portfolio decisions, financing decisions, decisions on payout policies, as well 
as in the decision on whether to use financial derivatives or not. This is not to say that risk 
management subsumes all corporate decision making. Rather, the modern perspective on 
corporate hedging acknowledges that the amount of risk and the capacity to bear risks can be 
influenced through operating, financing, as well as explicit risk management decisions. 
Determining where risks are managed most efficiently is a significant part of the corporate 
hedging decision. 
The fundamental risk choice for a firm is the selection of its operating policy. Were there 
no financial market imperfections, operating policy could be determined without a special 
concern for risks, and financing and risk management decisions would follow from the choice 
of operating policy. This separation is implied by the Modigliani-Miller (MM) theorems 
(1958, 1961). A corresponding separation takes place when there is no operational flexibility, 
say because the operating policy is fixed by external constraints. In both cases, financing and 
risk management policies are determined as optimal reactions to the given operating policy. 
Given a fixed operating policy, a corporate may hedge through all of the following 
financial decisions (this is by no means a complete list): a financial risk management policy 
which smoothens fluctuations in the firm’s earnings (Froot et al., 1993); a debt choice which 
takes into account earnings risks and the expected costs from financial distress (Leland, 
1994); a choice of dividend policy which delays dividends and accumulates buffer stocks of 
capital to control for the probability of bankruptcy (Milne and Robertson, 1996). These 
examples are to emphasize that even when the operating policy is taken as given, risk 
management with financial derivatives is only one way to hedge. Capital structure choice, 
payout policies, and liquidity management matter alike. In many cases, some of these non-
explicit risk management tools may be more effective than risk management through financial 
 derivatives, and in other cases financial derivatives may not be available at favorable terms to 
the risk management needs of the particular firm. 
In the other extreme, the firm may have considerable operating flexibility, while the 
firm’s financial flexibility may be very limited due to severe financial market imperfections. 
Then the choice of operating policy will be largely dictated by financial constraints, and 
corporate hedging will have a very operational content. In particular, many strategic decisions 
can be thought to take place between several mutually exclusive operating policies that are 
each associated with a distinct combination of risk and return. The concern for volatility 
induced by the financial constraints will be reflected in the choice of operating policy. An 
example of this type of corporate hedging analysis is Radner and Shepp (1996). 
Arguably, most firms will be located between these two extremes, possessing some 
financial as well as operational flexibility. Financial constraints will be reflected in the choice 
of operating policy, while constraints on operational adjustment will impose restrictions on 
feasible financial policies. Whether risks are managed through operational adjustment or 
financial adjustment will ultimately depend on the degree of financial flexibility in contrast to 
operational flexibility. 
2 Literature on corporate hedging 
Corporate hedging in the presence of linear investor utility is usually motivated by some type 
of financial market imperfections. The modern corporate hedging literature is reviewed in the 
following, organized according to the type of market imperfection. 
Smith and Stulz (1985) show how taxes create a motive for corporate hedging. When the 
effective tax function is convex in income, a firm may reduce its expected tax liability by 
smoothing its income. This argument is essentially an application of Jensen’s inequality. 
Within the same framework, Smith and Stulz show that the optimal degree of hedging 
depends on the cost of hedging. 
Froot et al. (1993) show how costly external capital motivates corporate hedging. The 
cost of external capital may exceed the cost of internally generated funds due to informational 
asymmetries. Hedging adds value by ensuring that the firm has sufficient internal funds to 
take advantage of attractive investment opportunities. In the presence of costly external 
 capital the firm may underinvest if internally generated funds fall short of profitable 
investment opportunities. Financial derivatives can be used to shift internally generated funds 
into those states and times when they are most needed, i.e. when profitable investment 
projects requiring large capital investments need to be undertaken. This principle determines 
optimal risk management strategies. 
Froot and Stein (1998), building on the model of Froot et al. (1993), show how costly 
external capital and incompleteness of capital markets influence capital budgeting and capital 
structure choice in corporations and financial institutions in particular. Non-traded risks need 
to be priced according to each bank’s internal valuation of cash flows. A bank’s ability to 
absorb losses depends on its capital structure. Hedging against non-traded risks can only be 
accomplished through adjustment of capital structure, i.e. reduction in leverage. The cost of 
this hedging, the value of lost tax benefits, has to be passed on to the pricing of the risks. 
Alternatively, when the adjustment of capital structure is very costly, the bank may invest less 
aggressively in non-traded risks. Hedging of those risks that are traded will increase the 
bank’s tolerance of leverage and adds value since tax benefits of debt may be taken advantage 
of. Investment choices, capital structure choices, and risk management choices in this theory 
are jointly and endogenously determined. 
A significant synthesis of capital structure theory was achieved by Leland (1994) (also 
Leland, 1998), who examined the joint determination of corporate capital structure and 
corporate debt values. Methodologically, Leland’s model is an extension of the classical 
Merton (1974) model of the firm. Optimal capital structure is influenced by firm risk, taxes, 
and bankruptcy costs, like in the classical theories, but also by the valuation of corporate debt, 
which in turn depends on the capital structure of the firm. Leland therefore accounts for the 
endogenuity of debt values within the context of the problem of determining the optimal 
capital structure. Equity holders may also choose the timing of bankruptcy optimally to 
maximize the valuation of levered equity, so that operational flexibility is present in this 
model as well. Leland (1994) essentially brings together three branches of literature: i) the 
classical literature on optimal capital structure that deals with taxes and bankruptcy costs, ii) 
the literature on the valuation of risky debt in structural models, initiated by Merton (1974), 
and iii) the literature on endogenous termination of operations (Brennan and Schwartz, 1985, 
Dixit, 1989). 
 Mello and Parsons (2000) analyze optimal hedging strategies in the presence of an 
exogenous borrowing constraint. Optimal hedges are shown to have the feature that they 
minimize the variability in the marginal value of the firm’s cash balances. They do this by 
transferring cash from states in which the marginal value of cash balances is low to states 
where the marginal value of cash balances is at its highest. In the presence of stochastic 
factors affecting firm profitability, the marginal value of the firm’s cash balances is not 
perfectly correlated with the firm’s actual cash balances. Therefore optimal hedging generally 
differs from hedging the firm’s cash flow. The same holds for other commonly used hedging 
strategies, such as hedging firm value or hedging sales revenues. 
Corporate dividend policies and risk choices in the presence of liquidity constraints have 
been analyzed e.g. by Milne and Robertson (1996), Radner and Shepp (1996), and Hojgaard 
and Taksar (1999). In these models, firms generate buffer stocks of liquid assets by delaying 
dividend payments. Hedges can be simultaneously undertaken to control for the drift and the 
volatility of the firm’s cash flow. Optimal dividend policies and risk reduction strategies are 
jointly determined. They have the feature that most risk reduction takes place when the capital 
stock is close to the firm’s liquidation point, while dividends are only paid once the capital 
stock exceeds an endogenously determined safety level. When the capital stock is at the 
dividend barrier, the firm is locally risk neutral and is run at the risk level delivering maximal 
expected profits. 
The models cited above demonstrate that investment, financing, and payout decisions 
may be driven by the concern to reduce volatility or the firm’s sensitivity to volatility, so that 
there can be a hedging element to each of these decisions. Moreover, hedging considerations 
may be reflected in these financial and operating decisions even if financial derivatives are 
present. 
Besides the general literature on corporate hedging cited above, there are several research 
streams which analyze the implementation or construction of hedges in specific contexts. 
First, the classical literature on the mechanics of hedging for risk (variance) averse agents 
concentrates on hedging by futures (e.g. Anderson and Danthine, 1981, Stulz, 1984). 
Corporate hedging of this type is only a part of corporate financial policy. Second, the plain 
term ‘hedging’ in the asset pricing literature refers to the process of replication, i.e. the 
manufacturing of more complex financial payoffs from more simple ones through dynamic 
 trading based on Merton’s (1973) idea. This is a literature that to a large extent takes the 
hedging objective as given, and as such is detached from the corporate hedging literature that 
is concerned with the principles that determine the optimal method and degree of hedging. 
3 Overview of the essays 
The essays in this collection study both financial and operational hedging from a theoretical 
point of view. Essays 1 to 3 analyze hedges that are implemented through adjustment of 
financial policies. Essay 1 studies optimal dividend and capital raising policies for a firm 
which faces an exogenous minimum capital requirement. Essay 2 studies a similar firm but 
subject to different capital market imperfections. Essay 3 analyzes banks’ choice of capital 
buffers under the proposed new Basel Capital Accord. Essays 4 and 5 analyze hedges which 
are operational in nature. Essay 4 analyzes the value of collateral as a hedging instrument for 
banks. Essay 5 studies models where operational flexibility is related to an option to abandon 
and to restart operations at a given cost. With the exception of essay 3, the essays share a 
common methodology in that uncertainty is represented by continuous time diffusion 
processes. 
The essays are motivated by pragmatic issues that risk management professionals in 
corporates and banks are currently facing. In particular, essay 2 is an attempt to test whether 
current levels of bank capitalization are adequate from the perspective of a fully optimizing 
model of bank behavior. Essay 3 is strongly motivated by the ongoing changes in banking 
regulation and the speculated increases in required bank capital. Essay 4 is an attempt to 
enrich the theoretical literature on defaultable loan pricing by drawing on common bank 
practices. 
Essay 1: Dividends, costly external capital, and firm value: the case of constant scale 
This essay studies optimal dividend and capital raising policies for a constant scale firm 
operating under a minimum capital requirement. The capital requirement states that the firm 
at all times must have a positive stock of capital to absorb potential losses from the productive 
activity, if the firm is to continue operating as a going concern. The productive asset is 
completely illiquid, so that extra capital can not be obtained through liquidating the 
productive asset. The firm has access to external capital, but raising of external capital is 
 subject to a proportional cost and can only take place at a bounded rate. The minimum capital 
requirement, together with these capital market imperfections, induces the firm to maintain 
buffer stocks of capital. Dividends are paid out of the capital stock, but only to the extent that 
the optimal buffer stock of capital can be maintained. 
The essay extends the model of optimal dividends studied earlier by e.g. Milne and 
Robertson (1996) and Asmussen and Taksar (1997), by introducing the option to issue new 
capital. The option to issue capital lowers the optimal buffer stock of capital, identified as the 
dividend barrier, by an amount that depends on the severity of the capital market 
imperfections. In the general case, optimal policies are described by two non-zero barriers, 
such that dividends are paid, at maximal admissible rate, when the capital stock is above an 
endogenously determined barrier, and capital is issued, again at maximal admissible rate, 
when the capital stock is below another endogenously determined barrier. The dividend 
barrier exceeds the capital issue barrier by a margin which depends on the cost of capital 
issuance. Severe enough capital market imperfections will cause the firm to abstain from 
issuing external capital altogether. A separate analysis is also provided for all the limiting 
cases where the capital market imperfections vanish. 
The assumption of constant scale abstracts from investment considerations, yielding quite 
explicit results. Yet it is well known that models with decreasing, and ultimately vanishing, 
scale returns generate qualitatively similar optimal policies (Radner, 1998, Alvarez, 2001). 
Moreover, it is shown in an Appendix to this essay that the model can be interpreted as a 
normalized form of a more general model with positive scale effects and time dependent 
profit flow. 
Essay 2: Optimal bank capital with costly recapitalization 
This essay analyzes the same basic model as essay 1, but under different capital market 
imperfections. Here the issuance of new capital is subject to a fixed cost and an 
implementation delay. The fixed cost can be interpreted as a fee to an investment bank 
organizing the capital issue, and the implementation delay represents the time it takes to get 
access to external capital. 
The fixed cost prevents continuous adjustments of the capital stock by means of new 
capital issues. The optimal capital issuance policy is by nature an impulse control policy, so 
 that capital is issued at stopping times which are the first-hitting times of endogenously 
determined barriers. A characterization of the solution in terms of a set of quasi-variational 
inequalities is provided, and a quasi-analytic solution in terms of two barriers which solve a 
pair of non-linear equations is obtained. The limiting cases of the model where the capital 
market imperfections are not present are also solved. The study of the limiting cases reveals 
that the fixed cost is not the characteristic that drives the qualitative results from the model. In 
terms of the qualitative nature of the solution, the delay in organizing the capital issue is more 
fundamental than the fixed cost. This result may have certain methodological value which 
extends outside the particular interpretation of variables in this model. 
The model is calibrated to data on actual bank returns over the period 1994-2001, and is 
found to be unable to explain the high bank capital levels that are observed empirically. This 
failure is partly due to banks’ accounting options for provisioning of expected losses, which 
smoothen banks’ accounting income. The assumption of normally distributed bank returns is 
also counterfactual. In the numerical applications, the model is used with implied bank return 
volatilities analogously to the manner the Black-Scholes formula is used in practice. 
Essay 3: A Value-at-Risk approach to bank capital buffers: an application to Basel II 
This essay analyzes the determination of bank capital in a more realistic institutional setting 
compared to essays 1 and 2. It is assumed that bank capital is determined by a Value-at-Risk 
type criterion which takes into account the volatility in the minimum capital requirement. 
Monte Carlo simulation techniques are then applied to quantify banks’ potential capital 
holdings under the proposed new Basel Capital Accord (Basel Committee, 2001). 
By their design, the minimum capital requirements under the proposed new capital 
regimes will be sensitive to banks’ portfolio quality. A bank’s capital charge will therefore 
vary over time in accordance with its portfolio ratings distribution. Costs associated with 
capital adjustment and portfolio adjustment create a motive for banks to hedge against shocks 
to capital. Holding of buffer capital constitutes the natural hedging vehicle, and in fact the 
only feasible hedging vehicle when the bank’s portfolio is highly illiquid and access to 
external is subject to high costs. Assuming that hedging is based on a targeted confidence 
level, increased volatility in minimum capital requirements will lead to higher capital buffers 
in relative terms, i.e. as a percentage of the minimum requirement. Yet the proposed new 
requirements will simultaneously lower the minimum capital requirements of some banks and 
 increase those of other banks. Therefore, the effect of the regulatory reform on total capital 
held by different banks is not immediately obvious. It is shown in this essay that bank capital 
buffers, as well as banks’ total capital holdings, under the new regime are likely to depend in 
a nontrivial way on the individual banks’ portfolio risk and on the selected capital regime. 
This simulation based analysis is, to the best of the authors' knowledge, the first 
quantitative exploration of the implications of risk sensitive bank capital requirements in a 
stochastic framework and at this level of institutional detail. This is a partial equilibrium 
analysis, however, which takes a bank’s portfolio as given and derives its capital needs based 
on a choice of risk level by the bank’s management. Equilibrium models of the banking sector 
where capital requirements play a role have been recently studied e.g. by Danielsson et al. 
(2001). These models abstract from the accurate description of minimum capital rules and 
bank portfolios that the analysis in this essay is based on. 
Essay 4: A structural model of risky debt with stochastic collateral 
This essay studies a problem of great practical importance in bank risk management, the 
evaluation of the protective value of collateral. The Merton (1974) model of risky debt is 
extended by allowing an explicit collateral value process which is correlated with the asset 
value process that determines default. The model yields a quasi-analytic expression for the 
loss-given-default (LGD). The LGD estimate takes into account the key drivers of recovery in 
the event of bankruptcy: current collateral value, collateral value volatility, and the correlation 
of collateral value with the default probability of the obligor. LGD estimates are frequently 
needed in portfolio credit risk models which are run with constant LGD parameters for 
computational reasons. 
As a second application, the model is used to set collateral requirements on bank loans 
according to a number of criteria which appear to correspond to common bank practices. The 
analysis is based on the observation that a bank can substitute risk sensitive pricing of its 
loans with appropriate adjustment of collateral requirements. This is because sufficient 
protective collateral limits potential losses in the event of default and makes loans 
homogenous in terms of their riskiness to be eligible for a uniform pricing. Casual evidence 
suggests that bank loans in a number of countries are priced in this manner. 
 This essay solves the pattern of collateral requirements implied by the uniform price 
criterion. Then two alternative criteria for setting collateral requirements are studied which 
circumvent the problem of pricing the loan in the first place. These criteria are based on 
limiting the risk from the collateralized exposure in a probabilistic sense. Non-price criteria 
may have practical value in that the pricing of illiquid bank loans is arguably much greater 
challenge than the evaluation of the probabilistic behavior of the exposure and the collateral. 
It is found that one of the probabilistic rules studied yields collateral requirements whose 
qualitative behavior is closely in line with the uniform price criterion. 
Essay 5: On the markup interpretation of optimal stopping rules 
This essay studies models where firms' profitability fluctuates stochastically and operational 
flexibility is present in the form of abandonment and restart options. Firms maximize their 
value through selection of optimal option exercise policies. Exercising the options is costly, 
resulting in behavior which is referred to as hysterisis in the real option literature. 
The models analyzed here have earlier been studied in Dixit (1989) and in Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994). The main goal of this essay is to demonstrate, extending on an idea presented 
by Dixit et al. (1999), that the optimal stopping policies in these models can be characterized 
through first-order conditions that have the markup property familiar from classical producer 
theory. These first-order conditions are arrived at when the objective function of the problem 
is evaluated directly as a function of the unknown stopping barriers. The solution procedure is 
an alternative to the dynamic programming/variational inequality route. It is claimed that in 
many cases the direct route, which relies on an appropriate representation of the objective 
based on renewal arguments, has some clear benefits over the dynamic programming 
approach. The direct route is also very intuitive and as such may have pedagogic value. 
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Essay 1: Dividends, costly external capital, and firm value: the 
case of constant scale 
 
Abstract 
We study optimal dividend and capital raising policies for a constant scale firm 
operating subject to a minimum capital requirement. Operating profits and losses 
drive the firm's capital stock. Owners derive value from the stream of dividends 
distributed out of the capital stock, but the threat of capital shortage constrains 
dividend distribution. Owners may obtain external capital to reduce the 
probability of capital shortage, but recapitalization is subject to proportional cost, 
and can only take place at limited rates. We solve for the optimal policy and the 
resulting firm valuation, and analyze the effects of costly external capital on firm 
value. We identify the conditions on the capital market imperfections under which 
costly recapitalization is optimal, and study the limiting cases of the model as the 
capital market imperfections vanish. Finally we compare capital issues and 
operational risk reductions as alternative methods of hedging against capital 
shortages. 
 
Keywords: dividends, capital issues, firm valuation, proportional cost 
JEL classification: G22, G32 
 
1  Introduction 
A stream of recent research has studied optimal dividend and risk choices for a constant scale 
firm which faces an exogenous minimum capital requirement (Jeanblanc-Pique and Shiryaev, 
1995, Milne and Robertson, 1996, Radner and Shepp, 1996, Asmussen and Taksar, 1997, 
Hojgaard and Taksar, 1999, 2001, Asmussen, Hojgaard, and Taksar, 2000). In these models 
the capital stock in the absence of controls evolves as an arithmetic Brownian motion. 
Dividends are paid out of the capital stock, and the value of the firm is the present value of 
optimally chosen dividends. The basic model of dividend optimization in the absence of risk 
control is treated in Jeanblanc-Pique and Shiryaev (1995), Milne and Robertson (1996) and 
Asmussen and Taksar (1997). Simultaneous risk choice between a finite number of drift-
 volatility coefficient pairs which together satisfy certain monotonicity requirements is 
analyzed in Radner and Shepp (1996). In Hojgaard and Taksar (1999), the volatility of the 
diffusion may be scaled down, in which case the drift is scaled down in the same proportion. 
This risk choice is interpreted as cheap reinsurance for an insurance corporation. Asmussen, 
Hojgaard and Taksar (2000) analyze a variation of the previous called excess-of-loss 
reinsurance. In Hojgaard and Taksar (2001), cheap reinsurance is available, and additionally 
the capital stock earns a possibly stochastic rate of return. 
In this paper we extend the basic model of dividend optimization by allowing for costly 
issues of external equity capital. The value of the firm in our model is the present value of net 
equity distributions, i.e. the present value of the dividend payout less the present value of the 
capital issued. We assume that capital issuance carries a proportional cost, and that capital 
issues can only be implemented at a limited rate. The proportional cost can be interpreted e.g. 
as the fee to an organizer of the capital issue, and the limited rate reflects the time it takes to 
obtain external finance. These capital market imperfections create a motive for buffer stocks 
of capital, the optimal size of which depends on the severity of the imperfections, as well as 
on the characteristics of the firm’s cash flow. We allow dividend payments at unbounded 
rates. 
Both capital issues and risk reductions can be interpreted as risk management tools which 
allow the firm (a bank or an insurance company) to operate with less buffer capital. There is 
usually a cost associated with both types of hedges: capital issues come with a proportional 
cost, while risk reductions as in Radner and Shepp (1996) or Hojgaard and Taksar (1999) 
involve a partial sacrifice of expected profit. Our model yields a decomposition of the firm 
value into the value of the capital issue option and the value of the non-optional firm, and 
enables us to compare the value of capital issues against the value of risk reductions. We 
illustrate these comparisons in Section 4 of this paper. Our analysis also contributes to the 
literature that studies optimal corporate hedging mechanisms in the presence of capital market 
imperfections, in particular in the presence of costly external capital. Froot et al. (1993, 1998) 
e.g. have shown that costly external capital leads to the interaction between investment and 
financing, and creates a motive for risk management1. Our model demonstrates that even in 
                                               
1
 A related work is also Mello and Parsons (2000), who show how a liquidity constraint generates a motive for 
risk management and determines the nature of optimal risk management policies.  
 the absence of investment considerations (our model assumes a fixed portfolio), optimal 
dividend and capital issuance policies depend on the degree of capital market imperfections 
associated with capital issuance. Our model does not capture explicit risk management 
technologies, such as financial derivatives. Risk management takes place by regulating the 
firm's buffer stock of capital through dividends and capital issues. 
The optimal policy in our model, which we obtain by combined regular/singular control 
methods, is of the barrier control type. In particular, for not-too-extreme parameter values 
there exists a positive barrier b1, such that new capital issues are implemented at maximal 
admissible rate when the firm’s capital stock is below b1. The firm starts distributing 
dividends, again at the maximal admissible rate, when the capital stock is above another 
barrier b2. The difference b2 – b1 is positive when the cost of capital issues is positive, 
approaches zero when the cost of capital issues approaches zero, and does not depend on the 
maximal admissible rate of capital issuance. Moreover, as the cost of capital issues exceeds a 
critical barrier, it is no more optimal for the firm to resort to capital issues. In this case the 
optimal policy is described by a single barrier above which dividends are paid. The value of 
the firm then reduces to one of a firm in the absence of the capital issue option. 
The assumption of constant scale in a firm’s operational cash flow could seem overly 
restrictive. We present two arguments in favor of the view that constant scale is a very 
relevant benchmark case. First, we present in the Appendix a model with stationary growth 
which reduces to our model with constant scale through a simple normalization. Second, we 
note here that there are theoretical results which assure that there is some robustness in the 
assumption of constant scale. In particular, Radner and Shepp (1996) have shown that when 
constant scale (in this type of model but without capital issues) is replaced with constant 
returns to scale, the basic problem no longer leads to a reasonable solution, but to one where 
either all capital is paid as dividends immediately (the drift is less than the discount rate), or 
dividends are withhold indefinitely and the value of the objective is infinite (the drift is higher 
than the discount rate). This reflects the mathematical incompatibility of linear discounting 
and constant returns to scale. Moreover, Alvarez (2001) and Radner (1998) have analyzed a 
variation of the basic model with linear utility where technology experiences positive scale 
effects that ultimately converge to a sufficiently low value, and has found that the optimal 
dividend policy is the same type of barrier policy than in the presence of constant scale. 
Constant scale is therefore not a necessary condition for the qualitative results of the model, 
 and qualitatively similar results are obtained from any model with e.g. declining and 
ultimately vanishing returns to scale. 
There is a sizable literature on the singular stochastic control of (arithmetic) Brownian 
motion. The references that are closest to our work have already been mentioned in this 
Introduction. Other areas where singular control has been applied include inventory control 
(Harrison and Taksar, 1983, Harrison, 1985), portfolio optimization under proportional 
transaction costs (Constantinides, 1986, Davis and Norman, 1989), and optimal firing and 
hiring (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990, Shepp and Shiryaev, 1996). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Optimal 
policies and the value function are derived in section 3. Numerical illustrations and 
comparative static analyses are in section 4. Section 5 concludes with a number of remarks 
concerning possible extensions and variations of the model presented here. 
2  The model 
We analyze a firm with a cumulative profit flow Y which evolves according to 
tt dWdtdY σµ += ,         (1) 
where { }0: ≥tWt  is a standard Wiener process, and the parameters µ and σ are positive 
constants. The standard filtration generated by the Brownian motion { }0: ≥tWt  is denoted 
{ }0: ≥tFt . This implies that instantaneous profit flow is non-predictable, and that both 
positive and negative instantaneous profits occur with positive probability. 
A dividend-capital raising policy is a two-dimensional stochastic process ( )SD, , where 
tD  is the cumulative amount of dividends paid up to time t and tS  is the cumulative amount 
of new capital raised up to time t. We denote by Π the set of policies ( )SD,  which are non-
decreasing right-continuous processes, adapted to Ft, satisfy 000 == −− SD , and where St 
satisfies the constraint 
 ∫
=
t
ut dusS
0
,    δ≤≤ ts0  for all t. 
The firm’s capital stock, as a function of a policy ( )SD, , is denoted SDtX ,  and evolves 
according to 
( )
( )( ) ttt
ttt
SD
t
dDdWdts
dSdDdYdX
−+−+=
−+−=
σαµ
α
1
1,
.      (2) 
Any profits and losses feed to the capital stock, dividends are paid out of the capital stock, 
and issues of new equity add to the capital stock. The parameter α ∈ (0,1) is the proportional 
cost rate of external capital. We interpret this so that for each unit of new capital raised, α 
units are used to pay external parties which facilitate the collection of external capital, and 1 - 
α units are retained to accumulate the firm’s capital stock. The initial stock of capital X0 is 
assumed to be non-negative and is generically denoted by x. 
The firm operates until the capital stock for the first time hits zero, i.e. until the stopping 
time 
{ }0:0inf ,
,
≤≥= SDtSD Xtτ , 
where X evolves according to (2). Zero is assumed to be the (normalized) default boundary, 
the violation of which destroys the firm’s potential to continue operating as a going concern. 
Firm value under policy ( )SD, , given an initial capital stock x, is the expected 
discounted present value of dividends less new capital issues until default time 
( ) ( )
∫
−
−
−=
SD
tt
t
SD dSdDeExV
,
0
,
τ
ρ
.       (3) 
where ρ is a positive parameter denoting the excess required return on equity over the riskless 
rate. The value function of the problem is defined by 
( ) ( )xVxV SD
SD
,
,
sup
Π∈
= ,         (4) 
 and corresponds to the value of an optimally managed firm. The problem is to identify V as 
defined in (4) and an optimal policy ( )∗∗ SD ,  such that ( ) ( )xVxV SD ∗∗= , . We note that the 
problem has five parameters (µ, σ, ρ, α, δ). The first two of these describe the profit dynamics 
from the productive technology, the third is the risk premium on equity, and the last two 
describe the capital market imperfections which constrain the acquisition of external capital. 
The model defined by (1-4) describes a firm whose capital dynamics does not depend on 
time or on the size of the firm’s capital stock. Hence there are no returns to scale in our 
model. This firm may be interpreted as a bank which has access to an infinitely elastic supply 
of zero cost (insured) deposits, and which has an illiquid portfolio of a fixed size. This 
interpretation has been suggested by Milne and Whalley (2001) in the context of the same 
basic capital dynamics. The capital dynamics in (2), however, can also be derived from a 
more general capital dynamics which is neither time nor state homogenous, through an 
appropriate normalization. We present this extension of our model in Appendix A, and show 
how (2) and (3) are obtained from the more general model. 
3  Value function and optimal policies 
The problem defined by (4) is a mixed regular and singular control problem. That V is 
concave follows from the linearity of the objective and the linearity of the capital dynamics 
using standard arguments as illustrated e.g. in Hojgaard and Taksar (1999). Assuming that V 
is twice continuously differentiable on (0, ∞), standard dynamic programming arguments (see 
e.g. Fleming and Soner (1993), or Hojgaard and Taksar (1999)) then imply that V satisfies the 
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) variational equation 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0'1,'1''
2
1
maxmax 2
0
=








−



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

−−−++
≤≤
xVsxVxVsxV
s
ραµσ
δ
, x > 0 (5) 
V(0) = 0.          (6) 
Our main task in this section is to construct a twice continuously differentiable, concave 
solution to (5) and (6). We find it useful to separate the analysis of the general case where α ∈ 
 (0, 1) and δ ∈ (0, ∞) from the various limiting cases which are obtained as either α = 1 or α = 
0, or as δ = 0 or δ → ∞. These limiting cases are discussed in section 3.2. 
3.1 The general case α ∈ (0, 1), δ ∈ (0, ∞)  
We seek to construct a concave solution to (5) that satisfies (6). We denote such a solution by 
f. Then f satisfies (5) written in an equivalent form 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0'1,1'1'''
2
1
maxmax 2
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
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

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
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xfsxfxfxfxf
s
αρµσ
δ
,  (7) 
x > 0. We define barriers b1 and b2 in terms of f as 
 ( ) ( ){ }1'1:0inf1 =−≥= xfxb α ,       (8) 
 ( ){ }1':0inf2 =≥= xfxb .        (9) 
By concavity and twice continuous differentiability of f, b1 < b2. We denote by s(x) the 
function that achieves the inner maximum in (7) for any x. Then it follows from the concavity 
of f and (7) that 
( )



>
≤
=
1
1
,0
,
bx
bx
xs
δ
.         (10) 
This implies that optimal policies have the following form: i) capital is issued at the maximal 
admissible rate δ when the capital stock is at or below b1, ii) no controls are applied when the 
capital stock is in the interval (b1, b2), iii) dividends are paid at maximal admissible rate when 
the capital stock is above b2. Since dividends may be paid at an unbounded rate, the process 
for capital is reflected at b2. 
The behavior of f can then be classified into three regions. For 0 < x < b1, f satisfies 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 0'1''
2
1 2
=−−−++ δρδαµσ xfxfxf . 
This has the general solution, denoted f1, 
  ( )
ρ
δ
−+= −+ xdxd ececxf 11 12111 ,       (11) 
where 
 ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]2221 2111 ρσδαµδαµσ +−+±−+−=±d .    (12) 
For b1 < x < b2, f satisfies 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0'''
2
1 2
=−+ xfxfxf ρµσ , 
which has a general solution, denoted f2, 
 ( ) xdxd ececxf −+ += 22 22212 ,        (13) 
where 
 [ ]2222 21 ρσµµσ +±−=±d .       (14) 
For x > b2, f satisfies 
 ( ) 33 cxxf += .         (15) 
We therefore conjecture the following solution to (7) 
 ( )
( )
( )
( )
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<<+=
<<−+=
=
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−+
233
2122212
112111
22
11 0
bxcxxf
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xf xdxd
xdxd ρδ
. 
The five yet unknown constants (c11, c12, c21, c22, c3) and the two endogenous boundaries 
(b1, b2) are to be solved from the value matching and smooth pasting conditions associated 
with the problem (see Dumas (1991) or Dixit (1991) for a discussion of these). We note that 
the + and - signs in the known constants d1+, d1-, d2+, d2- indicate the signs of these constants. 
We will use this information repeatedly below when we derive the signs of the other 
constants. 
 The smooth pasting conditions at b2 are 
 ( ) ( ) 1'' 2322 == bfbf  
 ( ) ( ) 0'''' 2322 == bfbf . 
Solving this system for c21 and c22, and inserting these into (13), yields 
 ( ) ( ) ( )2222 22212 bxdbxd eAeAxf −− −+ += ,       (16) 
 ( )+−+
−
−
=
222
2
21 ddd
dA ,         (17) 
 ( )
−+−
+
−
=
222
2
22 ddd
dA .         (18) 
The signs of the d’s indicate that A21 > 0 and A22 < 0. Then evaluating (16) at b2 yields 
( ) ρµ=+= 222122 AAbf . A value matching condition at b2 now determines c3, so that (15) 
becomes 
 ( ) ( )23 bxxf −+= ρ
µ
. 
When b1 is positive, f2 satisfies the boundary condition ( ) ( ) 112 1' −−= αbf  by definition (8) of 
b1. Substituting (16) into this condition yields an equation that implicitly determines b2 - b1 
 
( ) ( )
α−
=+ −−
−
−−
+
−+
1
1
122122
222221
bbdbbd
edAedA .      (19) 
We cannot solve this explicitly for b2 - b1, but the following lemma establishes the existence 
of a unique positive solution to (19). 
Lemma 1. There exists a unique positive b2 - b1 that solves (19). 
Proof: Define the continuous function g: [0, ∞) → R by 
 ( ) ydyd edAedAyg −+ −
−
−
+ +=
22
222221 .       (20) 
 We record the following properties of g: 1) g(y) > 0 0≥∀ y ; 2) g(0) = 1; 3) g’(0) = 0; 4) 
g’’(y) > 0 0≥∀ y ; 5) g is unbounded. 
1) holds since A21 > 0 and A22 < 0. To show 2) and 3), we evaluate g and g’ at 0 and use the 
expressions for A21 and A22 
 ( ) 10
22
22
22
2
22
2
222221 =
−
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=
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+
−+
−
−+ dd
dd
dd
d
dd
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−+ dd
dd
dd
dddAdAg  
To show 4), we differentiate g twice and determine the signs of the coefficients. 5) follows 
from the fact that the exponential function is unbounded, and –d2- > 0. Properties 3 and 4 
imply that g is increasing, so that for α > 0, g crosses (1-α)-1 at a single point y*(α) > 0, which 
is the value of b2 - b1 that solves (20). End of proof. 
We observe from (19) that b2 - b1 does not depend on δ, but is driven by the cost rate α. 
The next result characterizes the dependence of b2 - b1 on α. 
Lemma 2. b2 - b1 = 0 when α = 0, b2 - b1 is an increasing function of α, and 
( )
∞=∂
−∂
=0
12
αα
bb
. 
Proof: Let g be the function defined in (20). The first claim follows since g(0) = 1. By totally 
differentiating (19) w.r.t. b2 - b1 and α, we obtain 
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( ) ( ) 0'
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1
1
2
12 >
−
=
∂
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∗yg
bb
αα
, 
when α ∈ (0,1), since g’(y) > 0 when y > 0, and y*(α) > 0 when α > 0. The third claim 
follows since g’(0) = 0 and y*(0) = 0. End of proof. 
As α approaches 1, the right-hand side of (19) approaches infinity. The value of b2 - b1 
solving (19) therefore also increases without bound. This solution, however, is valid only for 
those values of α which are consistent with f2 at the dividend barrier b1 being positive. The 
following lemma gives an upper bound on α. 
Lemma 3. f2(b1) > 0 when α < αˆ , where αˆ  is given by 
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dd
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Proof. We know that ( ) ρµ=22 bf  for any b2, and the left-hand side of (19) shows that the 
partial derivative of f2(b1) with respect to (b2 - b1) is negative. Therefore there is a critical 
value b0 for b2 – b1 which yields ( ) 012 =bf . Substituting (16) into this condition yields 
 00202 2221 =+ −+
−− bdbd
eAeA ,        (22) 
from which b0 can be solved explicitly. Since (b2 - b1) is increasing in α, corresponding to b0 
there is a critical value of α, denoted αˆ , such that b0 solves (19) when α is at its critical value, 
i.e. 
 
αˆ1
1
0202
222221
−
=+ −+ −
−
−
+
bdbd
edAedA . 
Substituting in (22) and solving for αˆ  gives (21). End of proof. 
We observe from (21) that αˆ  ∈ (0,1) since –d2- > d2+ > 0. Moreover, αˆ  is a function of 
µ, σ and ρ, but does not depend on δ. This may appear a little surprising. One could a priori 
expect that higher capital issuance rates would cause the firm to tolerate higher costs of 
capital issuance. 
When α equals its critical value, the marginal value of capital at 0 just equals the hurdle 
rate for issuance of costly external capital, (1-α)-1. Figure 1 graphs the critical value αˆ  as a 
function of σ, for selected values of the drift rate µ. The figure indicates that the critical value 
of α is a declining function of the cash flow volatility, and an increasing function of the cash 
flow drift. As volatility converges to zero, the critical value converges to one. The critical 
value is also remarkably high at such values of the drift and the volatility parameters which 
may be deemed typical. When the (µ, σ, ρ) triple is at (1, 2, 0.1), e.g., the critical value for α 
is 0.76, implying that the marginal value of capital at zero is 4.2.  
We continue with the solution of the general case where α < αˆ . Given the solution (16) 
for f2 as a function of b2, we solve c11 and c12 from the smooth pasting conditions at b1, 
 ( ) ( )1211 '' bfbf = , 
  ( ) ( )1211 '''' bfbf = . 
Solving this pair of linear equations for c11 and c12 and inserting these into (11) yields 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
ρ
δ
−+= −− −+ 1111 12111
bxdbxd
eAeAxf ,      (23) 
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Analysis of the signs of the coefficients shows that A11 > 0 and A12 < 0. 
In (24) and (25), b2 - b1 is assumed to be the unique positive solution to (19). b1 is 
therefore the only unknown, and can be determined from the remaining boundary condition 
( ) 001 =f . Substituting (23) into this condition yields an equation that implicitly determines 
b1, 
 
ρ
δ
=+ −+ −− 1111 1211
bdbd
eAeA .        (26) 
The following lemma verifies the existence of a unique solution to (26). 
Lemma 4. A unique solution b1 to (26) exists. The solution is strictly positive when α < αˆ . 
Proof:  We define the function h: R×(0,1) → R by ( ) ( ) ( ) ydyd eAeAyh −+ −− += 11 1211, ααα , where 
A11 and A12 have been defined by (24) and (25), and do not depend on y. The argument 
emphasizes their dependence on α. 
I Existence and uniqueness. We know that A11(α) > 0 and A12(α)  < 0 for all α ∈ (0, 1). 
Differentiation of h w.r.t. y then shows that h1(y, α) < 0 for all y. Moreover, h(y,α) → ∞ as y 
→ -∞, and h(y, α) → -∞ as y → ∞. This implies that for all α ∈ (0, 1), there exists a unique 
y*(α) such that h(y*(α),α) = δ/ρ. 
II Positivity. We note that ( ) 012 >bf  when α < αˆ  by Lemma 3. Because of value matching at 
b1, ( ) ( ) 01211 >= bfbf . Value matching at b1 follows from the smooth pasting conditions at 
 b1. Differentiation of (23), on the other hand, shows that ( ) 0'1 >xf  for all x. This, combined 
with ( ) 001 =f  (condition (26)) and ( ) 011 >bf  implies that b1 is positive. End of proof. 
We have now determined the constants (c11, c12, c21, c22, c3) as explicit functions of the 
endogenous barriers (b1, b2), and the two endogenous barriers (b1, b2) as implicit functions of 
the problem parameters. To summarize, when 0 < α < αˆ , we propose the following solution 
to (7) subject to f(0) = 0, 
 ( )
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,    (27) 
where b1 solves (26), b2 – b1 solves (19), A11 and A12 are given by (24) and (25), and A21 and 
A22 are given by (17) and (18). The next lemma verifies that (27) is a concave solution to (7). 
Lemma 5. f given by (27) is a concave, twice continuously differentiable solution to (7) 
subject to f(0) = 0. 
Proof: We first show that f defined by (27) is concave. We know that f’’(x) = 0 for all x ≥ b2, 
and f is therefore (weakly) concave on [b2, ∞). The smooth pasting conditions at b2 imply that 
f2’’(b2) = 0. Differentiating f2 given by (16) three times, and analyzing the signs of the 
coefficients, shows that f’’’(x) > 0 on (b1, b2). f therefore has an increasing second derivative 
on (b1, b2), which, combined with the fact that f’’(b2) = 0, implies that f’’(x) < 0 on (b1, b2). 
Thus f is concave on (b1, b2). Similar reasoning can be used to establish the concavity of f on 
(0, b1). Differentiating f1 given by (23) three times and using the established fact that A11 > 0, 
A12 < 0, shows that f’’’(x) > 0 on (0, b1). Again, this combined with the fact that f’’(b1) < 0 
because of smooth pasting with f2, implies that f’’(x) < 0 on (0, b1).  
(27) is twice continuously differentiable by construction. By concavity, f’(x) > 1 for x < 
b2, so that 1 - f’(x) < 0 and (27) satisfies (7) for x < b2 by construction. Since f’(x) = 1 for x ≥ 
b2, we need to show that Lsf(x) ≤ 0 for x ≥ b2, for all s ∈ [0, δ], where 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )sxfxfxfxfxfLs 1'1'''
2
1 2
−−+−+= αρµσ . 
Substituting (27) into this, we get 
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for all s ∈ [0, δ]. End of proof. 
By a sufficiency argument similar to the one proved in Hojgaard and Taksar (1999), the 
solution (27) coincides with the value function defined in (4). Moreover, an optimal barrier 
policy exists. We state the result in the following proposition, but will not show the proof 
since the argumentation is essentially identical to the proof in Hojgaard and Taksar (1999). 
Proposition 1. Let 0 < α < αˆ , and f(x) be defined by (27). Then ( ) ( ) ( )xVxVxf SD ∗∗== ,  for 
all x, where ( )∗∗ SD ,  is the policy defined by the system of equations 
 ( ) ( ) ∗−+−++=
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tt
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t DWduXstxX σαµ
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,, 1 , 
2
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, t ≥ 0, 
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=<Ι
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∗
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t
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t dDbX , 
where s(x) is the function defined in (10), and b1 and b2 - b1 are the solutions to (27) and (19). 
3.2 The limiting cases 
We can distinguish three different limiting cases to our model, according to the nature of the 
resulting solution, as the two parameters α and δ describing capital market imperfections 
approach their limiting values. 
Case I: δ = 0 or α ≥ αˆ  
In the limiting case δ = 0 the capital issue option is not available. Also, it was shown in the 
previous section that whenever α is equal or greater to the critical value given by (21), the 
optimal policy does not involve capital issues. In both cases the solution reduces to the special 
case which has been solved by Milne and Robertson (1996), among others. The optimal 
policy is now described in terms of a single barrier b0, which is a reflecting dividend barrier 
 for the capital stock. The barrier b0 satisfies the condition ( ) 002 =f , which is written out in 
(22), and can be solved for b0 explicitly as 
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where d2+ and d2- are as in (14). The resulting value function is 
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Case II: α = 0 
As α → 0, it follows from the definitions (8) and (9) and continuous differentiability of f that 
b2 - b1 → 0. Lemma 2 in fact shows that b2 - b1 = 0 when α = 0, so that the optimal policy in 
this case is characterized by a single barrier b*, above which dividends are paid at unlimited 
rate (so that the process is reflected at b*), and below which new capital is raised at the 
maximal admissible rate δ. The value function and the barrier b* are characterized by the 
following result, whose derivation proceeds as in the general case. 
Proposition 2. Let α = 0. The dividend barrier b* is the unique positive solution to the 
equation 
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and the value function is 
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Case III: δ = ∞ 
As δ increases, the firm’s control on the minimum level of the capital stock improves. In the 
limit, as δ is unbounded, the control on the minimum level of the capital stock is of ‘barrier’ 
type, so that the capital stock is reflected at b1. In this situation the owners would clearly 
prefer to set the barrier b1 as close to zero as possible. Yet the barrier cannot equal zero, since 
this would not be enough to prevent bankruptcy. Unsurprisingly, then, optimal policy does not 
exist in the case where the rate of capital injection is unbounded. 
We can derive the ‘unreachable’ value function by the following heuristic argument. We 
know that when the rate of capital injections is unbounded, the capital injection barrier b1 is 
arbitrarily close to zero. Then a decision to raise a small amount ∆ of new capital at b1 raises 
the capital stock to b1 + (1 - α)∆. Since this is the approximately optimal action at barrier b1, 
the value function at b1 equals the net value from this operation. Thus we have 
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Solving the previous approximate equality for V’(b1), and letting both b1 and ∆ approach zero 
yields 
 ( )
α−
=
1
10'V .          (32) 
The value function in the case δ = ∞ can be found by solving the HJB equation (5) subject to 
the boundary condition (32). The solution, which can be obtained by straightforward 
adaptation of earlier arguments, is given in the following proposition. 
Proposition 3. Let δ = ∞. When α < αˆ , the value function is given by 
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where A21 and A22 are given by (17) and (18), and the dividend barrier bˆ  is the unique 
positive solution to (19). Else, the solution is given by (28) and (29). 
 The condition on α in the proposition means that even though δ approaches infinity, 
capital issues may not be optimally used when the cost rate is sufficiently high. The critical 
value of α is in fact the same as in the general model with finite δ. This is consistent with our 
earlier finding that αˆ  does not depend on δ. When α is below the critical value, the barrier bˆ  
solves the same equation as the difference b2 – b1 in the general model. Also the value 
function (33) is simply a left-shifted version of the value function (27) of the general model 
with finite δ, to the right of b1. In other words, as δ approaches infinity, b1 approaches zero, 
but the difference b2 – b1 remains constant. We noted already in connection with Lemma 2 
that b2 – b1 does not depend on δ. 
We finally look at what happens when α approaches zero and δ simultaneously 
approaches infinity, i.e. both capital market frictions disappear. This limit corresponds to 
frictionless capital markets, and as such is an interesting benchmark. Based on our previous 
results, in this case b2 – b1 approaches zero (due to vanishing α) and b1 approaches zero (due 
to δ approaching infinity). Both b1 and b2 therefore converge to zero, and the optimal policy 
converges to one where the capital stock is trapped at zero indefinitely. Of course, the optimal 
policy in the limiting case does not exist, but ε-optimal policies which keep the capital stock 
(most of the time) between two barriers, set arbitrarily close to each other as well as arbitrarily 
close to zero, can be implemented. The value function in the limiting case is obtained as the 
limit of (31) when b* approaches zero, or alternatively, as a limit of (33) when bˆ  approaches 
zero, and takes the affine form 
 ( ) xxV +=
ρ
µ
. 
4  Numerical illustrations 
4.1 The value of the capital issue option 
The value function (27) is the value of an optimally managed firm which has access to costly 
external capital. The value function (29) is the value of an otherwise identical firm which does 
not have access to external capital. The difference between (27) and (29) is the value of the 
option to issue new capital. 
 Figure 2 illustrates both value functions for different values of the parameter α. The cost 
of capital injections is zero in picture (1), 0.2 in picture (2), 0.4 in picture (3), and 0.6 in 
picture (4). The maximal rate of capital injections in all pictures is equal to the volatility rate. 
The value of the option to issue new capital declines with the cost rate α. This is because the 
value (27) of the firm with the capital issue option declines with the cost rate, while the value 
of the non-optional firm does not depend on the cost rate. 
Figure 3 shows the value of the capital issue option for the cases considered in Figure 2. 
The upper picture shows the absolute value of the capital issue option, while the lower picture 
shows the value of the option as a percentage of the cum-option firm value. Concerning the 
absolute value of the capital issue option, we observe a pattern that appears to be qualitatively 
robust to variations in the parameter values. First, the capital issue option has little value 
when the capital stock is very close to zero. The volatility of a diffusion locally dominates its 
drift, and therefore capital issues which are just changes in the drift of the diffusion process 
for the capital stock, have little effect on near-term bankruptcy probability. At a reasonable 
distance from zero, however, changes in the drift rate begin to have a more significant effect 
on the near-term probability of bankruptcy, and the value of the capital issue option therefore 
increases with the initial capital level. The higher the capital stock, on the other hand, the less 
likely will be near-term bankruptcy, even in the absence of the additional drift due to capital 
issuance. The value of the capital issue option therefore peaks at an intermediate level of the 
capital stock, and then begins to decline, ultimately converging to a non-negative constant. 
Specifically, the value of the capital issue option is constant and equal to b0 – b2 when the 
capital stock is above b0, which is obtained through subtracting (29) from (27). This value is 
non-negative since the barrier b2 in the general model may never exceed the barrier b0 in the 
model without capital issues. This result highlights the fact that the value of the capital issue 
option derives from the ability to advance dividend payments, i.e. to reduce the barrier b2 
relative to the barrier b0. 
The lower part of Figure 3 shows that the value of the capital issue option, as a proportion 
of the cum-option firm value, declines monotonically with respect to the capital stock. We see 
that the option to issue new capital can more than double the firm value when the capital 
stock is low and the cost rate α is not prohibitively high. As the capital stock increases 
without bound, on the other hand, the proportional value of the option converges to zero. This 
is because the absolute value of the option converges to a finite constant (as discussed above) 
 while the value of the firm is unbounded. The proportional value of the option when the 
capital stock is at the dividend barrier b2 measures the value of the capital issue option for an 
optimally capitalized firm. At this point the value of the optional firm is ρµ , while the value 
of the non-optional firm is obtained by evaluating (29) at b2. In the cases α = 0.0 and α = 0.2 
in Figure 3, the corresponding value of the option is 16% and 7%, respectively. These 
percentages represent the portion of firm value attributable to the flexibility to issue new 
capital, for a firm which is optimally capitalized (capital stock equals the dividend barrier). 
4.2  Sensitivity of b1 and b2 to capital market imperfections 
We have shown in the previous section that the optimal policy is to issue capital at the 
maximal admissible rate when the capital stock is below b1, and to pay dividends so as to 
prevent capital stock from rising above b2. The barriers b1 and b2 depend on the magnitude of 
the capital market imperfections described by the parameters α and δ. Here we illustrate this 
dependence. 
Figure 4 shows b1 and b2 as a function of the cost rate α. For a given δ, b2 – b1 is an 
increasing function of α (Lemma 2). Moreover, b2 – b1 does not depend on δ, so that changing 
δ either increases or decreases b1 and b2 by equal amounts, given a fixed α. When α 
approaches its critical value defined in (21) from below, b1 approaches 0 and b2 approaches 
b0. It is noteworthy that αˆ  is the smallest value of α at which b1 equals 0, and also the 
smallest value of α at which b2 equals b0. 
The most surprising aspect of Figure 4 is the fact that b1 may sometimes increase with α. 
In particular, when δ is relatively high, such as the case where δ = 30, there is a region of α-
values over which b1 is increasing. There are two counteracting effects which play a role here. 
On one hand, a larger α makes capital issues more expensive, suggesting that the capital issue 
barrier b1 should be lowered. On the other hand, a larger α means that the net rate of capital 
issuance δ(1-α) is reduced, suggesting an increase in b1. It turns out that for relatively low 
values of δ, the former effect dominates, while for high δ the latter effect may dominate, 
which is what we observe in Figure 4. 
The capital issue barrier b1 is non-increasing with respect to δ in all the cases considered 
in Figure 4, although we have not proven this in general. A higher δ allows the firm to wait 
 longer before initiating capital issues. As δ converges to infinity, the capital issuance barrier 
b1 converges to zero, and the dividend barrier b2 converges to the positive value solving (19). 
This limiting case has been analyzed in Proposition 3. 
4.3  Comparison of capital issues with temporary risk reductions 
In this section we compare the value of capital issues with the value of temporary risk 
reductions, which have been analyzed by Hojgaard and Taksar (HT) (1999). Their basic 
model is the same as in this paper, but instead of capital issues, HT allow the firm to reduce 
the volatility of its cash flow, in which case the drift of the cash flow is reduced 
proportionally. The controlled capital stock in their model evolves according to 
 tttt
Da
t dDdWadtadX −+= σµ, , 
where the coefficient of risk reduction a is allowed to take values in the interval [0, 1]. The 
optimal risk reduction policy in the HT model is the following: for x ∈ [0, u1], 
 ( ) ( )12 −−= γσ
µx
xa  
and for x > u1, a(x) = 1 , where 
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The dividend policy is the same form of barrier policy as in our model, so that every excess 
above boundary u2 is distributed away instantly, where the boundary u2 is given by 
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The value function in the HT model, using our notation, is 
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where A21 and A22 are as defined in (17) and (18). 
Figure 5 plots three value functions: i) the value function of the basic model in the 
absence of risk reductions and capital injections (dotted line), given in (29); ii) the HT value 
function in the presence of risk reductions (broken line), given in (35); iii) the value function 
with capital injections (solid line), given in (27). The option to issue new capital or to reduce 
risk cannot reduce firm value, so that the value functions associated with these alternatives 
dominate the value function of the basic model. Moreover, we observe from Figure 5 that in 
general, neither of the two risk management techniques is superior to each other in terms of 
their effects on firm value. When the maximal rate of capital issuance is low, such as in 
pictures (1) and (3), the value of risk reductions exceeds that of capital issues, irrespective of 
the level of the capital stock. This outcome changes, however, when the maximal rate of 
capital issuance increases. In pictures (2) and (4) new capital may be obtained at a rate that is 
three times the asset volatility rate. Here the value of risk reductions dominates the value of 
capital issues at low capital levels, but at higher levels of the capital stock the situation is 
reversed. It is intuitively clear that risk reductions are relatively most valuable at very low 
levels of the capital stock. This is because the volatility of a diffusion locally dominates its 
drift, and bankruptcy can only be avoided if the diffusion can be turned off. Capital issues 
only control for the drift of the diffusion, and therefore cannot completely eliminate the 
possibility of bankruptcy, given bounded drift rates. Risk reductions, on the contrary, under 
certain conditions are able to completely eliminate bankruptcies (bankruptcy under the 
optimally controlled cash flow process then becomes a zero probability event). 
The probability of bankruptcy under optimal policies can be analyzed with the help of the 
scale function associated with the controlled diffusion. Karlin and Taylor (1981) show that the 
probability of bankruptcy in finite time is zero if the scale function of the diffusion, which in 
the context of our model is defined by 
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, 
takes an infinite value for some x > 0. Hojgaard and Taksar (1999), based on this result, show 
that in their model the probability of bankruptcy in finite time is zero whenever 
 ρ
σ
µ
>2
2
2
. 
It is easy to show that in the model of this paper the scale function is finite for all positive x. 
The controlled capital stock is reflected at a finite barrier b2, has a bounded drift, and a 
volatility coefficient bounded from below. It is well known (and can be shown using the 
methods in Karlin and Taylor, 1981) that under the these conditions the probability of 
bankruptcy in finite time equals 1. 
We finally look at how the dividend barrier in the model with capital issues is related to 
the dividend barrier in the model with risk reductions. Figure 6 provides a comparison of the 
dividend barriers in the three models. The dividend barrier b0 in the basic model is an upper 
bound on the dividend barriers in the models with capital issues and risk reductions. We 
observe that the dividend barrier with risk reductions, u2, is approximately 10% lower than b0. 
These barriers do not depend on α or δ, while the dividend barrier with capital issues b2 is a 
function of both α and δ. As δ increases and α is below its critical value, b2 falls. When α is 
sufficiently low, b2 ultimately (for sufficiently high δ) falls below the barrier u2. The lower is 
α, the lower is the value of δ at which b2 intersects u2. When α is close to the critical value αˆ , 
however, b2 does not fall below u2 even though δ approaches infinity. This is because b2 – b1 
does not depend on δ and will exceed u2 when α is sufficiently close to αˆ . 
5  Extensions 
5.1  Direct bankruptcy costs 
The model in this paper embeds an indirect or opportunity cost of bankruptcy. This is the 
value lost due to irreversible discontinuation of operations which are fundamentally profitable 
on average. We can add direct bankruptcy costs to the model with little added difficulty. Let 
us assume that a positive cost K is incurred upon bankruptcy. The problem structure then 
 remains unchanged, with the exception that the boundary condition upon bankruptcy, V(0) = 
0, is replaced by V(0) = -K. This affects b1 through condition (26), but the condition (19) 
determining b2 - b1 remains unchanged. It is easy to show that b1 is non-decreasing with 
respect to K, which is in line with immediate intuition. 
5.2 Different capital market imperfections 
The proportional cost and the bounded rate of capital issuance may be replaced with 
alternative capital market imperfections. One alternative set of assumptions, consisting of a 
fixed cost of capital issuance and a delay in implementing the capital issue, is analyzed in 
Peura and Keppo (2002). 
 Appendix A 
We present here a model with stationary growth in time, and show how this model, through a 
simple normalization, reduces to the model presented in Section 2. In the extended model, the 
scale of the cumulative profit flow grows at a constant (risk free) rate in time, 
t
rtrt
t dWedteYd σµ +=ˆ ,                 (A1) 
where { }0: ≥tWt  is a standard Wiener process. The parameters µ and σ and the riskless rate r 
are positive constants. 
As in the model of Section 2, a dividend-capital raising policy is a two-dimensional 
stochastic process ( )SD ˆ,ˆ , where tDˆ  is the cumulative amount of dividends paid up to time t, 
and tSˆ  is the cumulative amount of new capital raised up to time t. We denote by Πˆ  the set 
of policies ( )SD ˆ,ˆ  which are non-decreasing right-continuous processes, adapted to Ft, satisfy 
0ˆˆ 00 == −− SD , and where tSˆ  satisfies 
∫
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This implies that the upper bound on the capital issue rate also grows at the risk free rate. The 
firm’s capital stock as a function of policy ( )SD ˆ,ˆ  is denoted SDtX ˆ,ˆˆ  and evolves according to 
( ) tttSDtSDt SdDddYdtXrXd ˆ1ˆˆˆ ˆ,ˆˆ,ˆ α−+−+= − .                (A2) 
The capital stock itself in this model earns the riskfree rate. The dynamics for the capital stock 
in (A2) is neither time nor state homogenous. The initial stock of capital 0ˆX  is assumed to be 
non-negative and is generically denoted by x. 
The firm operates until the capital stock for the first time hits zero, i.e. until the stopping 
time 
{ }0ˆ:0infˆ ˆ,ˆ
ˆ
,
ˆ
≤≥= SDtSD Xtτ , 
 where X evolves according to (2). 
The firm value under policy ( )SD ˆ,ˆ , given an initial capital stock x, is the expected 
discounted present value of dividends less new capital issues until default time 
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where ρ is a positive excess required return on equity, over the risk free rate (we note that 
here the discount rate is different from that in the model of Section 2). The value function of 
the problem is defined by 
( ) ( )xVxV SD
SD
ˆ
,
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ˆˆ
,
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ˆsupˆ
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= ,                   (A4) 
and corresponds to the value of an optimally managed firm. 
We now show how the model defined by (A1-A4) can be reduced to (1-4). In the context 
of the model (A1-A4), we define the normalized capital stock Xt as 
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Also for each policy ( )SD ˆ,ˆ  in Πˆ , we define the corresponding normalized policy ( )SD,  by 
 
∫
−
=
t
u
ru
t DdeD
0
ˆ
, 
∫
−
=
t
u
ru
t SdeS
0
ˆ
, for all t ≥ 0.              (A6) 
We observe from (A6) and the definitions of Πˆ  and Π  that if ( ) Π∈ ˆˆ,ˆ SD  then ( ) Π∈SD, , 
where ( )SD,  has been obtained from ( )SD ˆ,ˆ  through (A6). 
Now applying Ito’s formula to (A5), using (A1), (A2) and (A6), yields 
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 where ( )SD,  has been obtained from ( )SD ˆ,ˆ  through (A6). We also have that xXX == 00ˆ . 
Given (A6), the default times satisfy 
 { } { } SDSDtSDtSD XtXt ,,ˆ,ˆˆ,ˆ 0:0inf0ˆ:0infˆ ττ =≤≥=≤≥= . 
Therefore for any ( )SD ˆ,ˆ  ∈ Πˆ , we can rewrite (A3) as 
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which shows that the value of the objective (A3) in the extended problem, equals the value of 
the objective (3) in the original problem, once the policy ( )SD ˆ,ˆ  has been transformed through 
(A6) into a corresponding normalized policy. Now because ( ) Π∈ ˆˆ,ˆ SD  implies ( ) Π∈SD, , 
we have from (A8) that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )xVxVxVxV SD
SD
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Moreover, we can reverse the reasoning in (A6) and for each normalized policy ( )SD,  in Π  
define the corresponding policy ( ) Π∈ ˆˆ,ˆ SD  by 
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,  for all t ≥ 0.            (A10) 
Then performing the analogous but reverse steps to (A7) and (A8) gives a reverse inequality 
to (A9). This makes it clear that ( ) ( )xVxV ˆ= , where ( )xV  is defined by (4) and ( )xVˆ  is 
defined by (A4). Therefore solving of the time-homogenous constant scale problem (4) also 
yields a solution to the time-dependent problem with constant returns to capital, (A4). 
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 Figure 1. The critical value of α 
The vertical axis is the critical value of α given by formula (21). Fixed parameter value ρ  = 
0.1. αˆ  does not depend on δ. 
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 Figure 2. Firm value with (solid line) and without (dotted line) the capital issue option 
Horizontal axis: initial capital stock x. Vertical axis: firm value. Fixed parameter values: µ = 
1, σ  = 2, ρ = 0.1, δ = 2. Variable problem parameter: α = 0.0 in (1), 0.2 in (2), 0.4 in (3), and 
0.6 in (4). 
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 Figure 3. The value of the capital issue option 
The upper picture shows the absolute value of the option, the lower picture shows the value of 
the option as a percentage of the (cum-option) firm value. Fixed parameter values: µ = 1, σ  = 
2, ρ = 0.1, δ = 2. Given these parameters, b0 equals 5.74. 
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 Figure 4. b1 and b2 as a function of α 
The picture shows the optimal b1 and b2 as a function of α, for given values of δ (legend). 
Fixed parameter values: µ = 1, σ  = 2, ρ = 0.1. The critical α given by formula (21) is 0.76. At 
the critical α, b1 equals 0, and b2 equals the dividend barrier b0, 5.74. 
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 Figure 5. Firm value with the capital issue option (solid line), with the risk reduction 
option (broken line), and without the options (dotted line) 
Horizontal axis: initial capital stock x. Vertical axis: firm value. Fixed parameter values: µ = 
1, ρ = 0.1, α = 0.2. Variable parameters: σ  = 1 in (1) and (2), σ  = 2 in (3) and (4); δ = 1 in 
(1) and (3), δ = 3 in (2) and (4). 
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 Figure 6. Comparison of dividend payment barriers 
The dotted lines are the optimal dividend payment barriers b2 as a function of the maximal 
capital injection rate δ (horizontal axis), at three different values of α (legend). The thin solid 
line is the dividend payment barrier b0 (28), in the basic model with no capital issuance or risk 
reduction option, and the thick solid line is the dividend barrier u2 (34) in the model of 
Hojgaard and Taksar (1999) with risk reductions. Fixed parameter values: µ = 1, σ  = 2, ρ = 
0.1. 
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Essay 2: Optimal bank capital with costly recapitalization 
Joint work with Jussi Keppo* 
 
Abstract 
We study optimal bank capital holdings in a dynamic setting where the bank has 
access to external capital, but this access is subject to a fixed cost and a delay. Our 
model indicates that a recapitalization option may be valuable despite substantial 
fixed costs, and that a significant fraction of the value of low capitalized banks 
may be attributable to the option to recapitalize. When calibrated to data on actual 
bank returns, the model yields capital ratios that are significantly lower than 
actual bank capital ratios. This shortfall is, at least partly, explained by the 
skewness of the distribution of actual bank returns and by the banks’ accounting 
options for the provisioning of credit losses. We operate the model with implied 
bank return volatilities, in the same way as Black-Scholes model is used in 
practice. Analysis of the limiting cases where the capital market imperfections 
vanish reveals that the capital issue delay rather than the fixed cost determines the 
qualitative nature of the solution. 
 
Keywords: bank capital, dividends, capital issues, fixed cost, delay 
JEL classification: G32, G35 
 
1 Introduction 
A general risk management lesson from models with frictions is that, in the absence of 
explicit risk management tools such as financial derivatives, firms may choose to hold buffer 
stocks of liquid assets and capital as hedges against liquidity and earnings risks. The argument 
for the buffer stock role of liquid assets has been theoretically presented and empirically 
verified by e.g. Kim et al. (1998) and Opler et al. (1999), who find that firm liquid asset 
holdings are positively related to cash flow risks. The buffer stock role of equity capital, on 
the other hand, is supported by many empirical studies on capital structure (e.g. Harris and 
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 Raviv, 1990, Booth et al., 2001, and Titman and Wessels, 1988), who find that firm leverage 
is negatively related to earnings volatility. In other words, we observe risk management 
considerations to influence both corporate investment decisions and corporate financing 
decisions1. 
In banks the capital structure decision is in its very essence a risk management decision. 
Capital2 in banks is not predominantly a form of financing, but a buffer against asset risks 
which is needed to ensure the stability of the callable deposit based banking system. Banks 
rely on high leverage to achieve high equity returns, and operate subject to an explicit 
minimum capital requirement. As Froot and Stein (1998) have demonstrated, a bank investing 
in illiquid products may adjust its capital structure in order to accommodate the illiquid risks 
it chooses to bear. Data on banks confirms that they do hold buffer stocks of capital in excess 
of their minimum requirements: in the US, commercial banks' median total capital ratio was 
12.1% in 2001, and the median total capital ratio of even the largest banks (those with capital 
in excess of 3 m$) was over 11% (figures based on Bankscope data). The minimum 
requirement imposed by the Basel Accord is 8%, implying that the median bank capital buffer 
among US commercial banks is in excess of 4%. A qualitative explanation for banks' capital 
holdings could be based on the illiquidity of their asset risks and on some imperfections in 
their capital raising transactions. There are several models in the banking literature which can 
deliver predictions on buffer holdings of capital (a review of these models is given below). 
Yet what appears to be missing from the literature is a calibration of a model of this type to 
data on actual bank returns and risks, and a comparison of the model predictions against 
actual bank capital holdings. In this paper we develop a model of a capital constrained bank 
and perform such calibration. 
Our model of a capital regulated bank is an extension of the Milne and Robertson (1996) 
model of firm dividend policies under the threat of liquidation. In our model, bank equity 
holders optimize over dividend and equity issuance policies in order to maximize the present 
value of net distributions from the bank. Capital regulation is characterized by a strict 
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  By now there is a large literature on the interactions between financing, investment, and risk management in 
the presence of capital market frictions (e.g. Acharya et al., 2000, Froot et al., 1993, Froot and Stein, 1998, 
Leland, 1998, Mello and Parsons, 2000). 
2
 Consistent with common bank parlance, our use of the term bank capital refers to banks' book equity. This is 
the relevant measure of capital in an analysis of bank capital adequacy since minimum capital requirements 
under the Basel Accord apply to book equity.   
 minimum capital requirement, the violation of which results in liquidation and loss of 
continuing value. The bank portfolio is completely illiquid and is of constant size (an 
assumption of constant scale). Because the bank may finance its assets using zero cost 
(insured) deposits, any capital held in the bank carries an opportunity cost. Optimal capital 
level is determined from the trade-off between the opportunity cost of holding capital and the 
expected deadweight costs from liquidation. The bank has access to external (equity) capital, 
but this access is subject to a fixed cost3 and a delay. These capital market imperfections 
influence the level of optimal bank capital. 
The optimal policies in our model are of the barrier control type. Unless the fixed cost or 
the delay in capital issues are too high, there is a positive barrier u1 such that capital issues are 
ordered at the first time the capital buffer is at or below u1. If the bank has not been liquidated 
by the end of the delay, the owners pay the fixed cost K and raise new capital to the amount 
that makes aggregate capital buffer equal to a barrier u2, which is strictly above u1. When 
capital is between u1 and u2, the bank neither pays dividends nor raises additional capital. 
Above the barrier u2, the bank distributes dividends at maximum admissible rate, which in our 
model is assumed infinite, effectively preventing the capital buffer from rising above u2. Both 
the barriers u1 and u2 are sensitive to the degree of capital market imperfections. 
We also solve the limiting cases of our model as the capital market imperfections vanish. 
When the capital issue delay equals zero, an optimal policy does not exist, but we derive the 
limiting value function. When the fixed cost from capital issues converges towards zero, the 
optimal policy does not converge to a degenerate limit, and the optimal policy exists even in 
the limiting case when the fixed cost equals zero. These results imply that the delay in capital 
issues, rather than the fixed cost, determines the qualitative nature of the solution. Moreover, 
as either the fixed cost or the delay are sufficiently high, optimal policies do not involve 
capital issues and our model reduces to the Milne and Robertson model without the capital 
issue option. 
The defining properties of the Milne and Robertson (1996) model (also analyzed in 
Asmussen and Taksar, 1997) are the assumption of constant scale in banking activities and 
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 The cost of raising capital is likely to be positively related to the amount of capital raised. In section 5.4 of this 
paper we show how to determine the fixed cost as a function of the other model parameters so as to give a 
desired expected cost rate in capital issuance.  
 the objective function which is the present value of dividend distributions. We extend the 
model by allowing for equity issues, and redefining the objective function as the present value 
of net distributions. Endogenous determination of bank capital has also been studied using 
other variants of the same basic model. A closely related paper to ours is Milne and Whalley 
(2001), where the basic model is extended with Poisson distributed bank capital audits and a 
fixed cost of recapitalization. In their model, a forced liquidation following bank capital 
violation is replaced by an option to recapitalize, given an observed violation in a randomly 
occurring audit. Hojgaard and Taksar (1999) have extended the basic model into an insurance 
company setting by assuming that risk reduction at a proportional cost is available, which is 
interpreted as cheap reinsurance. Finally, Peura (2002) has analyzed the effects of an equity 
issuance option which is subject to a proportional cost, and an upper bound on the rate at 
which external capital can be raised. 
Each of the models listed above predicts that some amount of buffer capital will be 
optimally held. The models also demonstrate that buffer capital will be the lower, the more 
effective hedging mechanisms are available or the less expensive is external recapitalization. 
In fact, optimal capital holdings are the highest in the basic model where no risk reduction or 
recapitalization options are present, and each of the ‘variants’ will predict lower capital levels. 
Yet none of the papers has tested this class of models’ ability to explain empirically observed 
bank capital levels. In this paper we perform a simple calibration of our model (and as its 
special case the basic model of Milne and Robertson) to empirical data on bank returns, and 
compare the resulting model capital ratios against observed bank capital ratios. Our findings, 
stated briefly, indicate that this class of models does not generate sufficiently high capital 
buffers when calibrated with the empirically observed volatilities of bank returns. The models 
are able to generate capital ratios of the correct size when volatility is roughly tripled from its 
empirically observed value. This need for volatility adjustment is partly due to the fact that 
accounting based estimates of bank return volatility are likely to be downward biased because 
of banks’ income smoothing options (most notably, the provisioning for expected losses). 
Some part of this adjustment is also explained by the skew distribution of bank portfolio 
returns. Actual bank capitalization is likely to reflect the potential for large losses that banks 
may experience during severe economic downturns, while our model assumes normally 
distributed asset returns. Our dataset from 1994-2001 indicates that there is negative skewness 
in banks’ accounting returns, despite the fact that banks’ provisioning policies are likely to 
 reduce the negative skewness inherent in banks’ portfolio returns. Due to this model error, we 
operate our model with implied bank return volatilities, which are chosen so as to replicate 
observed bank capital levels. This is analogous to how the Black-Scholes model is used in 
practise. Our model yields simple quasi-analytic solutions for optimal policies, and can be 
used to study the effects of the capital market imperfections on optimal capital raising and 
dividend policies. The model also provides a decomposition of the value of a bank into the 
value of the capital raising option and the value of a non-optional bank. We illustrate these 
issues in section 5. 
The variants of the Milne and Robertson (1996) model are formulated in continuous time, 
and rely on stochastic and singular control techniques to obtain optimal policies. The 
determination of bank capital has also been studied in discrete time by Estrella (2001) and 
Furfine (2000). Estrella (2001) uses a variant of the classical inventory or cash management 
models (see e.g. Karlin and Taylor, 1981, pp. 211-212 for the classical cash inventory model). 
In his model, the objective is to minimize the combined costs from over- and 
undercapitalization, as well as from adjustment of capital. In Furfine (2000), the objective is 
the present value of net distributions, net of any adjustment costs. His model is therefore a 
combination of the inventory theoretic analysis of Estrella (2001) and the present value of 
dividends optimizing approach on which the variants of the Milne and Robertson (1996) 
model are based on. Furfine also performs a calibration of his model to panel data on bank 
capital and profitability, but does not explicitly analyze the absolute capital levels generated 
by his calibrated model. 
Methodologically, our paper is distinguished by the joint presence of an implementation 
delay and a fixed cost.  Both of these frictions have been analyzed in several contexts in the 
corporate finance literature. Fixed costs from transacting have been analyzed e.g. in the 
classical inventory control literature, in the literature on optimal portfolio choice with 
transaction costs (see e.g. Eastham and Hastings, 1988, Korn, 1998, Morton and Pliska, 
1995), and in connection to risky debt valuation by Fan and Sundaresan (2000). Fixed costs 
lead to impulse controls, i.e. controls that change state variables in discrete magnitudes and 
are applied at discrete stopping times. Impulse control techniques have been elaborated in 
books by Bensoussan and Lions (1982) and Fleming and Soner (1993). The effects of delays 
in implementing impulse controls within continuous time models have been analyzed e.g. by 
Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) and Alvarez and Keppo (2001) in connection with exercising of 
 real investment options, and by Subramanian and Jarrow (2001) in connection with optimal 
liquidation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model. The solution 
is characterized in terms of a set of quasi-variational inequalities in Section 3. Optimal 
policies and the value function are derived in section 4. Model parameters are calibrated, and 
results based on the calibrated parameter values are presented in section 5. Section 6 derives 
the probability of default of an optimally managed bank, and Section 7 concludes with a 
number of remarks concerning the extendability of the model presented here. 
2 The model 
We imagine a bank with a fixed portfolio of non-tradable assets. In order to simplify the 
empirical implementation of the model, we normalize the asset size so that the portfolio’s 
regulatory risk weighted assets (RWA) are equal to unity4. The state variable in the model is 
the bank’s (book) capital stock, which is denoted Xt. Since the bank’s risk weighted assets are 
normalized to one, Xt is also the bank’s regulatory capital ratio. Bank capital is driven by 
profits and losses, and in the absence of controls evolves according to  
tt dWdtdX σµ += ,         (1) 
where { }0: ≥tWt  is a standard Wiener process, and µ and σ are constant drift and diffusion 
coefficients, which are both assumed to be positive. We assume that the initial capital stock, 
X0, is nonnegative and generically denoted by x. We also denote the standard filtration 
generated by the Wiener process { }0: ≥tWt  as { }0: ≥tFt . 
Given our normalization RWA = 1, we can interpret µ as the bank’s expected return on 
(risk weighted) assets, and σ as the volatility of the bank’s return on (risk weighted) assets. 
That neither µ nor σ depend on the level of bank capital is due to the fact the bank’s deposits 
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 Risk weighted assets, under the current Basel Accord from 1988, are calculated as a weighted sum of the 
banks’ nominal exposures, where the weigths depends on product type and counterparty sector. For large banks, 
risk weighted assets are typically between 65 and 70 percent of total assets. Capital ratio is book equity divided 
by risk weighted assets. 
 are assumed to be insured and zero cost (this assumption is motivated in Milne and Whalley, 
2001). 
The bank’s owners control the bank capital ratio through dividend payments and issues of 
new capital. Formally, a control policy π is a collection { }( )πππ ii stL ,, , where πL  is a non-
decreasing process representing the cumulative amount of dividends paid under policy π, { }πit  
is an increasing sequence of order times of new capital issues, and { }πis  are the amounts of 
capital raised at each issue of capital. We assume that πtL  is a non-decreasing right-continuous 
process adapted to Ft such that 00 =−πL , that each πit  is a stopping time of the filtration Ft, 
and that each πis is measurable with respect to ( )−∆+πitF . Additionally, admissible controls 
satisfy 
11 ≥∆≥−+ i all for  tt ii ππ ,        (2i) 
 ( ] 1,,0 ≥∆+∈= i  ttt all fordL iitπ .       (2ii) 
The positive parameter ∆ is the length of the delay associated with a capital issue. When a 
capital issue is ordered at time ti, the capital can be raised at time ti + ∆. The measurability of 
si with respect to ( )−∆+itF  means that the owners may decide on the actual amount of capital to 
be raised at time ti + ∆ based on all then available information, i.e. they do not need to 
precommit to any quantity of capital at time ti when they order the capital issue. Condition 
(2i) states that a new issue may not be ordered while a previously ordered issue is still waiting 
to be completed. Condition (2ii) states that dividends may not be paid during the periods 
between the ordering of a capital issue and the actual capital collection. The condition has 
important technical merit, but also has an economic justification, in that ruling out dividend 
payments while a capital issue is under preparation is likely to make the issue more easily 
marketable, and to help reduce conflicts of incentives between existing and new equity 
holders. We do not analyze the division of bank value between existing and new equity 
holders, so the potential incentive conflicts are not explicitly present in our model. We simply 
think of constraint (2ii) as a restriction set by the capital markets. 
 The class of admissible policies satisfying the restrictions in (2) is denoted Π. The 
conditions (2i) and (2ii) together ensure that the capital stock remains uncontrolled during the 
waiting periods following each order of a new capital issue, and will be solely driven by the 
diffusion (1). The fact that the diffusion remains uncontrolled during the waiting periods is 
essential for the tractability of the solution. 
The capital stock, as a function of policy π, is denoted πtX , and can be expressed in 
integral form as 
{ }∑ ≤∆+Ι+−++=
i
ttittt i
sLWtxX ππππ σµ ,      (3) 
where I{⋅} is the indicator function of the event defined in the parenthesis. Dividend payments 
represent a leakage from the capital stock, while new issues feed to the capital stock. 
The minimum capital requirement under the current Basel Accord states that bank capital 
ratio Xt must at all times exceed 8%. In this paper we assume that the corrective action from 
violation of the minimum capital requirement will be liquidation5. The model bank therefore 
only operates up to the liquidation time 
{ }%8:inf ≤= ππτ tXt , 
where X evolves according to (3). However, because the capital dynamics in (1) is 
independent of the level of capital, we can without loss of generality reinterpret the state 
variable Xt as the capital ratio in excess of the minimum capital requirement, or the bank’s 
capital buffer. The time of liquidation is then defined as 
 { }0:inf ≤= ππτ tXt .         (4) 
The value of bank under policy π to its owners, given initial level of capital x, is the 
expected discounted present value of dividends less capital issues until liquidation 
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where ρ is a positive rate used to discount future periodic cash flows (and determines the size 
of the opportunity cost from holding of buffer capital), and K is a positive constant 
representing the fixed costs from a capital issue. The integral in (5) is considered from 0- to 
τπ, and hence includes the possible initial dividend payment ππ
−
− 00 LL , where we take 
00 =−πL . The value function of the problem is the value of an optimally managed bank 
( ) ( )xVxV π
π Π∈
= sup .         (6) 
The problem is to identify V(x) and, if one exists, an admissible policy ∗π  such that 
( ) ( )xVxV
*π=  for all x > 0. The problem has five parameters in total. Of these, µ and σ 
characterize bank returns, ρ is the discount rate (opportunity cost) associated with bank 
capital, and ∆ and K determine the magnitude of the capital market imperfections. 
3 Characterization of optimum 
The model is time-homogenous outside the order periods, in which case the current capital 
stock is sufficient as a state variable. We will characterize the value function to the problem 
through a set of quasi-variational inequalities. For this purpose, we define the following 
auxiliary operators. 
Let D be the set of real-valued functions on R+. We define the operator M:D → D by 
 ( ) ( )[ ] { }





 Ι−−+= ∆>∆
∆−
0
sup τ
ρ KssXfeExMf
s
x      (7) 
for all x ≥ 0 and f ∈ D, where X∆ is the value at time ∆ of X defined in (1), τ0 is the first hitting 
time of 0 of X defined in (1), and the expectation is conditioned on X0 = x. Mf(x) is the 
expected discounted value of the decision to order new capital when the capital stock is x, 
given that the ‘continuing value’ of the problem is f. If f is continuous and concave and such 
 that ( ){ } ∞<=≥= 1':0inf2 xfxu , the maximizing s satisfies 1)(' =+ ∗∆ sXf . In terms of u2, 
this is ∆
∗
−= Xus 2 . 
Also we define the infinitesimal generator A associated with the process (1) by 
 ( ) ( ) ( )xfxfxAf '''
2
1 2 µσ += ,        (8) 
for all x > 0 and sufficiently regular f. Then, the following characterization of optimum can be 
established using standard arguments (see e.g. Hojgaard and Taksar, 1999, or Fleming and 
Soner, 1993). 
Proposition 1. Assume that the value function (6) satisfies Ito’s formula. Then it satisfies the 
following set of inequalities: 
i) ( ) 00 =V  
ii) MVV ≥  
iii) ( ) 0≤− VA ρ          (9) 
iv) 1'≥V  
v) ( )( ) ( ) 01' =−−− VVAMVV ρ . 
(9) is a system of quasi-variational inequalities, which are the first order conditions to our 
problem and follow from standard dynamic programming arguments applied to the Bellman 
equation. The first equation follows from 0 being an absorbing state in our model. Inequality 
(9ii) holds for all x since the value of immediate order of new capital can never exceed the 
value function by definition of the value function. (9iii) holds since applying no control to the 
capital stock is always an admissible policy. (9iv) must hold for all x since paying dividends 
is an admissible policy. (9v) states that in an optimum, one of the inequalities must be tight. 
That is, for all x either taking no action or taking some of the admissible actions must always 
represent the optimal policy. 
In Proposition 1, we are not assuming that the value function is twice continuously 
differentiable everywhere. It is well known that the second derivative of a value function in 
general exhibits a discontinuity at the boundary of the region where impulse control actions 
 are optimal (see Dumas, 1991). This does not prevent Ito's formula from applying, but the 
differential generator in inequality (9iii) is to be interpreted in terms of left or right 
derivatives. Consequently, when we say that a function 'satisfies Ito's formula' we mean that 
the function is continuously differentiable everywhere, and twice continuously differentiable 
everywhere except at the boundary of the region where impulse control actions are optimal. 
Let f be a solution to (9) which is continuous and concave, and satisfies 
( ){ } ∞<=≥= 1':0inf2 xfxu . Then an admissible control policy ∗π  can be constructed 
recursively from f as follows: 
i) ( ) ( ){ }***1 :0inf πππ tt XMfXftt =≥= , 
( ) ( ){ }****1 :inf ππππ ttii XMfXfttt =∆+≥=+ , i ≥ 1;    (10) 
ii) ( )( )[ ] ( )*2*
'
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where ( )∆+∪=Ο ** , ππ iii tt  are the periods between the ordering of capital issues and actual 
capital collections. The maximum in (ii) exists by the assumptions on f. The interpretation of 
i) is that every time Mf and f coincide outside order periods, a new capital issue is ordered. ii) 
states that at every capital collection, just enough capital is raised to shift the capital stock to 
u2. According to iii), dividends are paid so as to never let the capital stock rise above u2 
outside order periods. During order periods, capital stock cannot be controlled. 
Appendix A proves the converse to Proposition 1, verifying that the set of inequalities (9) 
are sufficient conditions for the value function in our problem. 
Proposition 2. (‘verification theorem’) Let f be a concave solution to (9) which satisfies Ito’s 
formula and is such that ( ){ } ∞<=≥= 1':0inf2 xfxu . Let ∗π  be the admissible policy 
 constructed from f according to (10). Then f coincides with the value function in (6) and ∗π  is 
the optimal policy which attains f, i.e. ( ) ( ) ( )xVxVxf ∗== π . 
4 Value function and optimal policies 
Constructing a concave solution to (9) requires a guess on its form, i.e. on the order of the 
'optimality regions' for each of the policies. We will make a guess that we will verify later in 
this section to be the correct one. We denote a solution to (9) by f. We assume that there are 
two boundaries 0 ≤ u1 < u2 < ∞ defined by 
 ( ) ( ){ }xMfxfxu >≥= :0inf1 ,       (11) 
 ( ){ }1':0inf2 =≥= xfxu ,        (12) 
so that f solves (9ii) with equality for x ≤ u1, f solves (9iii) with equality for x ∈ [u1, u2], and 
that f solves (9iv) with equality for x ≥ u2. Then f also solves (9i) and (9v) for all x ≥ 0. In the 
following, we denote the general solution to (9iii) by f1 and the general solution to (9iv) by f2. 
The coefficients in the general solutions, as well as the locations of the barriers u1 and u2 are 
to be found from the value matching and smooth pasting conditions at the barriers. In 
particular, based on standard results (e.g. Dumas, 1991, and Dixit, 1991) we expect f to be 
continuously differentiable at the impulse control barrier u1 and twice continuously 
differentiable at the singular control barrier u2. If we can find such a solution to (9), then by 
Proposition 2 this coincides with the value function of our model. 
Stated differently, we assume that the optimal policy is of the following form: i) for x ∈ 
(0, u1], it is optimal to immediately order new capital, ii) for x ∈ (u1, u2), it is optimal neither 
to order new capital nor to pay dividends, and iii) for x ∈ [u2, ∞) it is optimal to pay 
dividends. Furthermore, we expect to have u1 < u2 and u2 finite. u1 may be 0 when the capital 
market imperfections are prohibitively high. Figure 1 illustrates the model with this form of 
solution. 
We analyze each of the three regions in turn. For x ∈ (u1, u2), (9iii) holds with equality, 
so that f satisfies 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0'''
2
1 2
=−+ xfxfxf ρµσ .       (13) 
The general solution to (13) is the exponential function 
 ( ) xdxd ececxf −+ += 11 211 ,        (14) 
 
[ ]2221 21 ρσµµσ +±−=±d . 
As x → u2, twice continuous differentiability requires that ( ) 1' 2 =−uf  and that ( ) 0'' 2 =−uf . 
Substituting these limits into (13) gives 
 ( )
ρ
µ
=2uf .          (15) 
For x > u2, we must have ( ) 1' =xf . Solving this first order differential equation with the 
boundary condition (15) yields 
 ( ) ( ) 222   , uxuxxf >−+= ρ
µ
.        (16) 
Twice continuous differentiability at u2 is guaranteed by equating the first and second 
derivatives of (14) and (16) at u2. This determines the coefficients in (14), which then takes 
the form 
 ( ) ( ) ( )xudxud eaeaxf −−−− −+ += 2121 211 ,       (17) 
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For 0 ≤ x ≤ u1, (9ii) holds with equality, so that f is determined as the fixed point of the 
operator M defined in (7). We analyze this operator, assuming that it is applied to a concave 
function f. As noted before, the supremum within the operator is achieved by ∆∗ −= Xus 2  
for all x > 0. Also using (15), we can simplify (7) to 
 ( ) ( ) { }[ ]∆>∆∆− Ι+= 0τρ βXEexMf x        (7') 
 where 2uK −−= ρµβ  measures the net benefits from new issues of equity. Since β is 
deterministic, equation (7') further simplifies to 
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where { }βτβ == tXt :inf  and ( )β+∆ xyg ,;  is the density of the absorbed process 
)( βτ∧∆∆X  that starts at x + β. The first equality in (7'') is due to the spatial homogenuity of 
arithmetic Brownian motion, the second equality follows since the values of X outside the 
event defined in the indicator function do not affect the expectation, and the third equality is 
due to the fact that for the absorbed process )( βτ∧∆∆X , the event in the indicator function is 
exactly the event that the process has not been absorbed by time ∆. Using the Reflection 
Principle (see e.g. Borodin and Salminen, 1997), the density can be written as 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∆+−∆−−∆++∆=+∆ σβµϕσβµϕβ
σ
µ
,;exp,;,; 22 xyxyxyg x   (18) 
where ( )σµϕ ,;y  denotes the density of a normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2, 
i.e. 
( ) ( )( )2 22exp21,; σµπσσµϕ −−= yy . 
By integrating, we get from (7'') and (18) that 
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where Φ(y) and ϕ(y) are the cumulative standard normal distribution and its density. Direct 
substitution shows that Mf(0) = 0. In general, Mf need not be increasing or concave. The 
derivatives of Mf are quite complicated expressions, and it is difficult to find necessary and 
 sufficient conditions on the primitive problem parameters that would guarantee e.g. that Mf is 
increasing or concave. The following sufficient condition, however, proven in Appendix B, is 
very useful. 
Lemma 1. If 2uK −−= ρµβ ≥ 0, then Mf'(x) > 0 and Mf''(x) < 0 for all x. 
The importance of Lemma 1 is due to the fact that capital issues cannot be optimal policies in 
our model unless β ≥ 0. This is evident from (7') because if β < 0, we have 
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where the first inequality is due to β < 0, the second is due to (9iv), and the third is due to the 
fact that the expression after the second inequality is the value of doing nothing over the 
period [0,∆]. By Lemma 1, we know a priori that if Mf constitutes part of the solution to (9), 
that part must be concave. This enables us to show that the entire solution to (9) is concave. 
The solutions for the functions Mf, f1 and f2 in (19), (17) and (16) are in terms of the 
barrier u2. In particular, we observe from the definition of β (see (7')) and from (19) that the 
function Mf(x) depends on f only through u2. Therefore we introduce the notation M(x,u2) = 
Mf(x) and f1(x,u2) = f1(x), where Mf(x) is given by (19) and f1(x) is given by (17). The 
remaining unknowns are the barriers u1 and u2, which are to be solved from the following 
value matching and smooth pasting conditions at u1  
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This non-linear system of equations is quite complicated algebraically, and closed form 
solutions for u1 and u2 do not exist. Hence ultimately solutions to equation (20) have to be 
found numerically. The following lemma, proven in Appendix B, provides a sufficient 
condition under which a positive solution to (20) exists. The condition is expressed in terms 
of a positive barrier u0 defined by ( ) 0,0 01 =uf , which can be solved for 
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 u0 is the dividend barrier in the model of Milne and Robertson without the capital issue 
option, and represents an upper bound on the dividend barrier in our model. 
Lemma 2. If ( ) ( ) 00100 ,, == ∂
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, then there exists a solution (u1,u2) to (20) 
satisfying 0 < u1 < u2 < u0 such that ( ) ( )212 ,, uxfuxMf ≤  for all 0 ≤ x ≤ u2. 
Lemma 2 states that if the derivative of the value of new capital issues at x = 0 is sufficiently 
high, then there will be a positive solution to (20), which implies that the option to issue 
capital will be optimally exercised for all x ≤ u1. Consequently, in cases where a solution to 
(20) satisfying 0 < u1 < u2 < u0 exists, we propose the following solution to (9) 
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where Mf is given by (19), f1 is given by (17) and f2 is given by (16). The boundaries u1 and u2 
are the solutions to (20). Appendix B proves the following. 
Lemma 3. Assume that a solution to (20) as described in Lemma 2 exists and that f is defined 
by (22). Then f is a concave solution to (9) and satisfies Ito's formula. 
Lemma 3 implies that formula (22) satisfies the conditions of Proposition 2, and hence 
coincides with the value function (6). The solution is also unique by the uniqueness of the 
value function. This is an indirect proof that a solution to (20) in the region 0 < u1 < u2 < u0 is 
unique. 
Figure 2 illustrates the solution in this general case. The solution f to (9) coincides with 
Mf for x < u1, with f1 for u1 < x < u2, and with f2 for x > u2. The functions Mf and f1 (f1 and f2) 
connect to each other smoothly at the barrier u1 (u2). At u1, the values and first derivatives of 
Mf and f1 coincide, but the second derivatives differ. Mf is more concave at u1 than f1, and the 
second derivative of the solution at this point experiences a discontinuity. In particular, we 
have ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )−=>=+ 11111 '''''''' ufuMfufuf . At u2, the first and the second derivatives of f1 
and f2 coincide, and the solution f at u2 therefore has a continuous second derivative. Mf, f1, 
and f2 each have continuous first and second derivatives on their entire domains of definition. 
f therefore possesses a continuous second derivative everywhere except at the point u1. 
 When no solution to (20) in the feasible region exists, the solution to (9) reduces to a 
special case corresponding to the Milne and Robertson (1996) model without the capital issue 
option. In this case u1 equals zero, u2 equals u0 given in (21), and the value function reduces 
to (23) below. A necessary condition for this is 
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Figure 3 illustrates one such case. In this example, the fixed cost K is relatively high so that 
the benefits from new capital issues, net of their cost, are low. For sufficiently high fixed cost 
K, it is even possible that Mf has a negative right derivative at zero, in which case Mf will take 
negative values. We note that Mf need not be globally concave, either. In the following 
subsection, we will systematically analyze the various limiting cases of our model. 
4.1 Limiting cases 
In this section, we analyze the limiting cases of the model as either the cost or the delay of 
capital issues equals zero, or as either of these increases above a critical value. The limiting 
cases help to understand the comparative statistics of the general model, and show exactly 
which of the capital market imperfections drive the qualitative results from our model. 
Case I: K → ∞ or ∆ → ∞ 
Let V be the value function (6). When K > µ/ρ, so that β < 0, we have from (7') that 
 ( ) { }[ ] ( ) { }[ ] ( )xVXVEeXEexMV xx ≤Ι≤Ι< ∆>∆∆−∆>∆∆− 00 τρτρ , 
for all x > 0, where the first inequality follows directly from (7'), the second follows from the 
fact that the value function satisfies (9iv), and the third holds because the expression after the 
second inequality is the expected value of doing nothing (taking no controls) during a period 
of length ∆. Therefore µ/ρ is an upper bound on those K under which ordering of new capital 
may be an optimal policy for some x > 0. Also, we get from (7') that 
 ( ) 0lim =
∞→∆
xMV  
uniformly in x on bounded intervals of the form [0,u0]. This implies that for sufficiently high 
∆ capital issues are also ruled out as optimal policies.  
 As either K or ∆ are above their critical values, the optimal policies and the value 
function of our model reduce to those of the Milne and Robertson (1996) model without the 
capital issue option. The value function is obtained as a special case of (22), by setting u1 = 0 
and u2 = u0 given by (21) (this enforces (9i)). The value function takes the form 
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where d1+ and d1- are as in (14), and a1 and a2 are as in (17). 
Case II: ∆ = 0 
In the absence of a delay in capital raising, new capital can be issued instantaneously and 
there is perfect control on the minimum level of capital. Given the opportunity cost of capital 
in our model, it is clearly optimal to wait until the capital stock falls arbitrarily close to zero 
before issuing new capital. As zero is an absorbing boundary for the capital stock, however, 
new issues still have to be implemented before the capital stock actually hits zero. Non-
surprisingly, then, an optimal policy in the model without delays does not exist. ε-optimal 
policies however can be constructed which set the capital issue barrier arbitrarily close to 0. 
Setting ∆ equal to 0, the operator M in (7') simplifies to 
 ( ) KuxxxMV −−+=+= 2ρµβ , 
for all x > 0, where u2 is defined as in (12). Taking the limit of this operator, as we let the 
capital issue point approach zero, we obtain the boundary condition satisfied by the limiting 
value function in the ∆ = 0 case 
( ) ( )( ) ( )0,max0,limmax0 200 KuxVMV x −−== =∆+→ ρµ . 
This boundary condition is to replace (9i). This condition is an endogenous equation in the 
value function, unlike the original boundary condition V(0) = 0, where the right-hand side is 
exogenous. Yet the solution to this special case is considerably easier to obtain than the 
solution to the general model, and we derive this in Appendix B. The reason for the relative 
simplicity of this special case is that instead of two endogenous barriers, the solution in the 
special case ∆ = 0 only has one free barrier. The free barrier whose optimal value we now 
 denote by uˆ  represents both the dividend barrier, i.e. the level of the capital stock above 
which dividends are paid, and the level up to which the capital stock is replenished each time 
a new capital issue is implemented. The solution is given in the following proposition that is 
proved in Appendix B. 
Proposition 3. If K < µ/ρ - u0, where u0 is given by (21), the value function is 
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where uˆ  < u0 is the unique positive solution for u2 in the equation 
 Kueaea udud −−=+ −+ −− 221 2121 ρ
µ
.       (25) 
Else, the value function and the barrier uˆ  are identical to (23) and (21). 
We note that the parametric form of (24) is the same as that of (23), the difference being the 
location of the barriers u0 and uˆ . As Proposition 3 shows, uˆ  < u0 when the condition of the 
proposition holds, and in this case (24) is a left-shifted version of (23). 
We also note that if both ∆ and K are equal to 0, then (25) is solved by uˆ  = 0. This 
limiting case represents perfect market conditions. In perfect markets, no buffer stocks of 
capital are held, and all profits are immediately paid out as dividends. When losses are 
realized, the capital to cover the losses is instantaneously raised from capital markets that 
operate frictionlessly. The controlled capital stock for the firm is a constant at zero. 
Case III: K = 0 
We can say little more about this limiting case than about the general case. The reason is that 
the limit K = 0 does not involve a degeneracy as the limit ∆ = 0 does. This is easily seen from 
the expression (7') for the operator M, where K is present in the β term. Setting K to zero does 
not influence the qualitative properties of M, and hence the solution for the case K = 0 is not 
qualitatively different from the solution in the presence of positive K. This implies that in a 
model with delays the presence of a fixed cost is not necessary to ensure the existence of 
optimum and interior solutions. We will demonstrate this further in the numerical examples 
on the behavior of the barriers u1 and u2. This is in sharp contrast to the ∆ = 0 case, where 
 optimal policies do not exist, but where the limiting ‘unreachable’ value function reduces to a 
simpler form as compared to the general case. 
5 Calibration and numerical examples 
In this section we calibrate the model parameters to data on US banks’ asset returns, and 
analyze the model’s ability to explain the empirically observed bank capital ratios. We then 
illustrate optimal policies as functions of the capital market imperfections, and demonstrate 
how the value of the capital issue option behaves as a function of the bank capital ratio. 
Finally, we show how to interpret and determine the fixed cost K to be used in our model. 
5.1 Calibration of parameters and comparison to actual bank capital ratios 
The accounting identity that governs the evolution of bank equity is of the form 
 ttttt SDNICC +−+= −1 , 
where Ct is bank equity (in excess of the minimum capital requirement) at time t, NIt is net 
income over period t, Dt is dividends over period t, and St is equity issuance over period t. The 
state variable in our model, Xt, is defined as the bank’s capital ratio (in excess of the minimum 
requirement 8%), so that the relationship between Ct and Xt is 
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Our model assumes that the bank has constant risk weighted assets, so that a discrete version 
of the model capital dynamics (3), expressed in terms of accounting variables, becomes 
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This expression and equation (3) suggest that we should interpret the model parameters µ and 
σ in terms of accounting data as 
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 where SD denotes standard deviation. For the estimation, we use annual Bankscope data on 
US commercial banks over the period 1994-2001. The total sample contains 276 banks whose 
2001 total assets exceed 1 billion USD. For each bank, we calculate the time-series average of 
the net income to risk-weighted asset ratio, over the sample period, and the standard deviation 
of that ratio. Then we take as an estimate of µ the median of the time-series averages across 
all banks, and as an estimate of σ the median of the volatilities across all banks. We take 
medians rather than means since we think that medians better describe the typical bank in the 
data set that includes a small number of banks with exceptionally high mean returns. The 
resulting estimate for µ is 2.0%, implying that the median US bank’s return on risk-weighted 
assets has averaged 2.0% over the 1994-2001 period. The estimate of σ from the data is 
0.5%6. 
The parameter ρ may be interpreted as the margin between the bank’s cost of equity and 
its deposits. Alternatively, ρ may be interpreted as the earnings-to-price ratio of an optimally 
capitalized bank within our model, i.e. one whose capital ratio is equal to the dividend barrier 
u2. This follows from (15) which states that the value of the bank (i.e. its market 
capitalization) in our model is equal to µ/ρ when the capital ratio is at u2. We use this 
interpretation to fix the parameter ρ. In particular, we set ρ equal to 1/15, consistent with a 
price-to-earnings ratio of 15 for an optimally capitalized bank in our dataset. 
The median total capital ratio over the US commercial banks in the Bankscope data is 
12.4%. This is the median of the time-series averages of the individual banks’ capital ratios 
over the 1994-2001 period, and we use it as our estimate. The variation in the capital ratios 
across years is moderate, in that the median capital ratio varies between 11.6% and 12.6% 
during the period 1994-2001. We are interested in comparing the observed capital ratio to the 
corresponding prediction from our model. We interpret the dividend barrier u2 in our model as 
the target level of buffer capital7, and will compare this barrier to the observed average bank 
capital buffer, which is 12.4% - 8% = 4.4%. Our main comparison is based on Figure 4, 
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 Had we taken means rather than medians across banks, the corresponding estimates for µ and σ would have 
been 2.2% and 0.8%, respectively. Hence the ratio of the average volatility to the average drift is somewhat 
higher than the ratio of the median volatility to the median drift.    
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 u2 is an upper bound on capital ratios for optimizing banks in our model, and an average capital ratio in the 
model would be somewhat below u2. Moreover, there is no single obvious definition of average here because the 
stationary distribution for the capital ratio in our model is a degenerate distribution at 0. This is due to the result 
(proved in Section 6) that an optimally managed bank in our model bankrupts with probability one in finite time.  
 which shows the model dividend barrier as a function of the volatility parameter σ, given the 
calibrated values for the parameters µ and ρ. 
The immediate conclusion from Figure 4 is that neither our model, nor the basic model of 
Milne and Robertson (1996), is able to explain the observed median bank capital ratio when 
volatility is at its observed value, 0.5%. The model of Milne and Robertson, obtained as a 
special case of our model through setting ∆ equal to infinity, yields capital ratios which are 
upper bounds on the capital ratios in the presence of the capital issue option, for any given 
values of the parameters (µ, σ, ρ). The capital buffer generated by the Milne and Robertson 
model, given the observed bank return volatility of 0.5%, is mere 0.8%, or less than one fifth 
of the observed value of 4.4%. The presence of a capital issue option with reasonable cost 
only worsens the fit of the model against empirical data. This conclusion is also independent 
of the estimate of the fixed cost K, set equal to 1 in Figure 4, since the dividend barrier in the 
basic model of Milne and Robertson does not depend on K.  
The volatility observed in the bank return data, 0.5%, is obviously far too low relative to 
the average bank return, 2.0%, for our model to generate capital buffers in the range of 4% or 
above. Bank return volatility in our model would need to be roughly tripled in order to 
replicate the observed capital ratios. In particular, we observe from Figure 4 that the limiting 
model of Milne and Robertson yields a capital ratio of 4.4% when evaluated at a volatility of 
1.5%, given the calibrated values for the parameters µ and ρ. When the capital issue option is 
present at reasonably low cost, volatilities in the order of 2% are needed to explain actual 
bank capital holdings. 
We find that there is good reason to expect our model to yield downward biased estimates 
of bank capital buffers, given the empirically observed volatility. First, our model assumes 
normally distributed bank returns, while bank portfolio returns are expected to display a skew 
distribution with a stretched lower tail. This is evident from the results of portfolio models 
such as CreditMetricsTM (J.P.Morgan, 1997), which simulate bank portfolio returns based on 
returns on individual counterparties. Also the Bankscope data over the period 1994-2001 
indicates that there is negative skewness in bank returns. The median coefficient of skewness 
across banks in our data is -0.13, even though this dataset hardly contains any bad years in 
terms of the overall performance of the US banking sector. Moreover, the share of negative 
returns in our dataset is 1.8%, while the share of negative returns suggested by a normal 
 distribution with a mean of 2.0% and a volatility of 0.5% is only 0.003%. A volatility of 
roughly 1% would generate the 1.8% probability of negative returns, given a mean of 2.0%. 
This is a strong indication that the normal distribution is not a good proxy for bank returns.  
Second, and perhaps more importantly, we would expect the volatility of bank returns, 
estimated from data on banks’ net income, to be a downward biased estimate of the true 
volatility in bank portfolio returns8. This is because of the options for the provisioning of 
credit losses that are available to banks, which allow banks to distribute credit losses that 
often are realized only during a fraction of quarters over each ‘credit cycle’, more evenly over 
time. The smoothing of banks’ net income is in fact likely to create both a downward bias in 
the estimates of volatility of bank returns, and an upward bias in the estimates of skewness of 
bank returns. The bias in the volatility estimate may explain some of the poor fit of our 
model, and suggests that the volatility could be scaled up to improve the fit of the model. 
Unfortunately, determining the correct magnitude of such volatility adjustment is extremely 
difficult since data on the true timing of banks’ losses is not publically available. The bias in 
the skewness estimate, on the other hand, may explain the low degree of negative skewness 
observed in our data, and suggests that the normal distribution is even less descriptive of 
actual bank portfolio returns than does the data on banks’ net income indicate9. 
An improved estimate of true bank returns will be a double edged sword from the 
perspective of our model. A higher volatility is likely to enhance the empirical fit of our 
model, but at the same time a larger negative skewness is likely to indicate a more serious 
departure from the normality assumption. We find that the estimation of banks’ true return 
distributions be an interesting challenge for future research10. In the absence of such 
estimates, however, we suggest that our model be used with implied bank return volatilities 
which correspond to observed bank capital ratios, in an analogous manner as Black-Scholes 
model and its extensions are used in practice. Our model is analytically quite tractable and 
easy to implement, and yields many conclusions on the optimal dividend and capital raising 
strategies, as well as on the behaviour of bank value, as functions of the capital market 
imperfections. These analyses are illustrated in the next subsections. 
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 This has been acknowledged in the literature on bank capital, see e.g. Estrella (2001), p. 19. 
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 Managerial risk aversion is another possible explanation for the high observed capital ratios. This would imply 
that the bank is managed according to a concave (managers’) objective, while our model assumes a linear 
(owners’) objective. 
 5.2 Comparative statistics with respect to capital market imperfections 
Our model predicts that optimal bank capital ratios and optimal bank equity issuance policies 
are influenced by the degree of capital market imperfections. In figures 5 and 6 we show the 
response of the barriers u2 and u1 to the values of the parameters K and ∆. We have drawn the 
figures keeping µ and ρ equal to their calibrated values (2% and 1/15, respectively), and we 
have set σ equal to an implicit value of 1.5%. Based on the results in the previous subsection, 
this value generates a capital ratio for the median bank that is of the same order of magnitude 
as the actual median capital ratio. 
Figure 5 shows the behavior of the dividend barrier u2 as a function of K and ∆. 
Unsurprisingly, we observe that u2 is non-decreasing with respect to both K and ∆. The 
optimal dividend barrier is determined by balancing the expected cost of new capital issues as 
well as the expected loss from liquidation against the time value of delayed dividends. The 
dividend barrier is non-decreasing relative to the fixed cost since this increases expected 
capital raising costs. The dividend barrier is non-decreasing relative to the length of the delay 
since a longer delay, ceteris paribus, implies a higher probability of liquidation. We also 
observe from Figure 5 that the optimal dividend barrier is quite sensitive to the introduction of 
small fixed costs from capital issuance when the fixed cost is initially zero. When the cost is 
already sizable, the dividend barrier is relatively insensitive to small increases in that cost. 
In the limiting case where ∆ equals zero, u2 is equal to its limiting value uˆ  given in 
Proposition 3. This limit is positive when K is positive. When K is below its critical value µ/ρ  
- u0, u2 is increasing in K (this can be easily verified from (25)). When K is at or above this 
critical value, capital issuance ceases to be an optimal policy, and u2 then equals u0 given in 
(21). 
Figure 6 shows the barrier u1, the highest order point for new capital issues, as a function 
of ∆ and K. We observe that u1 is non-increasing with respect to K, for all plotted values of ∆. 
This is intuitive, since a higher fixed cost reduces the net benefit from capital issuance. 
However, u1 does not behave monotonically with respect to ∆. When ∆ is relatively low, 
implying a quick access to new capital, the optimal response to an increase in ∆ is to raise u1. 
In this case a longer delay induces ‘earlier’ ordering of new capital, i.e. at a higher level of the 
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 There are other motivations for this task, such as the backtesting of banks’ credit portfolio models. 
 capital stock. On the other hand, when ∆ is relatively high the optimal response to an increase 
in ∆ is to lower the barrier u1. This happens because the value of ordering a new capital issue 
is affected two ways through changes in ∆. First, an increase in ∆ increases the probability of 
liquidation during the delay, ceteris paribus, inducing an increase in u1. Second, our model 
forbids dividend payments during the capital issue delay, so that an increase in ∆ defers 
potential dividend payments further into the future, should a capital issue be ordered now, 
suggesting a decrease in u1. It turns out that for low ∆, the former effect dominates, while for 
sufficiently high ∆, the latter effect dominates. Moreover, Figure 6 suggests that the higher is 
K, the lower is the point where the positive response of u1 with respect to ∆ turns negative. 
We also observe that, consistent with Proposition 3, u1 converges to its limiting value zero as 
∆ approaches zero. 
5.3 Value of the capital issue option 
The opportunity to issue new equity, being an option, cannot reduce firm value. The value of 
the capital issue option in our model is the difference between the value functions (22) and 
(23), for a given initial capital ratio x. In Figure 7, we show the value of the capital issue 
option as a function of the initial capital ratio, for different values of the fixed cost K. We 
make a number of observations. First, the value of the capital issue option is monotonically 
declining in the fixed cost K (and also in the delay ∆). This is not surprising, since the delay 
and the fixed cost in our setting are pure business constraints. Second, the value of the capital 
issue option, as a function of the initial capital ratio, displays a humped shaped behavior that 
appears to be qualitatively independent of the value of K. The option value is at its highest 
when the capital ratio is somewhat below the optimal capital order boundary u1. When capital 
is close to u1, capital issues both achieve their intended effectiveness and will be used with 
high probability (indeed with probability 1 when the capital stock is less than u1). The value 
of the new issue option decreases as the capital stock falls significantly below the optimal 
capital order barrier since it becomes increasingly unlikely that the firm is alive when capital 
becomes available. As the capital stock approaches zero, the value of the capital issue option 
therefore approaches zero as well. The value of the capital issue option is also reduced when 
capital increases significantly above u1, because there the probability of capital shortages in 
the near future is low, and the expected present value of the gains from future capital issues is 
therefore low as well. To conclude, the option to issue new capital is most valuable in 
 absolute terms to banks that are likely to issue new capital either immediately or in the near 
future, but are still at a reasonable distance from the point of liquidation. 
The examples in Figure 7 indicate that the option to issue capital has some value despite 
substantial capital market imperfections. In Figure 7 the bank has an annual expected return 
on risk weighted assets equal to 2%. The option to issue capital still has value when the fixed 
cost of a capital issue is 3% of the risk weighted assets, i.e. one and a half year's expected 
profit. Therefore it may pay to recapitalize, even when this means paying out several years' 
worth of expected earnings in fixed expenses. Also, the value of the capital issue option may 
constitute a substantial portion of the bank's equity value. In the case where K equals 1% (of 
the bank's risk-weighted assets) in Figure 7, the value of the capital issue option is at its 
highest (2.2%) when the firm’s capital ratio is 0.6% above the liquidation point. This peak 
option value is 13% of the corresponding value of a bank which does not posses a capital 
issue option. Moreover, the value of the new issue option in relative terms (as a percentage of 
the bank value in the absence of the capital issue option) is monotonically declining in the 
capital ratio. Hence the proportion of bank value which is attributable to the new issue option 
is highest with banks that are just above their minimum capital requirement. 
5.4 The effective cost of capital issuance 
Here we attempt to provide more insights into the interpretation and estimation of the fixed 
cost K. In practice, we would expect the costs of raising capital to be proportional, or at least 
positively related, to the size of the equity issue. This in turn suggests that there should be a 
relation between K and the other model parameters which determine the average size of an 
equity issue. We find it informative to express the effective cost of equity issuance in our 
model as the ratio of K to K+E[s]. Here E[s] is the expected intake of new capital (notation as 
in (7)), net of all the costs, so that K+E[s] can be interpreted as the total amount of capital 
raised, while K is the amount paid in fees and other costs to outsiders. Table 1 presents both 
the expected size of a new issue, E[s], and the effective cost of a new issue, K/(K+E[s]), as a 
function of the capital market imperfections ∆ and K. 
We observe from Table 1 that the effective cost of a new issue can be substantial, ranging 
up to 40% under those circumstances where issues of new capital will be optimally 
undertaken. Moreover, the effective cost of equity issuance increases with K, but at a lower 
 rate than K. This is because the expected size of a new issue is also increasing in K. In other 
words, the bank’s owners optimally issue new equity in larger quantities, but less frequently, 
when K is high, relative to the case where K is low. Such behavior is a natural response to the 
presence of a fixed cost, and is descriptive of impulse control policies in general. Table 1 also 
indicates that the increase in the issue size with increasing K is due to both increases in the 
dividend barrier u2 and decreases in the capital order barrier u1. Finally, we observe that the 
effective cost of a new issue is quite insensitive to the delay ∆, given a fixed K. 
The results in Table 1 are useful in helping to determine the value of K to be used in our 
model. Let us assume that the management has an opinion on the effective cost rate in capital 
issuance, as well as an opinion on ∆. Then the implied value of K may be read from (an 
extension of) Table 1. This provides an alternative way to parameterize our model, one where 
the degree of capital market imperfections faced by the bank is expressed in terms of the 
delay ∆ and the effective cost rate of equity issuance, given in terms of our notation as 
K/(K+E[s]). In section 5.1 we have already given empirical interpretations to the parameters 
µ, σ and ρ. On these grounds we believe that the empirical implementation of our model is 
relatively straightforward. That the model only has five parameters should also be an 
advantage. 
6 The probability of bankruptcy in finite time 
Does an optimally managed firm in our setup bankrupt in finite time? The probability of 
bankruptcy is not explicitly present in the corporate objective, but is determined 
endogenously as a function of the optimal policies. Previous analysis has shown that value 
maximization may be consistent with a probability of bankruptcy in finite time that equals 
one. This is the case in the basic model of Milne and Robertson (1996), in the model with risk 
choice of Radner and Shepp (1996), and in the model with a recapitalization option of Peura 
(2002). In the model with proportional risk reductions of Hojgaard and Taksar (1999), on the 
other hand, bankruptcies may under some parameter combinations be completely eliminated. 
As for our model, the following lemma is proven in Appendix B. 
Lemma 4. The probability of bankruptcy in finite time equals 1. 
 It should be noted that the result depends crucially on the assumption that the capital issue 
delay ∆ is strictly positive. As we have shown, in the limiting case where ∆ equals 0 (where 
an optimal policy does not exist) there are ε-optimal policies under which bankruptcies are 
zero probability events. 
7 Possible extensions 
We find that the failure of our model, and of this class of models in general, to explain 
observed bank capital ratios is most likely attributable to the shared assumption of normally 
distributed asset returns. The assumption is crucial for analytic tractability, but it would be of 
great interest to analyze the consequences of replacing that assumption with an asymmetric 
distribution of bank returns. The asymmetric distribution could correspond in form e.g. to the 
distributions implied by portfolio models, such as the CreditMetrics (1997) framework. Bank 
portfolio returns generated in a bottom-up manner from individual asset returns are 
distinctively asymmetric and long-tailed (relative to the normal distribution) in the presence 
of positive correlations between individual asset returns. These departures from normality 
should preferably be taken into account in the solution of the bank’s optimization problem, 
but without sacrificing the dynamic structure of the model and the fully optimizing behavior 
of the bank. We find that this is an interesting challenge for future research on banks’ 
capitalization and financing decisions. 
A second obvious extension were to factor investment considerations, and hence growth 
possibilities, into our model. The model of constant scale is most convenient analytically, and 
may provide a reasonable approximation to some banks. Yet it is very likely that a bank that 
is planning to increase its asset size will choose to hold ‘extra’ capital temporarily. Similarly, 
a bank that is expecting its assets to be reduced is likely to factor that expectation into its 
capitalization decision. The empirical data on banks will contain both banks that are 
expanding in asset size, as well as banks that are diminishing in asset size. We have taken the 
median capital ratio of large US banks as a proxy for the capital ratio of a constant scale bank. 
An extension of our model would take investment options into consideration explicitly. A 
highly stylized analysis of this type is Sethi and Taksar (2002). A related work based on a 
discrete time model is Cummins and Nyman (2001). Finally, the assumption that the liquid 
capital stock does not earn a return may seem problematic. In our model, as in Milne and 
 Whalley (2001), this was motivated by the perfectly elastic presence of zero cost (insured) 
deposits. We note that the basic model of Milne and Robertson (1996) has been generalized 
into this direction by Hojgaard and Taksar (2001), who analyze a model where the capital 
earns a (possibly stochastic) return, and solve the model explicitly in special cases, such as 
when the return on the capital equals the risk-free rate (a constant). 
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 Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2 
We will show the equivalence of a solution to (9) and the value function. First, we utilize the 
inequalities in (9) and a generalization of Ito's formula to show that a solution to (9) majorizes 
the value of any serious candidate for an optimal policy, and therefore also the value function. 
As a second step we show that the value of the policy defined by (10) coincides with the 
solution to (9). These two steps together imply that a solution to (9) coincides with the value 
function, and that the policy defined by (10) in terms of the solution to (9) achieves the 
optimum. 
Let f be as assumed in the proposition and choose an admissible policy { }( )πππ ii stL ,,  such that 
2usi ≤
π
 for all i. This restriction is harmless, since optimal policies can never have 
2uX it >∆+
π
 by constraint (2ii). Associated with this policy is the set { }ππ
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of Lπ. Let Tˆ  be a nonnegative stopping time that satisfies 
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It is a consequence of (2i) that such stopping time exists. Then we can write 
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where we have just decomposed the change in the discounted value of f(X) into those changes 
that occur during order periods, and outside order periods, respectively. By the generalized Ito 
formula (Dellacherie and Meyer, 1980), we can express the individual terms in the first row 
on the right-hand side of (A1) as 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
∑
∫
∫∫
∧∧≤<∧∧∆+Λ∈
−
−
∧∧
∧∧∆+
−
∧∧
∧∧∆+
−
∧∧
∧∧∆+
−
∧∧∆+
∧∧∆+−
∧∧
∧∧−
−
−
−−
−
−
−+−
+−=
−
TtsTts
ss
s
Tt
Tt
ss
s
Tt
Tt
ss
s
Tt
Tt
s
s
Tt
Tt
Tt
Tt
ii
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
XfXfeLdXfe
dWXfedsXfAe
XfeXfe
ˆˆ
,
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
11
11
1
1
~
'
'
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
ττ
ππρ
τ
τ
ππρ
τ
τ
πρ
τ
τ
πρ
π
τ
τρπ
τ
τρ
σρ               (A2) 
The first term on the right-hand side of (A2) is nonpositive since f satisfies (9iii). Also,  
( ) ( ) ( )ππππππ
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Let ε > 0 and define { }ετ πεπ == tXt :inf . Then (A3) also holds with πτ  replaced by επτ . 
Taking expectation of (A3) yields 
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ]








−≤
∫
∧∧
∧∧∆+
−
∧∧∆+
∧∧∆+−
∧∧
∧∧−
−
−
−
Tt
Tt
s
s
Tt
Tt
Tt
Tt
i
i
i
i
i
i
dLeEXfeE
XfeE
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
1
1
1
ε
π
π
ε
π
π
ε
π
π
ε
π
π
ε
π
π
ε
π
π
τ
τ
πρπ
τ
τρ
π
τ
τρ
               (A4) 
where the expectation of the Ito integral is zero since ( ) ( )επ ''0 fXf s ≤≤  by concavity of f. 
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where the convergence is monotone from below. Also, 
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where the inequality follows from the definition of Tˆ  and the assumed restriction on the 
policies π. The same holds also for the second random variable in (A6). Consequently, the 
random variables on the left-hand side of (A6) are majorized by a positive random variable 
with finite expectation. Letting ε → 0, we can use monotone convergence theorem and 
dominated convergence theorems, respectively, to all the terms in (A4), yielding 
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By the exactly same steps, we have for the third row on the right-hand side of (A1) 
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As for the second row on the right-hand side of (A1), we get from the definition of M that  
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In (A9), the equality follows from the facts that, first 
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 due to the definition of the indicator function, and second, that the indicator function 
'disappears' from the first term after the equality since f(0) = 0 by (9i). Substituting (A9) into 
the second row on the right-hand side of (A1), we get 
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where the second inequality follows since f ≥ Mf by (9ii). Taking expectations of (A1), and 
substituting in (A7), (A8), and (A10), we get 
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Since π is admissible, Lπ satisfies (2ii). Accounting for this, and letting j → ∞, (A11) 
simplifies to 
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We note in particular that ∞→πjt  as j → ∞ due to condition (2i). Letting T → ∞, we have 
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where we have again utilized the concavity of f. The convergence above follows from the fact 
that the expectation of X has a linearly bounded growth rate, 
[ ] 2uttxXE t ∆++≤∧ µπτπ , 
 where we have utilized (2i). Also as T → ∞,  
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where the convergence is due to monotone convergence on the part of the first term in (A14). 
On the part of the second term, the convergence follows from the boundedness from above of 
π
is  and K, and from (2i). Combining (A12), (A13), and (A14), we have shown that 
 ( ) ( )xVxf π≥ .                  (A15) 
Since π is arbitrary among the class of policies which may be candidates for optimal policies, 
we have that ( ) ( )xVxf ≥ . On the other hand, if we take the admissible policy ∗π  defined in 
(10), we can go through the same steps as above and we will get (A15) with equality. In 
particular, we have equality in (A3) because of (10iii) (dividends are never paid below the 
region where f'(x) equals 1) and the 'complementary slackness' condition (9v) that f must 
satisfy (f therefore satisfies (9iii) with equality in the region of 'inaction'). We have equality in 
(A9) due to (10ii), and equality in (A10) due to (10i). These imply that ( ) ( ) ( )xVxVxf ≤= ∗π . 
Combining this and (A15), we have ( ) ( ) ( )xVxVxf == ∗π . End of proof. 
 
 Appendix B: Other proofs 
Auxiliary lemma 1 (this will be needed in the proofs of lemmas 1 and 2). 
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The first equality follows from the linearity of the expectation, the second from the law of 
total probability, the third from the Strong Markov property of arithmetic Brownian motion, 
the fourth just rearranges, and the fifth follows from integration by parts. End of proof. 
Lemma 1. If 2uK −−= ρµβ ≥ 0, then M f'(x) > 0 and Mf''(x) < 0 for all x. 
Proof: Let us rewrite the operator M starting from (7') as follows 
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where again ( ) [ ]xXtPtxp =≤= 00, τ and the third equality utilizes the Auxiliary lemma 1. 
We know that p satisfies the Kolmogorov backward equation, and that its partial derivatives 
satisfy 
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for all (x,t) ∈ R++ × R++. We differentiate the final expression in (B1) once and twice with 
respect to x and obtain 
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where the inequalities hold for all non-negative β because of the signs of the partials of p(x,t). 
End of proof. 
Auxiliary lemma 2. Let K ≥ 0. For all 0 < u2 ≤ u0, ( ) ( ) 22 uxxfxMf −+=< ρ
µ
  for all x ≥ u2. 
Proof. We use here the notation Mf(x) = Mf(x,u2) and f2(x) = f2(x,u2). Beginning with (7'), we 
get 
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where p(x,t) is as defined in Auxiliary lemma 1. The fourth equality utilizes Auxiliary lemma 
1, the first inequality is due to setting K to 0, the second inequality is because u2 ≤ u0 < µ/ρ  
(this is due to (15) and (9iv)), the third inequality is because  
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and the final equality is due to (16). End of proof. 
Lemma 2. If ( ) ( ) 00100 ,, == ∂
∂
>
∂
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x
uxf
x
uxM
, then there exists a solution (u1,u2) to (20) 
satisfying 0 < u1 < u2 < u0 such that ( ) ( )212 ,, uxfuxMf ≤  for all 0 ≤ x ≤ u2. 
Proof. We use here the notation Mf(x) = Mf(x,u2) and f1(x) = f1(x,u2). Throughout, we suppose 
that the condition ( ) ( ) 00100 ,, == ∂
∂
>
∂
∂
xx
x
uxf
x
uxM
 holds. 
i) From (17) we get that ( ) 0,
2
21 <
∂
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u
uxf
, while in (21) we have defined u0 such that 
( ) 0,0 01 =uf . Therefore ( ) ( )010 ,00,0 ufuMf == , while ( ) ( )212 ,00,0 ufuMf <=  for 0 < u2 < 
u0. On the other hand, by Auxiliary lemma 2, ( ) ( ) ρ
µ
=< 22122 ,, uufuuMf  for 0 < u2 ≤ u0. The 
previous facts imply that there is a positive x within (0,u0) such that ( ) ( )010 ,, uxfuxMf > , and 
that in general the crossing between ( )0,uxMf  and ( )01 ,uxf  is not smooth. 
ii) From (19) and (17) we get (given positive ∆) 
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Based on Lemma 1, if 02 ≥−− uKρµ  then Mf(x,u2) is increasing and concave in x, while 
from (17) we get that for x < u2 also f1(x,u2) is increasing and concave in x. This, together with 
the previous inequality, implies that one can always find a (sufficiently small) u2 satisfying 0 
< u2 < u0 such that ( ) ( )212 ,, uxfuxMf <   for 0 ≤ x ≤ u2.  
iii) Based on i) and ii), and the continuity of Mf(x,u2) and f1(x,u2) with respect to x and u2, 
there will also exist a u2 satisfying 0 < u2 < u0 such that for some 0 < u1 < u2, 
( ) ( )21121 ,, uufuuMf = , while ( ) ( )212 ,, uxfuxMf ≤  for all 0 ≤ x ≤ u2. (By Auxiliary lemma 2, 
we then also have ( ) ( )222 ,, uxfuxMf <  for all x > u2). But at this choice of (u1,u2), 
continuous differentiability of Mf(x,u2) and f1(x,u2) with respect to x also implies that 
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== ∂
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=
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. This is because two continuously differentiable functions 
whose values coincide in the interior of their domain, but which do not cross, must posses 
equal derivatives at the point. End of proof. 
Lemma 3. Assume that a solution to (20) as described in Lemma 2 exists and that f is defined 
by (22). Then f is a concave solution to (9) and satisfies Ito's formula. 
Proof: f is concave: By construction f''(x) = 0 for x ≥ u2. Differentiating f1 given by (17) three 
times shows that f''' > 0 on (u1, u2). Therefore f has an increasing second derivative on (u1, u2), 
which combined with the fact that f1''(u2) = 0 implies that f''(x) < 0 on (u1, u2). Finally, we 
know from Lemma 1 that Mf is globally concave, and therefore f is concave on (0, u1). 
Equality of first derivatives of Mf and f1 at u1 then implies that f is globally concave. 
f satisfies Ito's formula because each of the component solutions is twice continuously 
differentiable, while f satisfies the smooth pasting conditions at the barriers u1 and u2.  
f solves (9): 
(9i): f(0) = 0 because Mf(0) = 0. 
(9ii): f(x) = Mf(x) for 0 ≤ x ≤ u1 by construction. By Lemma 2, f(x) = f1(x) ≥ Mf(x) for 0 ≤ x ≤ 
u2, and by Auxiliary lemma 2 f(x) = f2(x) > Mf(x) for x ≥ u2. 
(9iii): For 0 < x < u1, we have f(x) = Mf(x), and we get from Itô’s formula  
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where τ is a stopping time defined by εττ ε ∧= , for some ε > 0 such that x - ε > 0, x + ε < u1, 
and ( ){ }xXxxXt t =+−∉≥= 0,:0inf εετ ε . Taking expectations and noting that the last 
term is a martingale because Mf(x) is concave, we obtain 
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where ( )[ ]τρτ XMfeEx −  is the value of waiting untill τ prior to ordering a new capital issue. 
Because immediate ordering of capital is the optimal action at x < u1, we have  
  ( ) ( )[ ]τρτ XMfeExMf x −≥ . 
Combining the last two equations and the fact that f(x) = Mf(x) for x < u1, we get 
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A limit operation then gives us 
 [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
1lim
0
0
≤−=






−
∫→
xfAdsXfAE
E sxx
ρρ
τ
τ
ε
, 
for x < u1. 
For u1 ≤ x ≤ u2, we have (A-ρ)f(x) = 0 by construction.  
For x > u2, we have f(x) = µ/ρ + x - u2, f'(x) = 1, f''(x) = 0, so that  
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for all x > u2. 
(9iv): f'(x) = 1 for x ≥ u2 by contruction. That f'(x) > 1 for x < u2 follows from the concavity of 
f (proved above). 
(9v): Follows directly from construction. 
End of proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3. When ∆ = 0, we get from (7') that ( ) KuxxMf −−+= 2ρµ , for all 
x > 0, where u2 is the dividend barrier defined in (12). The boundary condition that replaces 
(9i) is given by the maximum of ( ) KuxMf
x
−−=
+→
20
lim ρµ  and zero. With this modification, 
the set of quasi-variational inequalities in (9) becomes 
( ) ( )0,max0 2 Kuf −−= ρµ  
( ) 0≤− fA ρ  
1'≥f  
( ) ( ) 01' =−− ffA ρ . 
 Solving ii) and iii) as previously, and enforcing smooth pasting at u2, yields expressions (16) 
and (17) in the text. The barrier u2 is solved by substituting (17) into the boundary condition 
i). Assuming that the maximum in i) is achieved by the first term, u2 is determined from the 
equation 
 ( ) ( ) Kueaeaugf udud −−=+== −+ −− 2212 21210 ρ
µ
.               (B3) 
We record the following easily verifyable properties of the function g: R+ → R defined in 
(B3): i) ( ) ρµ=0g , ii) ( ) 0' <ug , u ≥ 0, iii) ( ) ∞→−∞→ uasug , iv) ( ) 00'' =g , v) 
( ) 0''' <ug , u ≥ 0, where the convergence in iii) is exponential. Since K is positive, we have 
( ) Kg −>=
ρ
µ
ρ
µ0 . g is concave by iv) and v), and therefore crosses the linear function 
Ku −− 2ρµ  at a unique uˆ  > 0 which satisfies (B3). 
For the maximum in i) to be achieved by the first term, the solution to (B3) must satisfy 
 ( ) ( ) 0ˆˆ0 >−−== Kuugf
ρ
µ
,                  (B4) 
i.e. g(u2) must be positive at the point of intersection with the function Ku −− 2ρµ . Setting 
( ) 0=ug , we get that u = u0, where u0 is given by equation (21) in the text. Then a necessary 
and sufficient condition for (B4) to hold is that 00 >−− Kuρµ , or equivalently that 
0uK −< ρµ , which is the condition in the proposition. Since g is declining in u, in this case 
also 0ˆ uu < . End of proof. 
Lemma 4. The probability of bankruptcy in finite time is 1. 
Proof: We only need to analyze the case u1 > 0 since the case u1 = 0 (the basic model in the 
absence of capital issues) the result is known to hold. When u1 > 0, default can occur only 
during the capital issue’s time delay. Capital issue is ordered when Xt ≤ u1 and, because u1> 0, 
we get from (7'') that the probability of no default during ∆ is given by 
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density of a normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2, i.e. 
 ( ) ( )( )2 22exp21,; σµπσσµϕ −−= yy . 
The above equation implies that the probability of default during the delay is 
( )[ ] 100 <=∧∆∆ τXP . The probability of capital issue on [0,T] is bounded below as follows 
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We have the inequality because on the right-hand side the dividends are not considered and 
the process starts at u2. Now taking limit we get ( )[ ] 1lim 11 =≤∧
∞→
uTXP uTT τ  because  
( ) ( ) 22exp 22 22 ≤−Φ

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µµ .  
From (B5) we also get that the capital stock without capital issues satisfies 
 ( )( ) ( )( )[ ] 11lim 1211 121 =−−−≤−−−∧
∞→
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π
  for all n ∈ {1, 2, … }, 
where ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )ππ σµτ 121121121121 1111 uunuTuunuTuunuuunuT LWTxX −−−∧−−−∧−−−−−−∧ −+∧+=  and n 
indicates the number of capital issues we should have done. This implies that the capital stock 
process with capital issues hits u1 infinite often. Therefore, the probability of no default over 
infinite time horizon is given by ( )[ ] 00lim 0 =>∧∆∆
∞→
n
n
XP τ  because ( )[ ] 100 <>∧∆∆ τXP . 
The company has finite default time with probability 1. End of proof. 
 Figure 1. Illustration of the model structure 
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 Figure 2. Illustration of the value function in a case where both u1 and u2 are positive 
Parameter values: µ = 2%, σ = 2%, ρ = 1/15, ∆ = 0.5 years, K = 1%. The optimal barriers u1 = 
1.80% and u2 = 6.25% are marked with vertical dotted lines. The optimal dividend barrier in 
the absence of the equity issue option u0 = 6.51%. 
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 Figure 3. Illustration of the value function in a case where u1 = 0 
In this case D1M(0,u0) < D1f1(0,u0). Parameter values: µ = 2%, σ = 2%, ρ = 1/15, ∆ = 1 year, 
K = 6%. The optimal barriers u1 = 0 and u2 = u0 = 6.51%, where u0 is the optimal dividend 
barrier in the absence of the option to issue new capital, given by equation (21) in the text. 
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 Figure 4. Model capital buffers as a function of volatility 
The barrier u2, which is interpreted as the optimal capital ratio (in excess of the 8% 
minimum), as a function of volatility. The fixed parameters are equal to their calibrated values 
µ = 2%, ρ = 1/15. The fixed cost K = 1%. The calibrated value for σ is 0.5%. The observed 
median bank capital ratio is 4.4%. 
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 Figure 5. The dividend barrier u2 
Fixed parameter values: µ = 2%, σ = 1.5%, ρ = 1/15. As ∆ approaches zero, u2 converges to 
its limiting value given in Proposition 3, and which is positive for positive K. As ∆ or K 
approach infinity, u2 converges to its maximum value u0, which in this example equals 4.4%. 
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 Figure 6. The capital issue barrier u1 
Fixed parameter values: µ = 2%, σ = 1.5%, ρ = 1/15. As ∆ approaches zero, u1 converges to 
0. As ∆ or K approach infinity, u1 converges to 0. 
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 Figure 7. The value of the capital issue option for different levels of K 
Fixed parameter values: µ = 2%, σ = 1.5%, ρ = 1/15, ∆ = 0.25 years. 
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 Table 1. Effective cost of capital issuance 
Fixed parameter values: µ = 2%, σ = 1.5%, ρ = 1/15. E[s] is the expected net amount of 
external capital raised, calculated at the order time of a new capital issue. K/(K+E[s]) is the 
cost of capital issuance, as a proportion of the expected total amount of new capital. 
∆ K (%) u1 (%) u2 (%) E[s] (%) K/(K+E[s]) 
0.08 0.25 1.10 3.22 1.95 11 % 
0.08 0.5 1.00 3.46 2.29 18 % 
0.08 1 0.89 3.70 2.64 27 % 
0.08 2 0.75 3.94 3.02 40 % 
0.25 0.25 1.53 3.78 1.75 13 % 
0.25 0.5 1.33 3.95 2.12 19 % 
0.25 1 1.09 4.11 2.52 28 % 
0.25 2 0.79 4.26 2.97 40 % 
0.50 0.25 1.66 4.11 1.45 15 % 
0.50 0.5 1.34 4.22 1.88 21 % 
0.50 1 0.93 4.30 2.37 30 % 
0.50 2 0.21 4.35 3.14 39 % 
 
 
Essay 3: A Value-at-Risk approach to banks’ capital buffers: 
an application to the new Basel Accord* 
Joint work with Esa Jokivuolle♣ 
 
Abstract 
The rating-sensitive capital charges under the New Basel Accord will increase the 
volatility of banks' minimum capital requirements, which may necessitate banks 
to hold larger capital buffers in excess of the minimum requirements. We evaluate 
this claim through numerical simulations on representative bank portfolios, in 
which bank's choice of capital buffer is assumed to satisfy a Value-at-Risk type 
constraint. According to our results, the size of the buffer depends on bank's credit 
portfolio risk and on the chosen approach to calculating the minimum capital 
requirement. Although the more rating-sensitive Internal Ratings Based Approach 
imposes lower minimum capital requirements on sufficiently high-quality credit 
portfolios than the Standardised Approach, this capital relief is reduced by the 
need for relatively higher buffers in the former approach. The buffers induced by 
rating-sensitive capital charges may influence banks' choice between the proposed 
approaches to calculating the capital requirement, as well as the overall level of 
bank capital after the reform. Banks’ response to the volatility of the minimum 
capital requirements should therefore be given due consideration in the final 
calibration of the Basel risk weights. 
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 1 Introduction 
The second-round proposal for The New Basel Accord in January 2001, following the first 
initiative published in summer 1999, is a serious attempt to increase the risk-sensitivity of the 
rules according to which banks are required to hold capital. The purpose of the reform is to 
further improve the stability of banking, to correct possible distortions in the market and to 
contain capital arbitrage which has gradually undermined the effectiveness of the current 
accord. To increase risk-sensitivity, new risk-weight categories for the currently recognized 
risk types are added and entirely new risk types, such as operational risks, are incorporated. 
Highly detailed rules are planned for taking into account various risk mitigation techniques 
ranging from traditional collateral to credit derivatives in determining net exposures, and 
treatment for securitised assets are being developed. Moreover, an overall evolutionary 
approach is emphasized in that the framework offers different options of varying degrees of 
sophistication, which banks can pursue as their resources and capabilities develop. Finally, to 
complement the reforms in the area of direct risk measurement and the minimum capital 
requirements based on them, the supervisory review process will be strengthened and banks’ 
disclosure requirements will be increased. 
Perhaps the most important and visible part of the reform is the differentiation of 
corporate credits, currently all receiving 100 per cent risk-weight, into a number of risk-
weight categories based on credit ratings provided either by external rating agencies or banks 
themselves. The use of external ratings constitutes the new standardised approach (SA) in 
which unrated counterparties still receive the 100 per cent weight but in which rated 
counterparties receive weights ranging from 20% to 150%. The approach based on internal 
ratings (IRBA) is the more sophisticated and detailed one, also making use of additional 
elements such as the credit portfolio’s degree of diversification. Moreover, two options, the 
foundation and the advanced approach, are available within the IRBA. While the SA 
constitutes the obligatory part of the new capital framework, a bank can choose to use the 
IRBA instead, subject to supervisory approval of the bank’s internal credit rating systems. On 
the whole, the IRBA offers potentially much more risk-sensitivity than the SA. Many banks 
have expressed great interest in using the IRBA which would be much better aligned with 
 their economic capital models and which would more accurately reward low-risk portfolios 
with a lower capital requirement. 
The increased risk-sensitivity of the regulatory risk weights will be reflected in the 
volatility of the regulatory capital requirement. While under the current accord shocks to 
banks’ regulatory solvency ratios mainly result from unexpected losses, under the new 
framework these will also result from unexpected changes in risk-weighted assets due to 
ratings migration. If the volatility in minimum capital requirements rises relative to the 
current accord, banks are likely to increase their capital buffers above the minimum 
requirements. This is because – as both theory and empirical evidence since the introduction 
of the Basel 1988 Accord suggest - banks prefer to hold buffer capital in order to avoid the 
various costs, related to supervisory intervention and market discipline, which would result 
from approaching, let alone falling below, the regulatory minimum capital ratio (see Furfine, 
2000). In this thinking the 8 per cent minimum capital ratio is analogous to a (regulatory) 
default point in excess of which banks need to hold their actual capital. 
Banks’ response to the reform will impact the overall level of capital in the banking 
sector. The buffers that banks prefer to hold may also have implications for banks’ choice 
between the standardised approach and the internal ratings based approach. As the minimum 
capital requirement under the IRBA is likely to be substantially more volatile than under the 
SA, banks’ capital buffers are likely to be higher under the IRBA as well (this is something 
that we study). The minimum capital requirement plus the required additional buffer, not the 
minimum capital charge alone, is likely to influence banks’ choice between the two 
approaches. Basel obviously should take this into account in the final calibration of the risk-
weights, one of the aims of which is to provide banks with capital incentives to start using the 
more sophisticated internal ratings based approach. 
In this paper, we attempt to estimate the likely effect of the new Basel regimes on bank 
capital buffers. Our analysis is based on a small number of illustrative bank portfolios. We 
assume that a bank’s choice of capital buffer satisfies a Value-at-Risk type constraint, one 
which states that the capital buffer should cover the bank’s (credit) losses, as well as the 
change in the bank’s minimum capital requirement, at a sufficiently high confidence level, 
and over a horizon which reflects the illiquidity of the bank’s assets. In order to solve the 
capital buffer from this constraint, we implement a Monte Carlo simulation on a credit 
 portfolio model of the CreditMetricsTM type, but one which is extended to account for the 
regulatory minimum capital requirement. Effectively, we simulate bank credit losses and 
capital requirements simultaneously, and the Value-at-Risk requirement applies to the 
distribution of the sum of these two random variables. Given the complexity of the proposed 
Basel rules, our numerical approach is the most effective way to calculate the Value-at-Risk 
requirement with reasonable accuracy. As far as we are aware of, our simulation setup is 
novel. 
Our results indicate that especially for low-risk portfolios, the capital buffers under the 
internal ratings based approach are likely to be substantial. Interestingly, for high-risk 
portfolios the additional cushions would be reduced relative to the current capital accord. A 
failure to account for these effects in the final risk-weight calibration could result in a 
different subset of banks opting for the internal ratings based approach from what is intended 
by Basel. We also argue that it is important to understand the way banks would likely respond 
to the reform when interpreting, and comparing across banks, the regulatory capital ratios in 
the new regime. 
2 The setup 
We consider a bank having all its assets in illiquid corporate loans. We argue that there are 
essentially three constraints that the bank would need to meet when determining how much 
capital to reserve against its portfolio. First, there is the minimum regulatory capital 
requirement associated with the bank’s current portfolio. Second, the bank will want to 
reserve enough capital to absorb its credit losses and the fluctuations in its minimum capital 
requirement over its planning horizon1, one year in our examples, with a reasonable 
confidence level, without recourse to new external funds. This confidence level would reflect 
the various implicit costs the bank would incur from approaching the minimum capital ratio. 
The higher these costs are, the higher a confidence level the bank would choose. A confidence 
level of e.g. 95% would imply that the bank would tolerate a violation of the minimum capital 
                                               
1
 Our use of the term planning horizon may not be taken literally. In theory, the horizon should be related to the 
time it takes to liquidate the portfolio, or alternatively, to obtain external capital. Also the estimates for the key 
parameters needed in credit Value-at-Risk models to calculate economic capital, such as probabilities of default, 
are not readily available for frequencies higher than one year, which may determine the horizon to be used. 
 ratio on average once in every 20 years. Third, the bank will also want to satisfy an economic 
capital constraint, which states that capital must cover the bank’s credit losses over its 
planning horizon, with a sufficiently high probability. This probability would typically be 
chosen to be consistent with the bank’s overall rating target. An Aa target would imply a 
solvency probability of order 99.95% in a year. We suggest that the bank would choose the 
minimum amount of capital that satisfies each of these three constraints. We call this amount 
the minimum acceptable capital held by the bank. This divided by the risk-weighted assets is 
called the minimum acceptable capital ratio. 
We develop the capital requirements here from an accounting identity governing the 
bank’s capital dynamics. We let E0 denote current bank capital (ex time 0 dividends), I1 be the 
bank's profit, prior to any credit losses, during period 1, and L1 be the bank's credit losses 
during period 1. We denote by ktR  the bank’s regulatory capital requirement at time t ∈ 
{0,1}, and under regulatory capital regime k ∈ {CA (current approach), SA (new standardised 
approach), IRBA (internal ratings based approach)}. We assume the period length to be one 
year, but the formulas here apply for any period length. Finally, we define the bank’s capital 
buffer in the capital regime k, ktB , as 
 
k
tt
k
t REB −= . 
Assuming that no time 1 dividends are paid, the bank's capital dynamics satisfies the 
accounting identity 
 1101 LIEE −+= , 
where E1 denotes time 1 bank capital. We denote E[L1] the time 0 expectation of credit losses 
during year 1. We assume that the bank’s pricing of its loans is actuarially fair, so that its 
profit before credit losses equals its expected credit losses 
 [ ]11 LEI = . 
Credit losses over period 1 can be decomposed into expected losses and unexpected losses 
 [ ] 111 ULLEL += , 
where UL1 is the unexpected credit loss, defined by [ ]111 LELUL −= . Combining the previous 
three formulas, we obtain the capital dynamics 
  101 ULEE −= . 
From this simple dynamics we obtain the constraints that determine bank capital buffers. The 
first condition is the current minimum capital requirement 
 0000 ≥⇔≥ kk BRE .        (1) 
The second condition is concerned with capital adequacy at time 1. The bank’s capital at time 
1 satisfies the time 1 regulatory capital requirement if kRULE 110 ≥− . This may be expressed 
in terms of the time 0 capital buffer as 
 
kk RULB 110 ∆+≥ , 
where kkk RRR 011 −=∆  is the change in the bank’s regulatory capital charge between time 0 
and time 1. Denoting the required confidence level for regulatory capital adequacy at time 1 
by α, we obtain the Value-at-Risk constraint 
 [ ] α≥∆+≥ kk RULBP 110 ,        (2) 
which is a requirement on time 0 capital buffers. It is clear from (2) that in order to calculate 
the minimum acceptable capital buffer, we must identify the distribution of the sum of two 
random variables, the unexpected losses and the change in the minimum capital requirement. 
Both of these are driven by rating transitions and defaults in the bank’s portfolio. 
The third condition for capital adequacy is what is commonly known as ’economic 
capital constraint’, which states that the bank’s time 1 capital must be non-negative, at a 
sufficiently high confidence level β 
 [ ] β≥≥ 01EP . 
This may be expressed as a requirement on time 0 capital buffers as 
 [ ] [ ] β≥−∆+≥=−≥ kkkkk RRULBPRULBP 1110010 .     (3) 
Because the regulatory capital charge is non-negative, a comparison of (2) and the second 
expression in (3) reveals that if the confidence levels α and β are equal, the constraint (2) 
 imposes a higher initial capital buffer. In practical applications, however, we usually have β > 
α. In fact one of the advantages of our dynamic regulatory capital criterion (2), over the 
economic capital criterion (3), is that the applied confidence level need not be as close to 1, 
making it easier to achieve a given numerical accuracy in Monte Carlo simulations. 
Numerical simulations indicate that for typical values of α and β (such as 99% and 99.9%) 
and for average bank portfolios, the economic capital requirement (3) is not binding, and the 
dynamic regulatory requirement (2) determines the minimum acceptable capital buffer. 
Assuming that (2) determines the minimum acceptable capital, we let kB0ˆ  the smallest 
value that satisfies (2). Then minimum acceptable bank capital is kk BR 00 ˆ+ , and the minimum 
acceptable capital ratio can be expressed as 
 %8
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We explain briefly how we solve for the minimal initial capital satisfying criteria (2) and (3). 
We denote the distribution function of the random variable kRUL 11 ∆+  with F, and the 
distribution of the random variable UL1 with G. Given a hypothetical portfolio, we solve for F 
and G from a credit portfolio model of the CreditMetrics type, which is appropriately 
modified to produce realisations of kRUL 11 ∆+  and UL1 under the alternative capital regimes. 
In the model, latent correlated normal random variables representing customer firms’ asset 
values are used to simulate correlated rating migrations and defaults (see J.P. Morgan, 1997, 
for details). In terms of F and G, we can restate the constraints (1-3) as  
 00 ≥kB ,          (1’) 
{ }α≥≥ )(|min0 bFbBk ,        (2’) 
{ } kk RbGbB 00 )(|min −≥≥ β ,        (3’) 
so that the solution reduces to finding the percentile points of the distributions F and G 
corresponding to α and β, respectively.  
 2.1 Discussion of the set-up 
Our reduced form approach is intended to be a tool for capital adequacy planning in banks. 
We introduce a probabilistic constraint associated with regulatory capital adequacy into a 
standard credit portfolio model. We simulate (changes in) regulatory capital requirements as 
well as unexpected losses simultaneously, and determine the required capital buffer based on 
their joint dynamics from a Value-at-Risk type criterion. Our extension is non-trivial because 
for reasonable choices for the confidence levels α and β, the dynamic regulatory capital 
constraint (2) is the binding one and determines the required capital buffer. Economic capital 
in the standard sense of the term, i.e. the solution to (3), is mostly redundant within our 
approach. 
In a fully optimizing model of a bank, the optimal level of bank capital would be 
determined as a trade-off between the various benefits and costs associated with holding 
capital (see e.g. Furfine, 2001 or Estrella, 2001). Without doubt, a fully optimizing approach 
would only be feasible at the cost of abandoning the realistic model for bank portfolio 
dynamics considered here, as well as the detailed consideration of the Basel II rules. The 
confidence levels α and β in our model reflect the many tradeoffs that would be explicitly 
present in a fully optimizing model. In particular, the values of α and β reflect the costs and 
penalties associated with a violation of the regulatory capital constraint, the capital market 
frictions that affect the recapitalization of the bank, the sensitivity of the bank’s funding cost 
to the amount of capital held by the bank, and the availability of growth options to the bank. 
3 Numerical results 
3.1 Example portfolios and parameter values 
We perform our analysis under three capital regimes: the current Basel Accord (CA), the 
Standardized Approach under Basel II (SA), and the foundation Internal Ratings Based 
Approach under Basel II (IRBA). The minimum capital requirements under the three regimes 
 are displayed in Table 12. As for the IRBA regime, the minimum capital requirements are 
based on long term average annual default frequencies in Moody’s data, and a uniform 50% 
recovery rate assumption, consistent with the proposed new Basel rules for uncollateralized 
senior exposures.  
Table 1. Minimum capital requirements in the three capital regimes 
PD = probability of default, CA = current approach, SA = standardized approach, IRBA = internal ratings based 
approach. The IRBA capital requirements are based on default probabilities which are from Moody’s data over 
the period 1970-1999, and an assumed LGD of 50 %. 
 
Rating PD CA SA IRBA 
Aaa 0.01 % 8 % 1.6 % 1.1 % 
Aa1 0.02 % 8 % 1.6 % 1.1 % 
Aa2 0.02 % 8 % 1.6 % 1.1 % 
Aa3 0.03 % 8 % 1.6 % 1.1 % 
A1 0.05 % 8 % 4 % 1.5 % 
A2 0.06 % 8 % 4 % 1.7 % 
A3 0.09 % 8 % 4 % 2.2 % 
Baa1 0.13 % 8 % 8 % 2.8 % 
Baa2 0.16 % 8 % 8 % 3.1 % 
Baa3 0.70 % 8 % 8 % 8.0 % 
Ba1 1.25 % 8 % 8 % 11.5 % 
Ba2 1.79 % 8 % 8 % 14.4 % 
Ba3 3.96 % 8 % 8 % 23.2 % 
B1 6.14 % 8 % 12 % 29.7 % 
B2 8.31 % 8 % 12 % 35.0 % 
B3 15.08 % 8 % 12 % 47.2 % 
Caa 29.87 % 8 % 12 % 50.0 % 
 
We consider nine hypothetical corporate debt portfolios, which differ in two risk dimensions: 
the obligor ratings distribution (aggregate, investment grade and non-investment grade), and 
the degree of exposure concentration (500, 100 and 50 obligors, respectively). Total exposure 
within each portfolio is 100, and a given portfolio always consists of loans of equal size. Each 
obligor is assumed to be equivalently rated externally and internally, based on the rating scale 
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 In the SA exposures are assigned a capital charge according to their rating only. In the IRBA capital charges 
are derived from a continuous function based on the obligor’s probability of default and the exposure’s loss 
given default. Moreover, an adjustment depending on the portfolio’s degree of exposure concentration is added 
to the total capital requirement calculated in the first stage. The details of calculating the capital charge in the SA 
and in the IRBA are described in Basel Committee (2001). In the CA all exposures regardless of rating receive a 
common 8 per cent capital charge. 
 of Moody’s3. To obtain a realistic distribution of obligors over rating categories, we use 
annual data over the period 1987-99 on total U.S. corporate long-term debt by rating category 
as rated by Moody’s. In the aggregate portfolio, the share of obligors in each rating category 
corresponds to the time-series average of the share of that rating category on total debt over 
the sample period. The investment grade and the non-investment grade portfolios are 
constructed in a similar fashion. In the former, we only include debt in investment grade 
categories each year, whereas the latter includes total debt in categories Ba1 or below. All 
exposures in each portfolio are assumed to be senior and uncollateralized. Table 2 displays 
the rating distributions of the example portfolios. 
Table 2. Compositions of example portfolios 
Each cell gives the percentage of portfolio nominal value invested in the particular rating category. The average 
probability of default has been calculated using on the probabilities in Table 1. The portfolio weights are from 
Moody’s data 1987-1999. 
 
Rating Investment Aggregate Non-inv. 
 grade  grade 
Aaa 7.8 % 6.2 %  
Aa1 3.0 % 2.4 %  
Aa2 6.7 % 5.4 %  
Aa3 12.4 % 9.9 %  
A1 16.9 % 13.6 %  
A2 16.9 % 13.5 %  
A3 11.1 % 8.9 %  
Baa1 9.0 % 7.2 %  
Baa2 8.7 % 7.0 %  
Baa3 7.4 % 5.9 %  
Ba1  2.5 % 12.8 % 
Ba2  2.1 % 10.9 % 
Ba3  2.7 % 13.8 % 
B1  3.0 % 15.2 % 
B2  4.0 % 20.1 % 
B3  3.8 % 19.0 % 
Caa  1.6 % 8.2 % 
Average PD 0.1 % 1.9 % 8.8 % 
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 In calculating the IRBA capital requirements we implicitly assume that the bank is using an internal rating 
system that would produce equivalent ratings and default probabilities as if it were using the Moody’s system 
and data. The Moody’s system consists of 17 nondefault rating categories ranging from Aaa to Caa. According 
to the Basel Committee (2001), the IRBA approach would only require a minimum of 6-9 rating grades (for 
performing loans), so the 17 categories represents a case where the bank takes full advantage of the risk-
discriminating opportunities within the IRBA. The number of rating categories used and the probabilities of 
default assigned to these categories will affect our quantitative results, but hardly their qualitative implications. 
  
In simulating losses and capital requirements for these portfolios, we use a rating transition 
probability matrix for one-year horizon which is based on annual transition frequencies over 
the period 1970-1999 reported by Moody’s4. The default probabilities from the same data are 
used in the calculation of the IRBA capital charges. We assume a uniform 20% asset 
correlation between each pair of obligors, as well as a uniform recovery rate of 50% across all 
obligors, corresponding to the underlying assumption made by the Basel Committee in 
producing the capital charges for the IRBA. 
3.2 Capital requirements 
Table 3 shows the statistics of the credit loss distribution and the economic capital constraints 
for each portfolio. In this table, the unexpected loss corresponding to a confidence level β is 
the β’th percentile of the distribution G of the random variable UL1. The unexpected loss with 
confidence level β hence coincides with the economic capital requirement under the same 
Table 3. Credit risk statistics and the economic capital constraint 
Unexpected loss is defined as the given percentile of the credit loss distribution less expected loss. Total 
exposure in each portfolio equals 100. 
Unexpected loss Portfolio Expected 
loss 
Standard 
deviation β = 99% β = 99.9% β = 99.95% 
“500” 0.1 0.1 0.6 1.5 1.8 
“100” 0.1 0.2 1.0 1.9 2.4 
Investment 
grade 
 
“50” 0.1 0.3 1.5 2.1 3.0 
“500” 1.0 0.8 2.8 4.8 5.8 
“100” 1.0 1.0 3.5 5.5 6.5 
Aggregate 
“50” 1.0 1.2 4.0 6.0 7.0 
“500” 4.4 3.5 11.8 18.4 20.1 
“100” 4.4 3.7 12.1 19.1 21.1 
Non- 
investment 
grade 
“50” 4.4 3.9 13.5 19.6 22.1 
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 Again, these are assumed to be representative of the probabilities with which the model bank updates its 
internal ratings. We note that banks may use rating systems with different quantitative transition characteristics, 
which entail higher off-diagonal transition probabilities than the Moody’s matrix (see e.g. Kealhofer et al., 
1998). This would further increase the volatility in minimum capital requirements.  
 confidence level, expressed as a minimum level of equity (rather than as a capital buffer). We 
observe from Table 3, as expected, that the degree of diversification of the portfolio does not 
influence expected losses, whereas measures of loss dispersion increase as diversification is 
reduced. For a well-diversified portfolio with 500 assets, the standard deviation of the credit 
loss distribution is of the same order of magnitude than the mean of the distribution. We 
observe that diversification still offers considerable benefits for credit portfolios with over 
100 assets. In relative terms, the benefits of diversification appear the higher, the better the 
portfolio credit quality. Finally, Table 3 provides evidence that the skewness of the credit loss 
distribution is the more extreme, the better the average credit quality of the portfolio. For an 
investment grade portfolio with 500 assets, the ratio of the 99.9th percentile of the distribution 
to the standard deviation of the distribution is 15. For a corresponding non-investment grade 
portfolio the same ratio is only around 5. 
Table 4. Minimum capital requirements 
The regulatory 8 per cent minimum capital requirements. Total exposure in each portfolio equals 100. The lower 
of the minimum capital requirements in the SA and in the IRBA is indicated with gray shading. 
Portfolio CA SA IRBA 
“500” 8.0 4.3 2.4 
“100” 8.0 4.3 3.4 
Investment 
grade 
“50” 8.0 4.3 4.7 
“500” 8.0 5.6 7.9 
“100” 8.0 5.6 9.4 
Aggregate 
“50” 8.0 5.6 10.8 
“500” 8.0 10.5 29.9 
“100” 8.0 10.5 31.1 
Non- 
investment 
grade 
“50” 8.0 10.5 33.2 
 
In Table 4 we report the 8 per cent regulatory minimum capital requirements. We make some 
obvious remarks. First, while the current Basel regime does not differentiate corporate 
exposures according to their credit risk, the SA and the IRBA indeed do so. Second, only the 
IRBA punishes or rewards portfolios according to their degree of diversification, measured by 
exposure concentration. The effects of diversification are captured by the granularity 
adjustment term in the IRBA, not the baseline risk weights themselves. Table 5 shows this, by 
decomposing the IRBA minimum capital requirements in Table 4 into components due to the 
 baseline risk weights and the granularity adjustment, respectively. Table 5 further shows that 
the effect of the granularity adjustment is the largest in relative terms in high-quality 
portfolios. Moreover, both negative and positive granularity adjustments occur among our 
example portfolios. Third, the SA looks very competitive against the IRBA based on the 
minimum capital requirements. In fact the IRBA minimum capital requirement is lower than 
the SA minimum capital requirement in case of the 500 and 100 asset investment grade 
portfolios only. 
Table 5. The effects of granularity adjustment in the IRBA 
RWA = risk-weighted assets, GA = granularity adjustment. 
Portfolio  RWA GA RWA+GA 8%* 
RWA 
8%* 
(RWA+GA) 
“500” 28.0 2.0 30.1 2.2 2.4 
“100” 27.7 14.7 42.4 2.2 3.4 
Investment 
grade 
“50” 28.6 30.5 59.1 2.3 4.7 
“500” 99.4 -0.5 98.9 7.9 7.9 
“100” 103.7 13.4 117.1 8.3 9.4 
Aggregate 
“50” 103.4 31.1 134.5 8.3 10.8 
“500” 385.6 -11.5 374.0 30.8 29.9 
“100” 384.4 4.1 388.6 30.8 31.1 
Non- 
investment 
grade 
“50” 390.9 23.5 414.4 31.3 33.2 
 
The minimum acceptable capital amounts, calculated from (2’), are presented in Table 6. All 
results are based on the confidence level α = 99%. In those cells in Table 6 where the 
economic capital constraint (3’) is binding, the resulting minimum acceptable capital amount 
is reported in parentheses in the respective cell. In all cases economic capital has been 
calculated based on a confidence level β = 99.95%, so that the figures correspond to the right-
most column in Table 3. We observe that the economic capital constraint is binding under the 
CA and the SA for the non-investment grade portfolios. This reflects the fact that the CA and 
the SA are not sensitive enough to portfolio risk, so that the bank’s own economic capital 
requirement comes into play. Under the IRBA, the economic capital requirement is not 
binding for any of the portfolios considered. This is not very surprising, knowing that a 
multiplier greater than one has been used in deriving the current IRBA benchmark risk-
weights relative to an underlying economic capital model (for an explanation of the derivation 
of the IRBA risk-weights, see Wilde, 2001). 
  
Table 6. Minimum acceptable capital amounts 
The minimum amounts of capital satisfying (2) for the example portfolios, given α = 99%. Figures in 
parentheses are the economic capital requirements (3) where it is the binding constraint, given a confidence level 
β = 99.95%. Total exposure in each portfolio equals 100. The lower of the capital requirements in the SA and in 
the IRBA is indicated with gray shading. 
Portfolio CA SA IRBA 
“500” 8.5 5.6 4.8 
“100” 8.8 5.8 6.1 
Investment 
grade 
“50” 9.3 6.0 7.7 
“500” 10.3 8.4 10.6 
“100” 10.8 8.8 12.1 
Aggregate 
“50” 11.2 9.1 13.6 
“500” 17.2 (20.1) 19.0 (20.1) 33.2 
“100” 17.5 (21.1) 19.4 (21.1) 34.6 
Non- 
investment 
grade 
“50” 18.7 (22.1) 20.1 (22.1) 36.6 
 
Since the nominal value of each portfolio has been normalized to 100, the capital amounts in 
Table 6 also represent effective equity ratios for the portfolios. These equity ratios, which are 
obtained by dividing capital by nominal assets, are different from the usual bank capital 
ratios, which refer to capital over risk-weighted assets. The equity ratios are very informative 
in comparisons that take place between capital regimes, as we do here, because the risk-
weighted assets used to calculate standard capital ratios are not constant across capital 
regimes. 
Figure 1 illustrates the contents of tables 4 and 6, by decomposing the acceptable capital 
amounts for the 500 asset portfolios into the minimum requirement and the buffer, in each 
capital regime. This brings out the relative size of the buffer with respect to the minimum 
requirement. We note that buffers are very large in relative terms for investment grade 
portfolios in the IRBA, although the total acceptable capital amount in this case is quite low. 
Buffers are also large in relative terms for non-investment grade portfolio under the current 
Basel regime as well as under the SA. Perhaps surprisingly, however, the relative size of the 
buffer is quite low for non-investment grade portfolios in the IRBA. We provide an 
explanation to this below. 
  
Figure 1. Decomposition of acceptable capital into minimum capital and capital buffer 
Based on the results for the 500 asset portfolios. The figure combines information from tables 4 and 6. To focus 
on the effect of rating sensitivity, the economic capital constraint (the figures in parentheses in Table 6) is 
ignored. 
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Table 7 shows the capital ratios for all the example portfolios. These have been calculated 
from the minimum acceptable capital amounts through formula (4). All the capital ratios 
exceed the 8% regulatory minimum. We observe that the highest capital ratios are for well 
diversified investment grade portfolios under the IRBA, and for poorly diversified non-
investment grade portfolios under the current regime. In general, we observe that capital ratios 
of investment grade portfolio rise, going from the current regime to the more risk-sensitive 
regimes, while the capital ratios for non-investment grade portfolio are reduced. The capital 
ratios for average quality portfolios are virtually equivalent under the current regime and the 
IRBA. As an example, we note that the minimum acceptable capital ratio for the 500 asset 
investment grade portfolio in the current regime in 8.5%, whereas in the IRBA the ratio is 
16.0%. The corresponding ratios for the 500 asset non-investment grade portfolio are 17.2% 
and 8.9%. Table 7 also shows that the capital ratios under the current regime and under the 
SA decline when portfolio diversification increases, whereas in the IRBA the reverse 
 happens. The odd behavior of the capital ratio in the IRBA with respect to portfolio 
diversification is due to the granularity adjustment, which results in lower minimum capital 
charges for well-diversified portfolios, but as Table 7 confirms, part of this capital savings is 
consumed by the need for relatively larger capital buffers. 
Table 7. Minimum acceptable capital ratios 
The minimum acceptable capital ratios for the example portfolios, given α = 99%, calculated from (4). Figures 
in parentheses indicate the minimum acceptable capital ratio in cases where the economic capital constraint (3) is 
binding for the most conservative choice of β = 99.95%. Total exposure in each portfolio equals 100. 
Portfolio CA SA IRBA 
“500” 8.5% 10.4% 16.0% 
“100” 8.8% 10.7% 14.4% 
Investment 
grade 
“50” 9.3% 11.2% 13.1% 
“500” 10.3% 12.0% 10.7% 
“100” 10.8% 12.7% 10.4% 
Aggregate 
“50” 11.2% 13.0% 10.1% 
“500” 17.2% (20.1%) 14.5% (15.3%) 8.9% 
“100” 17.5% (21.1%) 14.8% (16.1%) 8.9% 
Non- 
investment 
grade 
“50” 18.7% (22.1%) 15.3% (16.8%) 8.8% 
 
That the relative size of the capital buffer for a given portfolio is not always higher in the 
more risk-sensitive IRBA, relative to the SA or the current regime, may appear as somewhat 
surprising. In fact, Table 7 indicates that the IRBA gives rise to higher minimum acceptable 
capital ratios than the SA only for the investment grade portfolios. A related observation is 
that in the CA and in the SA, the minimum acceptable capital ratio increases as the risk of the 
portfolio increases, whereas in the IRBA the reverse happens5. In order to understand why, 
we analyze the two random components that determine the capital requirement (2). The first 
component is the unexpected loss, and the second component is the change in the minimum 
capital requirement. In a high-quality portfolio there can be mainly rating downgrades but 
very few losses. This implies that in a rating-sensitive capital regime, like the IRBA, rating 
migration can cause considerable variation in the minimum capital requirement, whereas in a 
 capital regime relatively insensitive to ratings this is not the case. Therefore the minimum 
acceptable capital ratio for the investment grade portfolio is the highest in the IRBA, the 
second-highest in the SA, and the lowest in the current regime, CA. As for low credit quality 
portfolios, the unexpected loss component now contributes significantly to the capital 
requirement. Hence the minimum acceptable capital ratios in the risk-insensitive capital 
regimes are relatively high. In the risk-sensitive IRBA, on the other hand, the opposite 
happens because of two reasons. First, relative to a high-quality portfolio, there is more scope 
for rating upgrades which the risk-sensitive regime rewards with a lower minimum capital 
requirement. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the initial capital requirement in the 
more risk-sensitive approach already accounts for much of the potential losses in the planning 
period because the lowest rated assets receive capital charges which are of the same order of 
magnitude as realized losses in the event of default. Indeed, the highest-risk exposures receive 
the cap risk-weight in the IRBA, which implies that their capital charge equals their loss-
given-default. When losses are realized on such assets, there is an exactly compensating 
reduction in the amount of risk-weighted assets, and the net effect on the bank’s capital buffer 
is zero. 
Finally, returning to Table 6, we have indicated by gray shading the capital regime that 
the bank would choose on the basis of the lowest acceptable amount of capital, ignoring other 
factors that could affect its choice. We observe that only for the 500 asset investment grade 
portfolio would the bank opt for the IRBA, otherwise it would select the SA. This is a rather 
striking result, given that the Basel Committee and the EU have indicated that they would like 
to see a fairly large number of banks moving to the IRBA6. Moreover, it is interesting to note 
that only in investment grade portfolios would better diversification provide sufficient 
incentives to move from the SA to the IRBA. 
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 In the IRBA this is the case in moving to portfolios of poorer credit quality, keeping the degree of 
diversification fixed, and also in moving to less diversified portfolios, keeping the portfolio’s overall credit 
quality fixed. The capital ratio of non-investment grade portfolios, however, is practically insensitive to the 
degree of portfolio diversification. 
6
 We acknowledge that the assumption that all counterparties in our portfolios possess external ratings is likely to 
bias this comparison in favor of the SA. In the absence of external ratings, the SA basically collapses to the CA, 
which looks significantly less advantageous relative to the IRBA. Another possible reason for obtaining results 
strongly in favor of the SA is that we do not consider all the risk mitigation techniques which would benefit 
banks more in the IRBA than in the SA.  
 4 Implications and conclusions 
The effect of the capital regulation reform on overall bank capital depends on the amount of 
buffer capital that banks prefer to hold in excess of the new minimum requirements. The 
Basel Committee has stated as its goal that, after the reform, the overall level of capital should 
stay at about the same level as prior to the reform. An important implication of our analysis is 
that in order to achieve this goal, the banks’ likely adjustment of their capital buffers should 
be taken into consideration in the calibration of the new capital requirements. In particular, 
assume that regulators’ implicit criterion in determining the level of bank capital is to achieve 
a socially desirable level of default probabilities for banks. If the minimum capital 
requirement is set at a level that implies a given default probability, then the minimum 
acceptable amount of capital chosen by a prudent bank, in light of our results, would imply a 
substantially lower effective probability of default. Comparing tables 4 and 6, we observe that 
for investment grade portfolios the minimum acceptable capital amount under the IRBA is 
roughly twice the minimum requirement, indicating that actual bank default probability may 
turn out to be much lower than the one pursued. Banks should be made safe, but not too safe, 
because holding of idle capital has a cost from both microeconomic and macroeconomic 
points of view. 
Second, the additional buffers may give certain banks a disincentive to start using the 
IRBA. Other things being equal, a bank would choose the regulatory approach that would 
give it the lowest acceptable capital level. Basel has indicated that in the final stage of the 
reform the IRBA risk-weights would be calibrated in such a way that a representative bank – 
and obviously banks with risks that are lower than those of the representative bank - would 
have an incentive in the form of a lower minimum capital requirement to use the IRBA rather 
than the SA. A calibration done in this way could lead to problems such as in the case of the 
investment-grade 100 asset portfolio, for which the minimum capital requirement in the IRBA 
is lower than in the SA, whereas the minimum acceptable capital level in the SA is lower than 
in the IRBA (see the different coverage of the shadings in tables 4 and 6). This incentive 
problem is further illustrated in Figure 2. There we have graphed out the simulation results for 
the 500 asset portfolios from Tables 4 and 6. These show that the set of portfolios for which 
the minimum acceptable capital in the IRBA is lower than in the SA (portfolios to the left of 
A), is different than the set of portfolios for which the minimum capital requirement in the 
 IRBA is less than in the SA (portfolios to the left of B). Hence ignoring the capital buffers 
could lead Basel to provide capital incentives towards using the IRBA for a somewhat smaller 
set of banks from what was intended. 
Figure 2. Illustration of capital incentives 
The figure illustrates the fact that because of its lower risk-sensitivity, the SA may be a preferred alternative to 
the IRBA, when evaluated based on minimum acceptable capital amounts (which take into account the required 
capital buffer), even though the IRBA yields a lower minimum capital requirement (this happens between points 
A and B). Based on numerical results for the 500 asset portfolios in tables 4 and 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Third, we suggest that after the reform, banks’ capital ratios will have to be interpreted with 
care. In the IRBA, the lowest-risk banks are likely to have the highest capital ratios (i.e. 
capital relative to risk weighted assets), although their absolute capital amounts will be the 
lowest. Consequently, unlike in the current accord or in the SA, a high capital ratio of an 
IRBA bank will not be an indication of high portfolio risk, but to the contrary. We suggest 
that a simple leverage ratio – capital over nominal, not risk-weighted, assets - is more directly 
related to a bank’s portfolio risk after the reform, and that banks operating in different capital 
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 regimes can only be compared based on common denominator. In our example the portfolio 
size has been normalized to 100, so that the minimum acceptable capital amounts in Table 6 
can be directly interpreted as such leverage indicators. 
Fourth, our analysis indicates that banks may have incentives to try to dampen the 
volatility in their capital requirements, particularly so in the IRBA where banks are allowed to 
use their internal ratings. This may give rise to new types of capital arbitrage activities, where 
banks obtain the image benefits from being an ‘IRBA bank’, while simultaneously attempting 
to smoothen the variability in their internal ratings, so as to keep regulatory capital volatility 
at a low level. 
Finally, our analysis suggests that banks’ adjusting their capital cushions may help in 
alleviating the pro-cyclical effects of more risk-sensitive capital requirements that have been 
pointed out in the literature (see Blum and Hellwig, 1995). An increase in the volatility of 
banks’ minimum capital requirements, ceteris paribus, will increase the probability that a 
bank will face a regulatory capital shortage in an economic downturn. A regulatory capital 
shortage, on the other hand, may force banks to cut back on lending or to liquidate assets, and 
therefore provides an enforcing feedback to the original shock in the economy. Increased 
capital buffers will help banks to tolerate larger fluctuations in their minimum capital 
requirements, alleviating the effects of this procyclical mechanism. 
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Essay 4: A structural model of risky debt with stochastic 
collateral* 
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Abstract 
We present an extension of the Merton model of risky debt in which collateral 
value is a separate random variable correlated with the probability of default. The 
model is particularly suited for studying the behaviour of the expected loss-given-
default, as a function of collateral value parameters, and could be used for 
estimating losses-given-default in many popular models of credit risk which 
assume them constant. We also examine the problem of determining sufficient 
collateral amount to secure a loan to a desired degree. The estimation of the 
expected loss-given-default is of increased interest to bank practitioners and 
regulators due to the proposed new Basel Accord. 
 
Keywords: debt valuation, collateral, loss-given-default, loan-to-value 
JEL classification: G13, G21 
 
1  Introduction 
The effect of collateral values, and recovery rates in general, on the value of defaultable debt 
is evident from the generic debt valuation formula 
 ( )PDELGDPVF ⋅−= 1 .        (1) 
The value F of a risky dollar to be received in the future is obtained by applying an 
appropriate present value operator to the expected payoff at maturity, where the expected 
payoff is calculated by deducting the product of expected losses-given-default (ELGD) and 
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 the probability of default (PD), from the promised payment. The formula implies that a 10% 
change in the ELGD has an equivalent effect on the value of risky debt as a 10% change in 
the probability of default. In this sense, the ELGD and the probability of default are equally 
important determinants of risky debt values. Moreover, collateral value, the main determinant 
of ELGD, is in many cases an observable and traded quantity, whereas default probabilities 
are not directly observable. These arguments suggest that the modelling of collateral value 
dynamics should be of high priority in the valuation of risky debt. 
In the seminal work on debt valuation based on structural models of Merton (1974), the 
asset value (which determines default) and the collateral value (which determines the payoff 
to risky debt in the event of default) are the same process. Consequently, the correlation 
between the default determining variable and the collateral value in this model is perfect. It 
should be of interest to analyse situations where the determinant of default and the value of 
collateral are less than perfectly correlated. An example of such a situation is a bank loan 
backed by a pledged asset which is not owned by the borrowing firm but by a third party. In 
this case it is possible that the collateral value is relatively high even though the borrower’s 
asset value is low, or vice versa. In general, however, we would expect the collateral value 
and the borrower’s default probability to be negatively correlated. The values of most assets 
depend positively on overall business conditions, so that in a bad macroeconomic realisation 
where most defaults take place, the values of collateral items are likely to be low as well1.  
In this paper, we develop and analyse a model of risky debt where the default probability 
of the borrower and the value of the collateral supporting the debt obligation are less than 
perfectly correlated. Our model extends Merton's (1974) structural model in that we add a 
separate collateral value process which is correlated with the default determining asset value 
process. We interpret the collateral variable as the market value of the assets that the debt 
holder has a claim on in the event of a liquidation sale. We do not attach any particular asset 
stock interpretation to the underlying asset process, but rather think of the normalised 
difference between the asset value and the default boundary, representing a measure of 
distance to default, as a sufficient statistic for the likelihood of default. For this reason, we use 
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 Schleifer and Vishny (1992) present an equilibrium analysis of why collateral values tend to decline just when 
defaults abound.  
 the term default determining variable interchangeably with asset value. In line with this 
interpretation, our preferred implementation of the model does not require estimation of the 
asset value parameters individually, but relies on a one-to-one mapping between the distance 
to default measure and the default probability. Our non-concrete interpretation of the 
underlying asset value is similar to the interpretation suggested e.g. by Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995)2. Alternatively, since our structural assumptions restrict the evolution of 
default probabilities, but without implying a stringent interpretation of the default 
determining variable, our model can be classified as a reduced form model with special 
structure. The classification into structural and reduced form models of debt valuation is a 
shady one, and we think that our model can be interpreted to represent either class. 
Our model is particularly suited for answering two questions of great interest to bank 
practitioners as well as to regulators. The first is the issue of how should losses given default, 
that are stochastic, be estimated for the purpose of using them in credit risk models that often 
for practical reasons take them as constants. We provide a simple expression for the ELGD 
within our model, which could be the basis for loss-given-default estimates to be used in 
several reduced form models of risky debt (e.g. Jarrow and Turnbull, 1995, Jarrow, Lando 
and Turnbull, 1997, and Duffie and Singleton, 1999), as well as in portfolio models such as 
J.P. Morgan (1997) or Credit Suisse Financial Products (1997). In particular, when credit 
portfolio models are applied to bank loan books with a very large number of individual 
exposures, loss-given-defaults are often treated as constants for computational reasons. The 
question is then to find the constant estimates that give the best approximation to the results 
obtained from a full-scale portfolio model with stochastic collateral values. The ELGD for 
each individual exposure, calculated on a stand-alone basis, is a natural, yet not necessarily 
the theoretically correct, estimate to this end3. Effectively the same problem is also 
encountered by regulators who are currently working on reforming capital adequacy 
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 requirements to be more in line with economic capital models (Basel Committee, 2001). The 
internal ratings based approach to setting capital requirements on credit risk within the new 
Basel Accord is based on a one-factor version of the CreditMetricsTM framework, and the 
issue of how to estimate loss-given-defaults consistently with the dynamics of collateral 
values is also present here. 
As a second application, we suggest that our model could be used by banks in setting 
limits on loan-to-value ratios to be applied in lending. A limit on the loan-to-value ratio 
refers to the maximum amount of credit that may be granted against a given collateral. Such 
limits appear to be widely used by banks, and may partially substitute for risk sensitive 
pricing of loans. Often, however, there may not be a transparent quantitative theory which 
could explain the structure of the chosen limit system. We believe that existing practices 
could potentially be much improved upon by a model based quantitative approach. To this 
end, we calculate limits on loan-to-value ratios based on an uniform value principle, in which 
the choice of the loan-to-value ratio equalizes the valuation of loans across risk classes, as 
well as two other related probabilistic criteria. 
Our model yields a number of comparative static predictions on the behaviour of the 
ELGD with respect to the model parameters. We show that the ELGD is a decreasing 
function of the drift of the collateral value, an increasing function of the volatility of the 
collateral value, and an increasing function of the correlation between the collateral value and 
the default determining variable. Moreover, the ELGD is a decreasing function of the initial 
default probability of the borrower, given that the correlation between the collateral and the 
default probability is negative (the usual case). This last result at first appears counter-
intuitive, but we present an explanation to it. Our numerical results indicate that this effect 
may not be negligible in all cases. 
There is a large literature on the analysis of risky debt based on structural models. The 
seminal model of Merton (1974) has been extended to allow for endogenous bankruptcy e.g. 
by Black and Cox (1976), Leland (1994), and Leland and Toft (1996). Stochastic interest 
rates have been considered by Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993), Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995), and Briys and de Varenne (1997). Liquidation costs and the resulting 
bargaining game in the event of bankruptcy have been analysed by Andersen and Sundaresan 
 (1996), Fan and Sundaresan (2000), and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997). However, the 
only analysis that has considered the effects of less than perfect correlation between the firm 
asset value and the collateral value, that we are aware of, is Frye (2000a, 2000b). Fry uses the 
ELGD concept in proposing improved constant loss-given-default estimates in a portfolio 
context, where asset values and collateral values are assumed to be normally distributed. Our 
qualitative results regarding the ELGD are consistent with his, but we believe that the 
Mertonian lognormal framework that we use is a more realistic model of asset and collateral 
values. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our extension of 
the Merton model. Section 3 solves the model for debt prices and derives some of their 
properties which are relevant concerning the implementability of the model. Section 4 
analyses the comparative statics of debt values and the ELGD, while Section 5 illustrates 
loan-to-value ratios derived from the model. Section 6 contains a discussion of the potential 
applications of our model within the new Basel Accord. 
2 The model 
We build on Merton's classic model of risky debt. We study a defaultable zero-coupon debt 
contract with a face value of B, and a maturity of T years, which is backed by stochastic 
collateral V. The following assumptions characterize our model. 
Assumption 1. The default determining variable A satisfies the stochastic differential 
equation 
 1AdWAdtdA AA σµ += ,        (2) 
where the drift µA and the diffusion term Aσ  are positive constants, and { }0:1 ≥tW t  is a 
standard Brownian motion. 
Assumption 2. The collateral value  V satisfies the stochastic differential equation 
 2VdWVdtdV VV σµ += ,        (3) 
 where Vµ  and Vσ  are positive constants, and { }0:2 ≥tW t  is a standard Brownian motion, 
whose instantaneous correlation with W1 is ρdt. 
We interpret V as the market value that the lender can realize in an asset sale, when she 
liquidates both the collateral explicitly pledged against the debt obligation, as well as her 
share of the nonpledged assets. Thus we use the word collateral in a wide sense, and not only 
to mean the value of the pledged assets. 
Assumption 3. The risk-free interest rate r is independent of the variables A and V. 
Since our objective is to study the behaviour of credit spreads and loss-given-defaults, we can 
assume without loss of generality that the riskfree rate is a constant. We do this in all 
subsequent presentation to economize on notation. 
Assumption 4. Default occurs at T when the value of the default determining variable A at T 
is less than a positive constant D. 
According to the classical interpretation of A as total asset value, default is triggered if the 
asset value at maturity is less than the face value of the zero coupon debt. In this case our 
default boundary D would equal the face value of the zero coupon debt, B. We do not need to 
make such stringent interpretations concerning the capital structure of the firm. Even if we 
interpreted A as total asset value, we could allow several forms of debt by defining D as the 
total amount of debt. As suggested in the introduction, we prefer not to think of A as total 
asset value, but rather think of A and D jointly as a mechanism that generates a term structure 
of default probabilities for the firm. This interpretation is supported by the fact (which will be 
shown in the next section) that debt value is homogenous of degree zero in A and D. Thus 
only their relative magnitude matters for pricing of credit risk, not their absolute values. 
Default only occurs at the maturity of the debt contract in our model. We acknowledge 
that this is a shortcoming of the Merton model, and precludes coupon debt from being priced 
consistently. The portfolio models, on the other hand, which are the intended application for 
the ELGD estimates calculated from our model, share a similar one-periodic structure to our 
model. 
Assumption 5. The payoff to the holder of the zero coupon debt at T equals  
 ( ) ( ) ( )DAIBVMinDABI TTT <+≥ , ,       (4) 
 where I( ) denotes the indicator function for the event defined in the parenthesis. 
Assumption 5 implies that the payoff to the debt holder at maturity depends on A and V 
through their terminal values only. The value of A alone determines whether the firm is in 
default at T or not. If the value of A at T exceeds the default barrier D, the debt holder 
receives the promised amount B. When the value of A at maturity is below D, the firm is in 
default and the holder of the zero coupon debt receives ( )BVMin T , . This implies that a debt 
holder can never benefit from default through receiving more than her promised share of the 
value of the firm. 
So far we have assumed that A and V are correlated but have not defined their functional 
relationship. According to the asset value interpretation of A, there are basically two 
alternatives. If the debtor owns the collateral, then V is part of A. It is also possible that the 
collateral is not owned by the debtor but is provided by a third party. A common example of 
this would be an entrepreneur whose privately held company is the debtor but who provides 
the collateral to the lender as a private person. In this case V and A are correlated inasmuch 
as macroeconomic developments tend to affect all asset values in the economy, whether they 
be corporate assets or e.g. housing real estate. 
In the case where the debtor owns the collateral, we could specify A = A’ + V, where A’ 
and V are correlated lognormal diffusion processes. The correlation between A and V would 
then be effectively derived within the model from the processes of A’ and V. As the sum of 
two lognormal variables is not lognormal, such additive relation between A and V is not likely 
to work analytically. We have chosen to keep V and A separate, which, if the asset value 
interpretation is taken literally, corresponds to the case where the debtor does not own the 
collateral. But since we do not enforce the asset value interpretation in the first place, there is 
no need to combine A and V in any way. After all, if A is only a sufficient statistic for a 
default probability, A and V do not need to be in the same scale, and trying to force any 
summing between them would be a pointless exercise. 
Assumption 6. Sufficiently perfect capital markets. 
In our analysis, we ignore transactions costs, taxes and indivisibilities, and assume that 
agents are price takers. Short sales are allowed, and trading can take place continuously in 
time. Many of these assumptions can be relaxed without changing the conclusions materially. 
 3 Value of risky debt 
Let F(A,V,t) denote the value of the zero coupon debt as a function of the stochastic variables 
and (calendar) time t. At maturity the value is just the terminal payoff to the zero coupon 
debt, given by equation (4) above 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )DAIBVMinDABITVAF TTTTT <+≥= ,,, . 
Simple manipulations yield an equivalent form of the terminal payoff 
 ( ) ( ) ( )DAIVBMaxBTVAF TTTT <−−= ,0,, ,     (5) 
which reveals that the payoff from this risky debt is equivalent to a payoff from the 
corresponding riskfree debt, less the payoff from a European put option written on the 
collateral value, with strike B and maturity T, whose realisation is conditional on the value of 
the stochastic variable A. We will utilize this representation in what follows. 
Time 0 expected payoff, under an arbitrary probability P, is  
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We define formally the expected loss given default (ELGD) associated with the zero coupon 
debt contract as 
 ( ) ( )[ ]DAIVBMaxEELGD TTP <−= ,0 ,      (7) 
and the default probability of the borrower (PD), under probability P, as 
 ( )[ ]DAIEPD TP <=  
Given these definitions, we can write (6) as 
 ( )[ ] PDELGDBTVAFE TTP ⋅−=,, .       (8) 
Analogously to (1), we can value any payoff by taking its discounted expectation under a 
martingale probability measure Q. Evaluating (7) and (8) under a risk neutral measure yields 
the value of the risky zero coupon debt as (see Appendix for the proof). 
 Proposition 1. The value of the risky zero coupon debt is 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }TdQQTbLTrBVAF AV ,,;,,,1,0,, 2200 σρσ−= ,    (9) 
where 
 ( ) rTBeTrB −=,  
( )
( ) ( )[ ]
Q
dyynyThNe
b
yhN
QTbL
QN
VyTT
V
VV
∫
−
∞−
+−


















−
−−−
−








−
−
=
1
22
2
2
22
1
2
2
2
1
11
1
;,,,
ρ
ρσρ
ρ
ρ
ρσ
ρσσρ
 
 ( ) ( )[ ]TdhNTdQ AA ,,,, 212 σσ =  
 
rTeV
Bb
0
=  
 
rTeA
Dd
0
=  
 ( ) ( )
T
Td
Tdh
A
A
A
σ
σ
σ
2
2
1
21ln
,,
+
=  
 ( ) ( )
T
Tb
Tbh
V
V
V
σ
σ
σ
2
2
2
21ln
,,
+
=  
where ( )N  is the standard normal distribution function, and ( )n  is the standard normal 
density function. 
The solution (9) is not quite an analytic formula in that it involves a one-dimensional 
integral which has to be evaluated numerically. Such one-dimensional quadrature is not 
computationally intensive, though, and can be performed very quickly using some of the well-
known numerical integration schemes (see e.g. Press et al., 1992). 
Formula (9) is exactly of the same form as (1). In the formula (9), B(r,T) is the present 
value of B to be received at time T, or the price of a risk free discount bond. This is multiplied 
by the expected payoff, per unit face value, of the debt at maturity. This expected payoff is 
 just the promised unit payment, from which the product of the ELGD and the default 
probability is deducted, both calculated under the martingale measure. The function 
( )QTbL V ;,,, 2 ρσ  is the ELGD, expressed as a percentage of the face value of the debt. This is 
a function of the quasi loan-to-value ratio, b, as well as the parameters of the collateral value 
process. The function ( )TdQ A ,, 2σ  is the default probability of the counterparty under the 
martingale measure. This is a function of the quasi leverage ratio of the firm, d, as well as the 
volatility of the asset value process. 
The roles of the stochastic variables A and V are separated in a useful manner in our 
model. First, the default probability is only a function of the parameters of the asset value 
process (including d), and does not depend on the values of the collateral value parameters, 
nor on the particular debt contract’s loan to value ratio b. Second, the ELGD is a function of 
the parameters of the asset value process only through Q, the quasi default probability. Thus 
it is possible to implement the model and to calculate the ELGD with external estimates of 
default probabilities, similarly to reduced form debt pricing models, without having to 
estimate the asset value parameters in the first place. The parameters of the collateral value 
process as well as the correlation between the collateral and the default determining variable 
could be estimated using appropriate proxy variables such as stock market industry indexes, 
or real estate indexes in the case of real estate collateral. 
The debt value satisfies two useful homogeneity properties, which we record in the 
following. The proofs can be carried by substitution into the debt value formula (9). 
Proposition 2. The value of the risky zero coupon debt given in (9) is  
(i) homogenous of degree 1 in V0 and B, 
(ii) homogenous of degree 0 in A0 and D. 
The fact that debt value is linearly homogenous in the face value of the debt and the value of 
the collateral is an implication of the linearity of pricing: as long as the loan–to-value ratio 
remains unchanged, the terms of the loan do not change in relative terms. That debt value is 
homogenous of degree zero in the values of the default determining variable and the default 
boundary implies that debt value only depends on the ratio of the two variables. This supports 
 our interpretation of A and D as a stylized description of a mechanism for creating a term 
structure for default probabilities, rather than as concrete asset values. 
The debt value in (9) has an intuitive form, which becomes even simpler if we assume 
that the collateral value and the default determining variable are uncorrelated. Evaluating (9) 
with ρ = 0 yields the following expression for the debt value 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )TBVBSDAIETrBVAF VPutTQ ,,,,0,, 2000 σ<−= ,    (10) 
where BSPut is the Black and Scholes value of a put option on V, with strike B. Equation (10) 
shows that the value of risky debt in this case is the value of the corresponding riskless debt, 
deducted by the default probability of the firm times the value of a put option on the collateral 
value. Since default probability is less than 1, the risky debt is more valuable than the 
portfolio consisting of the riskless debt and a short position in the put option on the collateral 
value. This holds even if the collateral value and the asset value are positively correlated. The 
holder of the risky debt is hurt by low collateral values only when the firm actually defaults. 
As far as the correlation between collateral and asset values is less than perfect, defaults do 
not always take place when collateral values are low. 
Merton’s original model of risky debt can be obtained as a special limit of our model, 
which can be achieved by merging the asset value and the collateral value processes 
appropriately. Our model thus incorporates the Merton model as a special case, and is 
therefore a genuine extension. We record this in the next proposition. 
Proposition 3. Merton’s model of risky debt, where the value of a zero coupon bond is given 
by 
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is obtained as a limit of the debt value in (9) when A0 = V0, B = D, and the collateral and 
asset value parameters coincide, so that ρ = 1. 
 4 Sensitivity analysis 
Formula (9) shows that the value of risky debt depends on the collateral value parameters 
only through their effect on the ELGD. Since the ELGD has a negative sign in the debt value 
formula, the partial derivatives of debt value with respect to the collateral value parameters 
are of opposite sign than the corresponding partial derivatives of the ELGD. In this section 
we therefore only analyse the sensitivities of the ELGD. The brute force way to derive these 
sensitivities would be to analyse the explicit solution for L( ) in (9). A perhaps easier way to 
derive the sensitivities is based on manipulating the definition of the ELGD, (7), as 
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The last row in (11) shows that the ELGD can be expressed as the sum of the expected 
terminal payoff from a (long) put option on the collateral value, with strike equal to the face 
value of the debt, and a second term involving the covariance of the put option payoff with 
the indicator function of default. If the default determining variable and the collateral value 
are uncorrelated, then this term is zero, so that the ELGD equals the first term on the last row 
in (11). As the value of a put is an increasing function of the volatility of its underlying asset, 
the ELGD is the higher, the higher is the volatility of the collateral. 
The functions ( )TVBMax −,0  and ( )DAI T <  are both non-increasing in V and A, 
respectively. This implies that when the correlation between A and V is positive, the 
covariance between these functions (viewed as random variables) is also positive. Therefore 
under positive correlation between V and A, collateral volatility contributes positively to the 
ELGD also via the second term in (11). Moreover, the correlation between ( )TVBMax −,0  
and ( )DAI T <  increases with increasing correlation between V and A, so that the ELGD is 
also increasing with respect to the correlation parameter. These conclusions are in line with 
immediate intuition. 
Numerical examples of the behaviour of the ELGD, expressed as a percentage of the face 
value of debt, are presented in figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows the ELGD as a function of 
 collateral value volatility and the correlation parameter, for a firm with 0.5% default 
probability over a one year horizon, and for a debt with one year maturity and initial loan-to-
value ratio of 1. As proved above, the ELGD is increasing in the volatility and the correlation 
parameters. The variation of the ELGD as a function of these parameters appears 
economically quite significant. Given a correlation of 40%, doubling the volatility from 20% 
to 40% nearly doubles the ELGD from 22% to 39 %. We also note that in the presence of 
zero collateral value volatility, the ELGD in Figure 1 equals zero since the initial loan-to-
value ratio equals 1. 
As a reservation to these result, we note that we have not varied the collateral value drift 
as a function of its volatility and correlation. We simply assumed the drift to equal the 
riskless rate. For long maturity credits in particular, the effects of the drift on the ELGD can 
be substantial. Asset pricing theories suggest that the collateral value drift should be related 
to the collateral value volatility and the correlation. Stocks with high volatility would have 
high expected growth rates as well, ceteris paribus, which would produce a dampening effect 
on the conditional loss expectation. In principle, all the collateral value parameters – its drift, 
volatility and the correlation with asset value – should be jointly estimated by taking into 
account the asset pricing relationships which are not explicitly considered in our model. 
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the ELGD and the probability of default. We 
observe that for positive correlation between collateral value and the firm asset value, the 
ELGD is the lower, the higher is the likelihood of default. This might at first appear 
counterintuitive. The logic behind this ceteris paribus result is that the lower is the probability 
of default, the more the firm asset value has to decline before default will occur. Positive 
correlation between the asset value and the collateral value in turn implies that, for a given 
initial collateral value, the future collateral value in the event of default will an average be the 
lower, the lower is the initial default probability. Hence the negative relationship between 
initial default probability and the ELGD. We also note from Figure 2 that this relationship 
vanishes for zero correlation between the collateral and the firm value. Although the effect 
does not appear economically very significant for a wide range of parameter values, in some 
cases it may not be without significance. Figure 2 e.g. shows that for a collateral volatility of 
15% and correlation with the asset value of 60%, the ELGD estimate for a top quality credit 
 (one year default probability close to zero) is about twice that of a quite low quality credit 
(default probability higher than 10%) with similar collateral position. 
5 Loan-to-value ratios 
As a second application of our model, we analyse several rules that banks could use in 
determining limits on loan-to-value ratios (the ratio of the face value of the debt to the 
collateral value pledged against the debt, B/V0 in our model) in lending. Limits on loan-to-
value ratios can at least partially substitute for risk sensitive pricing of loans, in that sufficient 
protective collateral limits potential losses in the event of default, and thus makes loans 
‘sufficiently riskless’ to be eligible for a uniform, risk insensitive pricing. Loan-to-value 
ratios, or implied collateral haircuts, set according to such objectives should itself be sensitive 
to both the default risk of the counterparty, and the risk characteristics of the collateral value. 
In order to implement the previous idea, a definition of ‘sufficiently riskless’ is required. 
Clearly value could be used as a criterion: one might require that the value of the loan, 
calculated from (9), implies a credit spread of 10 basis points or less. On the basis of this 
uniform value criterion, one could calculate limits on loan-to-value ratios as a function of the 
default probability and the parameters of the collateral value, then apply those limits in 
lending, and price all loans uniformly at 10 basis points over the riskless rate4. We present 
loan-to-value ratios calculated according to this rule in Table 1A. 
We note from Table 1A that the loan-to-value ratios calculated according to the uniform 
value criterion decline with increasing collateral value volatility, decline with increasing 
correlation between collateral and asset value, and decline with increasing default probability 
of the borrower. Loan-to-value ratios also usually decline as the maturity of the contract is 
increased (in which case the cumulative default probability is also increased appropriately). 
The opposite happens, however, when the volatility of the collateral value is very low. This is 
because in these cases the collateral value drift begins to dominate the collateral value 
volatility as maturity lengthens. 
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 The uniform value criterion to setting loan-to-value ratios essentially takes a loan value 
as given, and maps it into a corresponding loan-to-value ratio, or equivalently, a collateral 
requirement. Solving for the loan-to-value ratio requires valuing the loan in the process. 
Sometimes this can be a laborious task that one would like to avoid, in particular since 
valuation may require the estimation of non-observable quantities such as risk-neutral 
probabilities of default. We are interested in finding out whether there could be other rules for 
setting loan-to-value ratios which would depend on the statistical model of the collateral and 
the asset value only, and which would produce results which are qualitatively similar to the 
ones based on the uniform value criterion? We test two probabilistic criteria below. 
A Value-at-Risk type rule based on the conditional probability of loss is the following: 
allow loan-to-value ratios up to the point where the conditional probability of the collateral 
value falling below the face value of the debt in the event of default is at most X%. Table 1B 
presents loan-to-value ratios based on this rule for different values of the collateral value 
parameters. We observe that under this rule, loan-to-value ratio declines as either the 
collateral value volatility or the correlation between collateral value and asset value increases. 
Also, loan-to-value ratios decline as the maturity of the loan increases, unless the volatility of 
the collateral value is very low. This behaviour is in line with the sensitivity results obtained 
from the uniform value rule. Contrary to the uniform value rule, however, the loan-to-value 
ratio increases as the credit quality of the firm declines, given that the correlation between 
collateral and asset value is positive. In some cases this effect can be quite significant. This 
result is analogous to the negative relation between default probability and the ELGD 
observed previously. Yet the result is counterfactual, since casual empirical evidence suggests 
that loan-to-value ratios actually decline with increases in the default probability of the 
borrower. More seriously, this kind of limit system violates basic economic principles of 
value, in that if pricing is not risk sensitive, one should clearly not lend more to a lower 
quality customer, provided he can pledge the same collateral as a better quality customer. 
This odd behaviour is of course due to the fact that pricing cannot be based on information 
which is conditioned on default having taken place alone. The probability of default must 
clearly be reflected in the loan-to-value criterion, if this is to be substituted for risk sensitive 
pricing. 
 We have tested an alternative criterion based on unconditional probability of loss, 
stating: allow loan-to-value ratios up to the point where the unconditional probability of a 
credit loss is at most X%. Interpreted differently, the probability that the customer defaults 
and that, simultaneously, the collateral value falls below the nominal loan amount must not 
exceed a certain percentage. A immediate implication of this criterion is that any loan-to-
value ratio is acceptable with borrowers whose default probability is below the unconditional 
loss probability which is used in the criterion5. In table 1C, we illustrate loan-to-value ratios 
determined based on this criterion. The criterion, with 0.1% as the maximal allowed 
probability of loss, produces both infinite loan-to-value ratios, as well as loan-to-value ratios 
above one hundred percent. In contrast to the previous criterion, however, the loan-to-value 
ratios calculated based on this criterion decline as the default probability of the borrower 
increases. This criterion in fact displays all the same comparative statics as the uniform price 
rule, and is therefore the more recommendable of the two probabilistic criteria analysed here. 
6 Conclusions and discussion on the applicability under Basel II  
In essence this paper is an attempt to provide insights to the estimation of a central credit risk 
quantity, loss-given-default, that is often treated as a constant for practical reasons, but that 
really is stochastic because of the uncertainty regarding the future value of collateral. 
Although our model is rather simple and stylized, we believe it can be a useful quantitative 
tool. Be it the estimation of the expected loss-given-default to be used in credit risk models, or 
determination of loan-to-value ratios for lending guidelines, the model helps to understand 
which parameters are relevant to consider and what are their likely effects. Moreover, we 
believe that our framework could be useful in estimating losses-given-default in the advanced 
internal ratings based approach of the new Basel capital accord. 
Although the document of Basel Committee (2001) already contains many highly 
structured proposals for determining banks' minimum capital requirements for credit risk, 
some of them leave considerable room for banks themselves to decide what particular 
techniques to employ. The prime proposal in this category is the advanced internal ratings 
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 based approach for corporate credit exposures, in which banks would be allowed to provide 
their own loss-given-default estimates subject to certain qualitative minimum requirements. 
In forming these estimates, any type of collateral could in principal be considered. The loss 
concept would be that of expected loss-given-default (Basel Committee, 2001, paragraph 
326). We suggest that our model could be applied for this purpose. As we have shown above, 
our method can be used to answer the question of how much is one expected to lose, in the 
event of default, from a given exposure which is protected by a given amount of collateral. 
Our approach takes this estimation problem down to the fundamental structural parameters, 
namely the drift and volatility of the collateral value, its correlation with the obligor’s default 
probability, and the obligor's default probability. Of course a prerequisite for the acceptance 
of any internal model is the validation of the model-based estimates against empirical data. 
The advanced IRB approach is not the only potential application of our framework 
within the new Basel Accord. In the so called foundation IRB approach, Basel Committee 
(2001) has suggested collateral haircuts for various asset types. It would be interesting to 
study whether these are consistent with those that can be obtained from our model. Moreover, 
the January 2001 proposal of the Basel Committee (2001) was rather short on the treatment 
of retail portfolios. Our framework might be useful in assessing losses-given-default in retail 
loans often backed by various types of physical collateral as well. 
The Basel Committee's proposal has provoked critique (e.g. Frye, 2001) for ignoring the 
systematic risk component of loss-given-default, which results from the exposure of collateral 
values to the common risk factors driving defaults. We believe that this criticism could be at 
least partly accounted for within the current Basel proposal by using appropriate collateral 
haircuts which take into account the systematic risk. A collateral haircut percentage y is by 
definition a number which satisfies  
 ( ) 01 VyERGD −=  
where ERGD stands for the expected recovery given default. Within our model, the ERGD 
and the ELGD of a zero coupon bond are related by ERGD + ELGD = B, so that our ELGD 
estimates can easily be mapped into haircut percentages. When e.g. the face value of the debt 
equals the current collateral value (B = V0), the ELGD percentages in figures 1 and 2 directly 
correspond to the haircut percentage. 
 A more subtle point concerns the correct definition of the event on which the expectation 
should be conditioned in the calculation of the ELGD. We have calculated ELGD conditional 
on the borrower’s own default. In a portfolio context, where the task is to allocate capital 
which is estimated as a given percentile point of a portfolio distribution, to individual 
obligors and exposures, the correct conditioning event is one where the portfolio value is 
equal to the given percentile point in its distribution. This event is much more complicated 
than a default of a single counterparty, since in general there are several possible 
combinations of defaults by different obligors which all give rise to the same portfolio loss. 
Praschnik at al. (2001) discuss one way to numerically calculate such expectations. 
 
 Appendix 
The value of risky debt is obtained be taking a discounted expectation, under a martingale 
measure Q, of the payoff at T which is given by equation (5) in the text, 
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where ( ) rTBeTrB −=,  is the present value of the riskless payoff B to be received at time T in 
the future. In the presence of a stochastic riskless term structure, the function B(r,T) would be 
the price of a riskless discount bond under the chosen term structure model. The challenge is 
to evaluate the term [ ])(),0( DAIVBMaxE TQ <− . For this purpose, let us denote the joint 
density function of AT and VT as f(A,V), the density function of VT, conditional on AT, as 
fV|A(A,V), and the marginal density function of AT as fA(A). The expectation can then be 
evaluated as follows (we have dropped time-subscripts) 
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where y and z are jointly standard normally distributed random variables with correlation ρ, 
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=  is the quasi loan-to-value ratio of the zero coupon debt, 
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From the properties of the bivariate normal distribution, we know that conditional on y, z is 
normally distributed as ( )z y N y| ~ ,ρ ρ1 2− . Using this knowledge, the first term in the final 
expression in (A2) can be written as 
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The second term in the final expression in (A2) can be completed into a square prior to 
integrating. The expression inside the inner integral becomes 
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Substituting this expression into the last row in (A2) yields 
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Combining (A2), (A3) and (A4) gives 
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Noting that ( ) ( )[ ]TdhNTdQ AA ,,,, 212 σσ = , substituting (A5) into (A1), and using the 
definition of conditional expectation, we get equation (9) in the text. 
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Figure 1. The ELGD as a function of collateral volatility and correlation 
Constant parameters: (one year) default probability 0.5%, loan-to-value ratio 1, debt maturity 
1 year, riskless rate 5%, collateral value drift 5%, residual recovery rate 0%. 
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Figure 2. The ELGD as a function of default probability 
Constant parameters: loan-to-value ratio 1, debt maturity 1 year, riskless rate 5%, collateral 
value drift 5%, collateral value volatility 15%, residual recovery rate 0%. 
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 Table 1. Loan-to-value ratios 
The (cumulative) one/three-year default probabilities for A, BB, and B rated counterparties 
are 0.03%/0.22%, 1.32%/6.01%, and 5.58%/15.6%, respectively. These are obtained by 
assuming a time-homogenous transition matrix of annual rating transition probabilities, 
based on Standard and Poor’s default statistics (see J.P. Morgan, 1997, table 6.11). Risk free 
rate is 5% and collateral value drift is 5%. 
1A: Loan–to-value ratios based on uniform value criterion 
Highest ratio of loan amount to current collateral value such that the yield spread on the loan, 
over the riskfree rate, is less than 0.1%. 
 volatility 5 % 15 % 30 % 
correlation rating 1-yr 3-yr 1-yr 3-yr 1-yr 3-yr 
0 % A * * * * * * 
 BB 113 120 109 99 94 67 
 B 105 111 93 87 72 52 
30 % A * * * * * * 
 BB 109 113 97 87 75 51 
 B 101 107 85 78 61 42 
60 % A * * * * * * 
 BB 105 109 87 77 62 41 
 B 99 105 80 72 54 36 
* All loan-to-value ratios satisfy the criterion. 
 
1B: Loan-to-value ratios based on conditional loss probability 
Highest ratio of loan amount to current collateral value such that the conditional probability 
of loss, given bankruptcy, is less than 5.0%.  
 volatility 5 % 15 % 30 % 
correlation rating 1-yr 3-yr 1-yr 3-yr 1-yr 3-yr 
0 % A 97 100 81 73 61 43 
 BB 97 100 81 73 61 43 
 B 97 100 81 73 61 43 
30 % A 92 93 69 59 45 27 
 BB 93 96 73 64 50 33 
 B 94 97 75 66 53 36 
60 % A 87 88 61 49 35 19 
 BB 90 92 67 57 42 27 
 B 92 94 71 62 46 31 
* All loan-to-value ratios satisfy the criterion. 
 1C: Loan-to-value ratios based on unconditional loss probability  
Highest ratio of loan face value to current collateral value such that the unconditional 
probability of loss is less than 0.1%.  
 volatility 5 % 15 % 30 % 
correlation rating 1-yr 3-yr 1-yr 3-yr 1-yr 3-yr 
0 % A * 114 * 109 * 98 
 BB 95 95 84 63 66 34 
 B 94 93 74 58 53 27 
30 % A * 106 * 86 * 62 
 BB 94 91 77 56 53 26 
 B 90 90 70 53 46 22 
60 % A * 98 * 67 * 36 
 BB 90 89 71 52 45 22 
 B 89 89 67 51 41 21 
* All loan-to-value ratios satisfy the criterion.    
 
 
Essay 5: On the markup interpretation of optimal stopping 
rules* 
 
Abstract 
In the context of the standard irreversible investment problem, Dixit et al. (1999) 
derived a first-order condition for optimal stopping rules that has a markup 
interpretation familiar from classical producer theory. We show here that optimal 
policies can be characterized through first-order conditions that have the markup 
interpretation also in stopping models with flow payoffs and multiple (an infinite 
sequence of) stopping decisions. We do this by analyzing two well known models 
in the real options literature: a model of abandonment where the objective is the 
present value of a flow payoff, and Dixit’s (1989) regenerative model of 
investment and abandonment. The markup formulas follow from conveniently 
representing the objective function as a function of the stopping barriers, taking 
advantage of renewal arguments. In many cases this approach is equally tractable 
as the dynamic programming approach, provides a different economic intuition 
into the solution, and is pedagogically very appealing. 
 
Keywords: optimal stopping, investment, abandonment, markup 
JEL classification: D21, G31 
 
1  Introduction 
The standard approach to optimal stopping is via dynamic programming/variational 
inequalities, as illustrated e.g. in Bensoussan and Lions (1982) or Oksendal (1995). A 
textbook example of an optimal stopping problem whose dynamic programming differential 
equation can be solved explicitly is the plain vanilla irreversible investment problem first 
solved by McDonald and Siegel (1986) and extensively analyzed by Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994). It is well known that this particular problem can also be solved using a direct 
approach, whereby the objective function is represented in terms of the unknown stopping 
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 barrier, and then optimized with respect to the location of the barrier. Moreover, as noted by 
Dixit et al. (1999), the direct approach yields a first-order condition for the optimal 
investment barrier that has exactly the same form as the optimal pricing rule of a firm that 
faces a downward sloping demand curve, generally referred to as the markup pricing rule. 
Dixit et al. hence refer to this first-order condition as the markup interpretation of optimal 
investment rules. 
The markup first-order condition obtained by Dixit et al. (1999) follows automatically 
from the representation of the objective in terms of the unknown barrier. The direct approach 
therefore provides a different economic intuition into the solution relative to dynamic 
programming, an intuition that most economists may be more familiar with and which could 
be lost if the problem were attacked through solution of the HJB equation. The direct 
approach also has other merits relative to dynamic programming. First, solution of the optimal 
policies in the direct approach reduces to solving a system of algebraic equations, as opposed 
to solving a differential equation. Second, the system of algebraic equations in the direct 
approach does not involve other unknowns besides the stopping barrier(s). The dynamic 
programming approach eventually leads to first-order conditions for the barrier(s) as well, but 
this system is of higher dimension since it contains unknown coefficients of the general 
solution to the HJB equation. 
In this paper, we apply the direct approach to some straightforward variations and 
generalizations of the basic irreversible investment problem, and obtain first-order conditions 
that have ‘classical’ mark-up interpretations in terms of relevant elasticities. We first study a 
problem of optimal abandonment of a firm generating a flow of rewards. We find this 
particular model well suited for demonstrating the simplicity of the technique, for 
regenerating the closed form solutions obtained earlier based on dynamic programming, and 
for showing that with the direct approach, variations in the problem structure can be handled 
very efficiently. We then apply the direct approach to a regenerative stopping problem with 
both flow rewards and lump-sum payments at stopping times, i.e. to Dixit’s (1989) model of 
sequential investment and abandonment. As for both of these models, we claim that the direct 
approach is conceptually simpler and (at least) equally tractable as dynamic programming, 
and yields first-order conditions with clear economic interpretations. 
 A necessary condition for the direct approach to work is that the objective function be 
represented as a function of the stopping barriers in terms of components that are suitable for 
explicit computation. As for the standard irreversible investment problem, the representation 
obtained by Dixit et al. (1999) is a product of two terms, both of which are functions of the 
barrier. The essential argument that Dixit et al. (1999) need to obtain this representation is the 
time-homogeneity of the problem. The generalizations that we analyze preserve time-
homogeneity, and we assume the state variable to be a strong Markov process. We use 
renewal arguments which take advantage of just these properties to obtain convenient 
‘product’ representations of the objective. We acknowledge that other methods could be 
applied to represent the objective as a function of the barriers. A representation based on 
Green functions has been used by Alvarez (1998, 1999, 2001) to solve one-off stopping 
problems using the direct approach. The first-order conditions obtained by Alvarez however 
do not have the mark-up character. In regenerative problems, in particular, it appears that 
renewal techniques are essential for representing the objective in terms of components that 
that are amenable to explicit computation (these component solutions may be obtained using 
the method of Green functions, but as for the models analyzed in this paper, the technique is 
unnecessarily general). Related techniques have also been utilized in the (s,S) inventory 
literature (e.g. Porteus, 1971, 1972, Harrison, 1985, Bentolila and Bertola, 1990), but these 
papers have not been concerned with the mark-up interpretation of the first-order conditions. 
The paper most related to ours is Sodal (2002), which analyzes the stochastic rotation 
problem of Faustmann using the same methods that we use in this paper. The model in 
Section 5 of this paper is a generalization of the model analyzed by Sodal. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief summary of Dixit et al.’s 
(1999) results. Section 3 introduces an optimal abandonment problem with flow rewards and 
derives the markup first-order condition. Section 4 presents explicit solutions to this problem 
under two different stochastic processes for the state variable, and demonstrates the efficiency 
of the direct method in accommodating a variation in the problem structure. Section 5 applies 
the direct approach to a model of joint investment and abandonment, derives first-order 
conditions analogous to those in the simpler models, and obtains the objective function in 
closed form in the case of geometric Brownian motion price dynamics. Section 6 concludes. 
 2 An overview of Dixit et al. (1999) 
Dixit et al. (1999) developed the markup interpretation in the context of the standard 
irreversible investment problem first analyzed by McDonald and Siegel (1986). The state 
variable P representing the net present value of an investment project is assumed to follow a 
time-homogenous diffusion process (not necessarily geometric Brownian motion). The 
objective is to maximize the value V of the option to undertake this investment against a fixed 
investment cost I, by optimally choosing the exercise time of the investment option 
 ( ) ( )[ ]IPeEPV P −= − τρτ
τ
sup         (1) 
where the optimization is over all stopping times τ of the filtration generated by the state 
variable P. The discount rate ρ is taken to be a constant. Since the optimal stopping times in 
problem (1) are hitting times of a fixed barrier b, the problem reduces to 
( ) ( )[ ] [ ]( ) ( )( )IbbPLIbeEIbeEPV
b
P
b
P
b
bb
−=−=−=
−−
,supsupsup ρτρτ   (2) 
where bτ  denotes the first hitting time of P to the barrier b from below, defined as 
{ }bPt tb ≥≥= :0infτ , and L(P,b) denotes the Laplace transform of bτ , given that P0 = P. 
The elasticity of the Laplace transform of the hitting time, with respect to the barrier b, is 
defined by 
 ( ) ( )( )bPL
bbPLb bLb
,
,
−=ε .         (3) 
Dixit et al. show that this elasticity is independent of the starting value P, although in general 
the elasticity depends on the value of the barrier b. The first-order condition to (2) then takes a 
specially intuitive form when expressed in terms of the elasticity, 
 ( )∗∗
∗
=
−
bb
Ib
bL
ε
1
,         (4) 
which is identical in form to the markup pricing rule of a firm facing a declining demand 
curve. Indeed, interpret I as the marginal cost of the firm’s output (assumed constant), b as the 
output price, and L(P,b) as the demand curve facing the firm (which is declining in b, and 
increasing in P which may be interpreted as a shift parameter). Then equation (2) is a standard 
 one-period profit maximization problem, and (4) is the optimal pricing rule, 
bL
ε  in this case 
being the price elasticity of demand. 
Returning to the optimal investment problem, rearranging (4) in terms of ∗b  yields an 
implicit expression for the optimal investment threshold in terms of the elasticity 
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This is in general only an implicit expression since 
bL
ε  may depend on b. It is obvious from 
this expression that when the elasticity is positive and larger than 1 in absolute value, the 
optimal barrier ∗b  will exceed the break even value I. 
For some typical diffusion processes used to model project values, explicit expressions 
for L(P,b) are known. When P satisfies a geometric Brownian motion with parameters µ > 0 
and σ > 0, we have 
( ) 1,
β


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=
b
PbPL ,         (6) 
where 1β  is the positive solution to the fundamental quadratic associated with geometric 
Brownian motion, 
 ( ) 01
2
1 2
=−+− ρµβββσ , 
and is larger than 1 in well behaved cases, i.e. when µ < ρ. Substituting (6) into (3), we 
observe that the elasticity of the Laplace transform with respect to b is constant and equal to 
1β . Substituting this into (5), we obtain the familiar result for the optimal investment barrier 
 Ib








−
=
∗
11
1
β
β
. 
3  An abandonment problem 
Our analysis here is in the context of a stopping problem which has earlier been studied based 
on dynamic programming methods by Dixit (1989) and Leland and Toft (1996), among 
 others. A firm with unit output and a constant unit cost C experiences a stochastic output price 
P, which follows a time-homogenous diffusion process which satisfies the strong Markov 
property. Hence the firm's instantaneous profit flow is Pt - C. The firm value is the present 
value of this profit flow, based on a constant discount rate ρ, allowing for the firm's option to 
irreversibly terminate its operations, should the profit flow become sufficiently negative. 
Again, we know from the problem structure that the optimal stopping times must coincide 
with first hitting times of a constant barrier. Denoting the stopping barrier by b, we write firm 
value as 
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where bτ  denotes the first hitting time of P to the barrier b from above, defined by 
{ }bPt tb ≤≥= :0infτ . We want to write this objective in a form that is suitable for explicit 
calculation, and then optimize the barrier by differentiating the resulting expression with 
respect to b. We first write (7) as 
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where we have used the fact P is assumed to be a strong Markov process. In order to 
economize the presentation, we define the following functions 
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 ( ) [ ]beEbPL P ρτ−=, .         (9c) 
 Here as before, L(P,b) is the Laplace transform of the first hitting time of P to the barrier b. 
Note, however, that although we use the same notation L(P,b) for the Laplace transform in the 
optimal investment problem and in the optimal abandonment problem, the hitting times are 
not the same and therefore the Laplace transforms in the two models are two different 
functions. 
Substituting the definitions (9a-c) into (8), we have 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )bWCWbPLCWPWbPV −+−= 00 ,; .     (10) 
This is a decomposition of the firm value into two terms. The component inside the first 
parentheses is the present value of the profit flow, given the current price, assuming that the 
firm is operated indefinitely. This term may be negative for sufficiently low P, and does not 
depend on b. The second component ( ) ( ) ( )( )bWCWbPL −0,  is the value of the option to 
terminate operations irreversibly. The present value factor ( )bPL ,  is always non-negative, so 
that for the option value to be positive, W(b) must be less than ( )CW0 . When P is a growing 
process, this already implies that the optimal b must be less than C. Optimal choice of b 
maximizes the option value and hence the firm value. The first-order condition for optimality 
of b in (10) is 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 0',,; 0 =+−= ∗∗∗∗∗ bWbPLCWbWbPLbPV bb .    (11) 
We define the elasticity of the Laplace transform L(P,b) with respect to b as in (3). Again, the 
elasticity only depends on b since similar reasoning as in Dixit et al. (1999) can be used to 
show that the elasticity must be independent on P. The first-order condition (11) now can be 
expressed as 
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which is closely analogous to the markup formula (4) of the optimal investment problem. 
Moreover, when W(b) is first-degree homogenous in b, as will be the case when P follows a 
geometric Brownian motion, we have ( ) ( )bbWbW '= , so that equation (12) becomes 
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. 
 This is like the markup formula (4) of the optimal investment problem, with the exception that 
the optimal stopping barrier for the value of the investment project ∗b , and the investment 
cost I, have been replaced by the expected present values ( )∗bW  and ( )CW0  of the price flow 
and the cost flow, as defined in (9a) and (9b). These expectations are conditional on the 
current value of the price level being at the optimal stopping barrier. Solving the previous 
equation in terms of ( )∗bW  gives 
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which is completely analogous to (5). 
There is one more form for the first-order condition that is very useful, in particular to 
show the analogy between the current problem where a single stopping decision is analyzed, 
and the more general problem in Section 5 where successive investments and abandonments 
are studied. Let us denote the present value of the undiscontinued profit flow as 
( ) ( ) ( )CWPWPW 0~ −= , and define its elasticity with respect to P as 
 ( ) ( )( )PW
PPWP PWP ~
~
~ =ε . 
Then we can write condition (12) as 
 ( ) ( )∗∗ = bb
bP LW
εε ~ .         (14) 
This states that the elasticity of the present value of the profit flow equals the elasticity of the 
discount factor, when both are evaluated at the optimal exit barrier. 
4  Explicit solutions 
Applying formula (12) is very straightforward if explicit expressions for the functions W(P), 
( )CW0 , and L(P,b) defined in (9a-c) can be found. We show this under two assumptions 
concerning the dynamics of P which yield well known closed form solutions to (9a-c). 
4.1 Geometric Brownian motion 
Let P satisfy the stochastic differential equation 
  PdBPdtdP σµ += , 
where B is a standard Brownian motion and µ and σ are positive parameters such that µ < ρ. 
Then explicit solutions to (9a-c) are (see e.g. Dixit, 1993) 
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ρ
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Here 2β  is the negative solution to the fundamental quadratic associated with geometric 
Brownian motion, 
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=−+− ρµβββσ . 
Substituting (15c) into formula (3) for the elasticity, we get 02 <= βε bL . Under geometric 
Brownian motion, the elasticity is constant as in the model of optimal investment. Moreover, 
since (15a) is first degree homogenous in P, we can utilize the markup formula (13) to 
determine the optimal abandonment barrier. Substituting in (15a), (15b), and 2β  for the 
elasticity, yields the optimal barrier 
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Since 2β  < 0 and ρ > µ, we have ∗b  < C. In the case of abandonment, the optimal barrier is 
below the cost rate, which is due to the option value of waiting. This is the same formula that 
could have been obtained based on dynamic programming methods. 
4.2  Arithmetic Brownian motion 
Now assume that P satisfies 
 dBdtdP σµ += , 
 where B is a standard Brownian motion and µ and σ are positive parameters. Then for the 
formulas (9a-c) we get 
 ( ) 2ρ
µ
ρ +=
PPW ,                 (16a) 
 ( )
ρ
CCW =0 ,                  (16b) 
 ( ) ( )( )bPbPL −= 2exp, λ ,                (16c) 
where λ2 is the negative root of the fundamental quadratic associated with arithmetic 
Brownian motion,  
 0
2
1 22
=−+ ρµλλσ . 
Substituting (16c) into (3), we get that ( ) bb
bL 2
λε = . Substituting this as well as (16a) and 
(16b) into (12), we get the optimal barrier 
 
σ
µ
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2
1Cb . 
Since λ2 is negative, the optimal abandonment barrier is less than the unit cost C. 
4.3  Geometric Brownian motion and concave profit function 
Equation (10) clearly shows that the objective function in our abandonment problem is 
composed of three components, which are the present value of the revenue flow, the present 
value of the cost flow, and the discount factor. These can be evaluated independently of each 
other. Therefore variations to the problem structure that perturb any of the three components 
can be accommodated by re-evaluating the affected component only. This is one of the 
benefits of the approach taken in this paper. As an example, let P follow geometric Brownian 
motion as in Section 4.1, but assume that the profit function in our problem is changed from 
Pt - C to CPt − . This profit function could result e.g. from a constant elasticity demand 
curve of the form ( ) 5.0−= PPD . A power function of geometric Brownian motion is still a 
geometric Brownian motion, so that the present value corresponding to (9a) but with Pt 
replaced by tP  is readily calculated, 
  ( )
2
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2
1
σµρ +−
=
PPW .        (17) 
On the other hand, neither the function ( )CW0  nor the Laplace transform L(P,b) will change. 
The optimal stopping barrier is then calculated through substituting (15b), (15c), and (17) into 
the markup formula (12). The optimal barrier is 
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while the breakeven price level, i.e. the price yielding zero instantaneous profit, is C2. 
5  A problem of investment and abandonment 
Both the optimal investment problem and the optimal abandonment problem analyzed in the 
previous sections are examples of one-off termination problems, where the choice variable of 
interest is a single stopping time. We demonstrate here that the direct approach applies also to 
regenerative problems with multiple (an infinite sequence of) stopping decisions, and that the 
first-order condition(s) still have interpretations in terms of elasticities of relevant economic 
quantities. 
The problem that we analyze here is a generalization of both the standard optimal 
investment problem and the optimal abandonment problem studied in the previous section. 
This problem has previously been analyzed based on dynamic programming methods by Dixit 
(1989) (see also Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, pp. 215-218). As before, P is a price that follows a 
time-homogenous diffusion process, C is a constant unit cost, and the firm has a technology 
that produces a single unit per unit time. The firm may begin to operate by incurring a fixed 
lump-sum investment cost I, and may cease to operate by incurring a lump-sum abandonment 
cost D. Once a firm has ceased to operate, it may begin to operate again by incurring the 
investment cost I. The value of the firm is the present value of profits less the present value of 
the costs of investment and abandonment. As a function of the abandonment barrier b1 and the 
investment barrier b2 (b1 is less than b2), the value of an idle firm, i.e. one that is not 
operating, is 
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where ,..., 21
11 bb ττ  are successive hitting times of the barrier b1, and similarly for the hitting 
times of b2. The hitting times are formally defined by 
 { }21 :0inf2 bPt tb ≥≥=τ , 
 { }1:inf 21 bPt tibib =>= ττ , i = 1, 2, ... , 
 { }21 :inf 12 bPt tibib =>= −ττ , i = 2, 3, ... . 
This is regenerative problem which starts anew at each stopping time. The firm value can be 
expressed in a concise form by taking advantage of this regenerative structure, as well as the 
strong Markov nature of the state variable. Let us define the functions 
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 ( ) ( )[ ]ibibeEbbU b 112121 , ττρ −− += .                 (19d) 
Here W(P) and ( )CW0  are exactly as in the previous problem, L(b1,b2) is the Laplace 
transform of the time interval it takes for the state variable P to first-hit b1, starting from b2, 
and U(b1,b2) is the Laplace transform of the time interval it takes for the state variable P to 
first-hit b2, starting from b1. Appendix A shows that, assuming that the firm is idle initially, 
the objective function (18) can be expressed with the help of (19a-d) as 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]DCWbWbbLICWbWbbV +−−−−= 012102212 ,, , 
so that the objective function (18) takes the form 
( ) ( ) ( )21221121 ,,;,; bbVbbPVbbPV = .       (20) 
Here V1 is the expected present value of a stream of 1’s received at times ,..., 21
22 bb ττ  , and is 
therefore a multiperiod discount factor. V2 is the expected value of the profit flow during the 
time interval it takes for the state variable P to first-hit b1, given that P starts at b2, added with 
the value of the lump-sum payments at b1 and b2. This is the value of one recurrent sequel in 
this regenerative problem, the sequels of which are ex ante identical probabilistically. The 
objective function then has a very natural interpretation as the multiperiod discount factor 
times the value of a typical sequel. This representation of the objective is entirely analogous 
to the representations (2) and (10), respectively, in the one-off stopping problems. Therefore it 
is clear that the first-order conditions will have similar look out as well. 
We write the first-order conditions to (20) in terms of the elasticities of the functions V1 
and V2 with respect to the barriers b1 and b2, 
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where the elasticities have been defined as 
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All elasticities are generally functions of both b1 and b2. In order to interpret the equations, 
remember that V1 is a multiperiod discount factor, and V2 is the value of a single sequel or 
turnaround in the regenerative problem. As the abandonment barrier b1 is increased, the 
expected length of a sequel is reduced, so that the multiperiod discount factor increases. 
 Raising b1 at the optimal pair (b1, b2) simultaneously reduces the value of a single turnaround, 
and at the optimum these two effects are balanced according to (21a). As the investment 
barrier b2 in increased, the expected length of a sequel is increased, and the multiperiod 
discount factor is therefore reduced. Raising b2 at the optimal pair (b1, b2) on the other hand 
increases the value of a single turnaround. At the optimum pair (b1, b2) the effects are 
balanced according to (21b). 
The first-order conditions (21a-b) are entirely analogous to the first-order condition (14) 
in the one-off abandonment problem. The essential difference between (14) and (21a-b) is that 
in (14) the discount factor is a single period one, whereas in (21a-b) the discount factor is the 
multiperiod discount factor V1. 
In order to obtain the value of the objective in closed form as a function of b1 and b2, it is 
sufficient to know (19a-d) in closed form. When P is a geometric Brownian motion, the 
expressions for W(P), ( )CW0 , and L(b1,b2) are as in (15a-c). For U(b1,b2) we have 
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where β1 is the positive solution to the fundamental quadratic associated with Geometric 
Brownian motion. We have therefore a closed form expression of the objective as a function 
of b1 and b2. The first-order conditions for b1 and b2 however are quite complicated and it 
does not appear to be possible to solve them for b1 and b2 in closed form. 
Dixit (1989) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) have analyzed this problem based on dynamic 
programming methods. They also obtained a system of first-order conditions which could not 
be solved explicitly for the barriers. As compared to our direct approach, the dynamic 
programming route resulted in a system of four equations in four variables (equations (12-15) 
in Dixit, 1989). The unknowns in these equations included the two barriers, as well as two 
unknown coefficients of the general solution to the HJB differential equation. In reference to 
the solution of Dixit (1989), the direct approach leads us directly into a situation where the 
unknown coefficients of the HJB equation have been solved in terms of the unknown barriers. 
Moreover, the first-order conditions in the direct approach do have clear economic 
interpretations as conditions equating marginal benefits with marginal costs, and have a 
 format which is familiar from e.g. classical producer theory. This is hardly the case with the 
first-order conditions (12-15) in Dixit (1989). 
Conclusions 
We have shown that the direct approach yields first-order conditions with markup 
interpretations in optimal stopping problems with flow payoffs as well as in regenerative 
problems. The markup conditions are necessary conditions for optima, while we have not 
discussed the sufficiency of these conditions. In our specific examples we have demonstrated 
that the solutions to the markup necessary conditions coincide with those obtained based on 
dynamic programming arguments. Sufficient conditions for optimal solutions in related 
problems can be found in the relevant mathematical literature, e.g. Alvarez (2001) and Brekke 
and Oksendal (1994). 
Interesting extensions of the techniques applied here are to problems where the state 
variable experiences jumps, such as the cash management model of Bar-Ilan et al. (2002). It 
appears that these problems are quite untractable using dynamic programming methods, but 
that renewal arguments can be of great value. In general, it appears that the dynamic 
programming approach has often been pursued in the economic literature in place of the more 
direct approach, even in cases where the direct approach would have been equally (or more) 
tractable and conceptually simpler. The models analyzed in this paper, as well as in Sodal 
(2002), are simple demonstrations of this. 
 
Appendix A. Derivation of a sum-of-geometric-series representation for formula (18) 
The objective function (18) is 
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The expectation of the first summation can be written as 
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By the strong Markov nature of the state variable, any of the flow integrals can be written as 
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            (A3) 
Taking expectations in (A2) term by term, substituting in (A3), and using the notation defined 
in (19a-d), (A1) becomes 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )






+−−−
+−−−
ΛCWbWbbLCWbWbbUbbL
CWbWbbLCWbW
bPU
0121022121
012102
2
,,,
,
, , 
which the term inside the outer parenthesis is an infinite geometric sum where the multiplier 
is ( ) ( )2121 ,, bbUbbL  and the initial term is ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )CWbWbbLCWbW 012102 , −−− . Hence 
the first summation in (A1) can be written as 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )CWbWbbLCWbWbbUbbL
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,
−−−
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
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
−
.            (A4) 
Entirely analogous steps yield the expressions 
 
( )
( ) ( ) IbbUbbL
bPU






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− 2121
2
,,1
,
,                 (A5) 
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( ) ( ) ( )DbbLbbUbbL
bPU
21
2121
2
,
,,1
,








−
,                (A6) 
for the second and the third summations in (A1). Summing (A4), (A5) and (A6) gives the 
representation found in the text.
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